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ABSTRACT
This study identifies and models the terms of contracts
between landlords and tenants in a rental market with price
controls where evasion is widespread. Previous work on rent
controlled housing markets has neglected certain important
features. Most models assume that controls are fully en-
forced, or characterize evasion as reductions in maintenance
or lump sum advance "key money" payments. Neither assumption
is appropriate for housing markets in developing countries,
where administrative resources for enforcement are in short
supply and capital markets are imperfect. Informal contracts
between landlords and tenants are feasible and common,
particularly between small scale, resident landlords and
their tenants and in informal sector housing.
Two models of a rental transaction with rent controls and
evasion are developed. In both, landlords and tenants enter
into informal contracts with a mutually agreed rent which
includes period by period side payments in addition to or
instead of lump sum key money payments. The first model is a
neoclassical one. Rental housing is supplied by a competitive
industry subject to price controls. Landlords set the mag-
nitude and form of side payments to maximize expected returns.
Imperfect capital markets facing both landlords and tenants
lead to price dispersion and a variety of coexisting forms of
side payments. In the second model landlords who supply
vacant rental units in exchange for side payments have
monopoly power, and exercise a degree of price discrimination,
seeking tenants able to pay key money or higher rents.
The two models are tested with data from a 1931 survey of
renter and owner-occupant households in Cairo, which has had
rent controls for over 30 years, but where extensive private
rental housing construction has continued. A joint discrete-
continuous choice model of key money payments was estimated.
Key money is most likely to be paid by higher income, more
educated household heads; resident owners and landlords in
informal areas are less likely to collect key money. The
continuous choice model explained about half the variation in
key money for recent movers. A hedonic model of rents ex-
plained rents for households which did not pay key money more
successfully than for households which paid key money. The
empirical results support the validity of the model of
imperfect competition between landlords.
Supervisor: William C. Wheaton
Title: Associate Professor of Economics and Urban Studies
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Rent Controls and Black Markets: an Introduction
This thesis investigates the structure of housing prices
and the supply and consumption of housing services in a market
where institutional arrangements between landlords and tenants
are highly regulated, and where a variety of informal
agreements have developed in response to the regulation. It
was stimulated by the apparently paradoxical nature of the
rental housing market in Cairo, where stringent price controls
have been in force for over thirty years, but this country
case study has implications relevant beyond the immediate
Egyptian context.
In major cities of developing countries, where the urban
housing stock is growing rapidly, the impact of rent controls
has been significantly different from that predicted by
theories developed for and appropriate to the U.S.A. or
Western Europe. We identify a number of aspects of the
housing market in Cairo which, we believe, are shared with
other developing countries, and which significantly affect the
practical impact of rent controls.
Under Cairo's rent controls even the newest units are
subject to controls, and yet production of new rental housing
has continued. The developed country paradigm of the impacts
9of rent controls leads us to expect that production of new
rental housing in such a market will cease, unless the rent
controls are ineffective. We expect the construction of
rental units to continue only if landlords can earn a "normal
return" in the long run.
Both theoretical models and empirical research on the
impacts of rent controls in developed countries predict
significant deterioration of the housing stock when rents are
controlled. Yet a recent study of the Cairo housing market
was able to report that "rent control does not appear to have
had a major effect on rates of new costruction" and
"maintenance of existing buildings appears in some respects
not to have been greatly affected by rent control" (Abt 1981a,
208). Thus when Cairo renters were asked in a 1981 survey
about changes in building condition since they moved in, they
reported "no change" (68 percent) or "improvement" (9 percent)
more frequently than "decline" (16 percent). About 12 percent
of buildings occupied by renters were reported to be "in bad
condition" or "about to collapse", compared with 15 percent of
owner-occupied buildings'.
In spite of the continuing decline of real rents,
construction of rental housing has continued in Cairo. In 1981
over fifty percent of renters lived in dwellings built after
1960. More than half, and perhaps as much as three fourths of
the new housing constructed in Cairo in the 1970's was in the
informal sector2 . Moreover, much of the new informal housing
was rented, even though the rent controls might have been
10
expected to diminish or even eliminate the incentives to build
new rental units.
The continued existence of new construction and the
stable condition of much of the existing stock of housing
suggests that either the rent controls do not "bite", or they
are not fully effective. That is, landlords are able to earn
at least a "normal return" because rental transactions involve
illegal side payments from tenant to landlord. Alternatively,
it may be that rental housing transactions in Cairo are so
idiosyncratic that it is not appropriate to model them as
"market" transactions, and that they are better viewed as a
set of relationships and continuing bargains involving a
multiplicity of incompletely monetized elements. Again,
rental transactions may be appropriately modelled as a market
but the effect of rent controls may be to create a persisting
disequilibrium in the market.
A number of important questions follow. Does the law
allow landlords an adequate return? If rents in Cairo are not
fixed by the rent control legislation, how are they deter-
mined? What form do side payments take? Is rental housing
traded in a competitive black market in which illegal side
payments bring supply and demand into equilibrium at a single
market price? Or is the black market price of each vacant
rental unit determined idiosyncratically, as the result of
bilateral bargaining between landlord and tenant? What effect
do the controls on rents have on renters' housing costs, and
on the incentives of landlords to provide rental housing?
11
This study sets out to identify and to model the informal
as well as the formal terms of the agreements entered into
(explicitly or implicitly) by landlords and tenants in Cairo,
focussing on the role of side payments and other forms of
evasion of rent control. A model of the housing market in
such a context which limits itself to formal, legal
institutional arrangements is not likely to be adequate to
portray what is really happening.
1.2 Rent Controls in Third World Housing Markets
We expect that our findings will contribute to our
understanding of rental housing markets in cities in
developing countries, many of which are characterized by rent
controls with evasion. Rent control laws are in force in
major cities in over fifty countries. Some form of
residential rent control is in force, for example, in India,
Hong Kong, Egypt, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Uruguay, Nigeria,
West Germany, France, Italy, the U.K., Canada, as well as the
U.S.A 3 .
Egypt is certainly not the only country experiencing
difficulty in enforcing its rent controls4 . Descriptions of
rent controlled housing markets have often noted the
prevalence of side payments, and the local term for them,
although the phenomenon is otherwise neglected. "Key money"
in Cairo is so-called because would-be tenants pay a lump sum
to landlords in order to get the key of a vacant apartment,
for example. "Shoe money" in Hong Kong is paid by landlords
12
to induce sitting tenants to put on their shoes and leave the
unit. "Turban money" is said to derive its name because
turbans are used by landlords in some parts of India to put
the side payments they receive from tenants. In England,
would-be tenants are asked to pay much more than the market
value ostensibly for the "furniture and fixtures" in a rent-
controlled apartment.
Even though empirical research interest in modelling
housing markets in developing countries has grown, stimulated
by the increased availability of micro (household) data,
little attention has been given to the impact of rent
controls, despite their prevalence. This neglect is all the
more surprising given the importance of the rental sector in
most large cities of developing countries, many of which have
some form of rent controls, and the potentially considerable
effects of controls on both the supply of housing and housing
consumption.
The neglect of rent control is consistent with a general
neglect of rental markets. Much of the recent empirical and
policy research on urban housing markets in developing
countries has focussed on owner-occupants and on the scope for
self-help, squatter settlement upgrading, and site and
services projects. The resources of individual low and middle
income owner-occupier households came to be seen as an
important and neglected source of domestic savings and
hitherto unused resources (self-help labor) which could be
mobilized to help deal with the housing problems of rapidly
13
growing cities in the developing countries.
The recent focus on owner-occupants is also a result of
the influence of John Turner's model5 which portrays the
desired housing consumption of new in-migrants to the city as
an almost inevitable progression. New in-migrants would
progress from temporary rented quarters in the central city,
for a period in their life-cycle when access to jobs and to
informal work opportunities has the highest priority, to
subsequent home-ownership in more remote squatter settlements
as the appeal of security and of housing as an asset as well
as a source of shelter came to predominate. Thus, in the late
1960's and 1970's it was usually assumed that owner-occupants
were the principal, if not the sole occupants of squatter or
informal settlements. That bias has recently begun to change.
In many countries the informal sector is now recognized
as an important source of rental as well as owner-occupied
housing. Rental income has come to be recognized as a
resource which allows low-income households to finance
construction of housing for themselves, and the construction
of rental units as an important vehicle for the savings of low
and middle income households.
A number of recent studies of housing markets in which
controls were in force have ignored them entirely: Ingram
(1984) estimates coefficients of housing demand for Colombia
and assumes implicitly that the rental market he treats is in
equilibrium, although rent controls were in force at that
time. In some contexts that may indeed be an appropriate
14
strategy. Strassman (1982) notes that the coexistence of rent
controls with vacancy decontrol and little or no protection
for tenants against eviction in Cartagena (Colombia) meant
that rents were at market levels, but that renters had very
high mobility rates because landlords had very powerful
incentives to change tenants frequently 6 . In contrast,
Malpezzi, Mayo and Gross (1985) use data from three cities
with rent controls in estimating models of housing demand in
developing countries, but note the existence of controls and
comment that:
The most striking result (in their comparisons of rents
with user costs for owners] is the extreme divergence of
Cairo from the pattern found elsewhere. The large
apparent difference in consumption is in part explained
by the existince of rent control in Cairo.(Malpezzi, Mayo
and Gross 1985, 53)
Elsewhere (Mayo, Malpezzi and Gross 1986) they note the
unsatisfactory state of our current knowledge of the effects
of different rent control regimes and the complexity of the
phenomenon.
While recent empirical work has largely neglected the
impacts of rent controls, an earlier generation of writers on
housing in developing countries recognized their prevalence
and questioned their efficacy and the equity of the resource
allocation which resulted. Charles Abrams (1964) noted that
rent controls exist "in one form or another in most
underdeveloped countries"(248). In Bolivia, he points out
"evasion of rent controls by both landlord and tenant have
become routine" and he cited South America, Israel and Greece
15
as countries where "key money tenure" has grown up.
Aaron is one of the very few writers to treat rent
controls in more depth. He supplies a description of the
terms of rent controls in Mexico city which in 1966 had been
in effect for about twenty years. He, too, recognizes the
importance of evasion, reporting that reductions in
maintenance in controlled buildings are common. Since in
Mexico city rent controls applied only to existing tenancies,
and not to housing constructed since 1948, rent controls have
established a dual real estate market. Side payments are paid
by landlords to induce residents to leave:
Tenancy in a rent-controlled property has become a
valuable capital asset approximately worth the present
discounted value of the difference between the controlled
and free market rent...occupants of rent controlled
properties do regard possession as a capital good and
they demand very substantial payments.. .as a condition
for vacating. (Aaron 1966, 318)
Aaron notes that buildings with controlled tenancies are
disproportionately located in the city center. He argues that
controls have impeded redevelopment and resulted in
inefficient land use. In contrast, Cheung (1975,1977)
documented the impacts of Hong Kong's rent ordinance and the
legal mechanisms by which they have been bypassed to permit
redevelopment of buildings with sitting tenants. Judicial
interpretations of the law have permitted property owners to
buy out the rights of rent controlled tenants (with "shoe
money"), thereby facilitating the redevelopment of central
sites to much higher densities.
The most detailed and analytical account of rent controls
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in a developing country deals with the case of Egypt. In it,
Wheaton (1981) describes the regulations, noting that
"incentives for new housing rapidly diminished", but:
Annual private housing construction has decreased only
moderately.. .this, of course, immediately suggests that
some form of cost recovery is occurring below the
surface. (Wheaton 1981, 248)
Wheaton was obliged to base his account of the Egyptian
rent controls on official (aggregate) statistics and casual
empiricism. Thus, for example, he argues that:
Egypt's particular rent control law makes it difficult to
charge a black market rent.. .tenancy laws.. .prevent
eviction as long as official controlled rents are paid.
Initial entrance is tantamount to ownership and so it is
entrance rather than continuing occupancy which becomes
priced in the black market... Since 1970 almost every
apartment changing hands has involved "key money" and
everyone treats such payments as a fact of life. (ibid.
248)
In contrast, our survey data will suggest that key money
has become far more frequent over time but that it still
changes hands in only a minority of tenancies. He points out
that with perfect capital markets key money should equal the
discounted value of the difference between controlled and
shadow rents, but that borrowing to pay key money is rarely
possible. Hence, he speculates that key money may be:
The idiosyncratic product of tenant-landlord
bargaining... Each participant tries to assess the
relevant probabilities and there is no assurance that the
prices which emerge are uniform.(ibid. 248-9)
At the same time, adopting official estimates of the scale of
informal housing in Cairo, he comments that:
Rent control is not vigorously enforced in such housing
as it is generally accepted by tenants that some
combination of rent and key money is necessary to cover
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costs.(ibid. 252)
As he notes, writing of the informal sector, "multi-unit
structures are normally built with the developer living in
one, or part of one unit, renting the remainder" (ibid.).
Informally made and enforced landlord-tenant contracts also
incorporate terms which assign the right (and obligation) to
maintain the unit to the tenant, whereas Wheaton expected
greater decay in the housing stock, since "the lump sum
character of key money provides no marginal incentive to
housing maintenance"(ibid. 249).
Gupta (1985) devotes a section of his lengthy description
of urban housing in India to the rent controls which were
introduced in the 1940's as ad hoc emergency wartime measures
and which, as in Egypt, cover new construction as well as
older dwellings. He notes that:
The existing empirical evidence does not indicate any
adverse effects of rent legislation in India. However,
this appears to be the result of circumventing the
provisions of these Acts... [Tihe operation of rent
control legislation has in many cases been bypassed, and
rents paid by tenants and realized by houseowners have
generally remained outside the purview of rent control
measures. (Gupta 1985, 161)
However, Gupta also notes that controls seem to have led
to reduced maintenance and deterioration of the older housing
stock (159) and that while the overall rate of housing
construction has not slackened, most construction has been for
upper and middle income groups, a fact he implies is perhaps
attributable to the rent controls' effects.
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Okpala (1981) provides further evidence of the prevalence
of rent control evasion. Writing about Nigeria, he points out
that:
Neither the landlords nor even a good many tenants or
prospective tenants pay much attention to the rent
control law. In the face of the acute housing situation,
the tenants - particularly those still looking for
accommodation - agree to pay the landlord's prices so as
to have shelter over their heads.(Okpala 1981, 715).
We will suggest that recent survey data show that this
kind of evasion of rent controls is far more common than
Wheaton suggested, and that it constitutes an important reason
for the continued construction of private rental housing.
1.3 Rental Contracts: The Scope for Evasion
The rights and obligations of owners and tenants can vary
widely. In some countries and cities, the rights conferred by
ownership are more or less absolute; elsewhere they are
severely curtailed by rent controls or landlord-tenant laws
which define in detail the allocation of rights conferred by
ownership and tenancy. Hence, the terms of the tenancy
agreements between landlords and tenants which define each
party's rights and obligations and specify the renter's
security of tenure, responsibility for maintenance of the
building and the dwelling unit, the owner's right to make
structural changes to the building, and the long term
flexibility of rents can differ greatly from place to place.
The scope for evasion and avoidance of rent controls will vary
correspondingly.
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In both developed and developing countries, landlord-
tenant relations are further defined by custom and by an
informal unwritten contract consisting of mutual expectations.
Such a contract is sometimes at variance with the strict
letter of the law, or of the written contract. Rent controls
modify the formal legal and institutional arrangements
defining the respective rights and obligations of owners and
renters. If rent controls "bite" (set rents different from
those which tenants and owners would negotiate freely) they
also provide an incentive to both owners and would-be renters
to enter into arrangements which evade or avoid the terms of
the price controls. Where rent controls are enforced, would-
be renters face long waiting times (while seeking housing) and
significant search costs; many will be willing to make side
payments to avoid those costs. The form of arrangements to
evade rent controls will depend heavily on the ability of
landlords and tenants to enforce illegal or informal
contracts, and on their expectations about the willingness of
each party to renege on such an agreement.
For example, previous theoretical models of rent control
evasion assume that side payments will take the form of a lump
sum transfer (key money) equal to the expected present value
of the difference between market and controlled rent. They
rule out period-by-period payments with the same present value
on the grounds that it is easy for a tenant once in occupancy
to renege on such a transaction:
[T]he gap cannot be filled with a period-by period side
20
payment... [O]nce in the dwelling unit, the tenant...
cannot be evicted without cause. Hence, once in the
unit, the tenant could cease to make the side payment and
only pay the official rent... the landlord has no legal
recourse to collect the side payments. Thus the landlord
would demand a "key money" payment... then the tenant
would have no opportunity to default. (Henderson 1985,
108)
In poor countries most housing market participants have
relatively little wealth or access to capital markets. That
suggests that when key money changes hands, it will be smaller
than previous formal models have suggested, and that tenants
have an incentive to offer informally enforceable side payment
contracts incorporating higher rent payments (rent premiums)
instead.
In any market where price controls "bite", setting an
arbitrary price for the good, the amount of the good demanded
is likely to be incompatible with the amount supplied, so that
the market is in disequilibrium. Most recent empirical
studies of the housing market have adopted the premise that
the market adjusts quickly to equilibrium in the short run as
households move to attain an equilibrium quantity of housing
and mix of attributes and amenities from their dwelling. Yet
this notion of perfect arbitrage is only appropriate if search
and transactions costs are negligible. The transaction costs
associated with moving are potentially so large that they may
cause households to choose to endure disequilibrium for long
periods of time, postponing adjustments in housing expenditure
to changes in family status and income and thus violating the
equilibrium assumption7 .
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If rent controls are enforced, and hence demand exceeds
supply at the ruling price, search times rise and transaction
costs are greatly increased as some trades take place at the
controlled price and other would-be renters find themselves
thwarted. Sitting tenants choose not to move, even though
their housing consumption is not optimal. If the rent
controls are less than fully enforced, then their impact on
market equilibrium will depend on the terms of contracts
between landlords and tenants and the form of side payments.
When tenants can sell their occupancy rights the prices of
tenancies may be able to adjust so that the market is
reasonably close to equilibrium. If, on the other hand,
sitting tenants have paid a lump sum for occupancy rights in
advance but cannot sell those rights either to the owner or
another tenant, then any disequilibrium is likely to persist.
If side payments take the form of period to period rent
premiums, then the impact on market equilibrium will depend on
whether those payments are fixed for the duration of a tenancy
or can vary with market conditions.
1.4 Outline of the Study
Chapter 2 sets the background for the study with a brief
description of Egypt and of urban housing in Cairo and the
context of Egyptian housing policy. The provisions of the
rent control laws and their administration are described in
some detail as a necessary preliminary to our subsequent
consideration of the impacts of evasion and avoidance on the
22
housing market.
Chapter 3 presents evidence that evasion of rent controls
is indeed widespread in Cairo. We review a number of studies
of housing markets, primarily in developing countries, which
suggest that informal contractual agreements between
individual landlords and their tenants are both feasible and
widely found. The viability of such informal contracts
depends on such characteristics of landlords as the scale of
their holdings and whether they are resident. Examining the
characteristics of owners and renters in Cairo, we find that
they are strikingly similar in many respects, and suggest that
that has made the development and enforcement of informal
contracts possible. In the final section of chapter 3 we set
out to identify the specific characteristics of rental
contracts (formal and informal) in Cairo, and the scope for
enforcement of contracts incorporating illegal side payments.
Chapter 4 reviews economic models of rent controls,
focussing on their treatment of evasion and side payments.
Two models of rental markets with controls and evasion are
then proposed. In both we assume that capital markets are
imperfect (so renters cannot borrow to pay key money) but
informal contracts for period-to-period payment of illegally
high rents are enforceable. Side payments take the form of
key money or higher rents. We first outline a neoclassical
market in which rental housing is supplied by a competitive
industry, subject to price controls. Landlords set the
magnitude and form of side payments to maximize expected
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returns. We consider the impact of imperfect capital markets
and identify factors likely to lead to price dispersion. We
then propose an alternative model of imperfect competition
between landlords which may better portray the observed
characteristics of the Cairo market.
In any housing market, the inherent heterogeneity of
housing as a commodity and the relatively high costs of moving
and search give the owner of a vacant unit a limited degree of
monopoly power. In the Cairo market, because arbitrage is not
feasible (tenants have secure tere, but units once rented
are not tradeable), and because capital market imperfections
limit new construction, the supply of vacant units in the
market at any given moment will be inelastic. As a result,
landlords willing to supply vacant rental units in exchange
for side payments have substantial monopoly power. In the
second model of chapter 4, rents and side payments are
determined by bilateral bargaining between the landlord and
the would-be tenant, in the course of which landlords exercise
a degree of price discrimination. Both uncertain penalties
for evasion and capital market constraints influence the
bargaining strategy of market participants.
In chapter 5 we estimate a hedonic model of housing
values in Cairo, using owners' and renters' estimates of the
sales value of their dwellings. The results obtained strongly
support the view that owners and renters in Cairo share a
common perception of the "market value" of housing in the
city. That suggests that we can plausibly assume that both
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landlords and tenants are informed participants in a "market"
for rental housing, even if the outcome of individual
transactions reflects a multiplicity of idiosyncratic factors.
Estimates of the value of rented units based on the hedonic
model are then used in the following chapters to test our
hypotheses about the role of rents and key money in evasion of
rent controls in Cairo.
In chapters 6 and 7, we use data from the Cairo household
survey to test hypotheses about the magnitude and incidence of
side payments derived from the two models outlined in Chapter
4. In a competitive market in which slack in the system of
enforcement allows landlords to collect side payments, we
expect to find a tradeoff between rent and key money. That
is, renters all pay the same black market price, but may pay
in either form. We also expect that discounted ratio of rent
and key money will give a normal rate of return. In an
imperfectly competitive market, characterized by monopoly
power, landlords use their monopoly power to pursue a policy
of price discrimination, and price dispersion is associated
with idosyncratic characteristics of tenants and landlords.
As a result, renters who pay key money may also pay higher
rents. In chapter 6 we report the results of estimating
econometric models of key money and in chapter 7 we model
determinants of rents. Chapter 8 concludes, summarizing our
findings and suggesting policy implications and directions for
future research.
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Footnotes
1 The survey was carried out by Abt Associates, Dames and
Moore and the General Organization for Housing Planning and
Building Research of the Arab Republic of Egypt. It is
described in appendix 1 and in Abt 1982a.
2 Built on land reserved for agriculture, or built without
building permits, and in contravention of official subdivision
regulations. See Abt 1981a.
3 See Gupta 1985, Cheung 1975, Wheaton 1981, Aaron 1966,
Collier 1976, Strassman 1982, Okpala 1981, Hallett 1977,
Pearsall 1984, Angotti 1977, Harloe 1985, Thibodeau 1981, and
Smith and Tomlinson 1981 for descriptions of the controls in
effect in these countries.
4 Such problems are also not limited to less developed
countries. Writing of the post-war controls, de Jouvenel
(1948) asserts that key money of $500 to $1500 per room
changed hands in Paris for rent controlled apartments with
rents of 10% of the market level; Friedman and Stigler (1946)
quote figures for key money in the United States. Both
articles are reprinted in Frazer Institute 1975.
5 See Turner 1977 for a full account of this model of the
functions of self-help housing.
6 Vacancy decontrol: rent controls fix the price of rental
housing for sitting tenants, but landlords may set market
rents for vacant units.
7 See Venti and Wise 1984, Dynarski 1985, and Anas and Eum
1984.
Chapter 2
Egypt: Background for the Study
2.1 Introduction
This study uses data from a recent (1981) survey of
households in Cairo to analyze its rental housing market and
the impacts of price controls on it'. Since the empirical
analysis is based on Egyptian data, this chapter provides a
summary description of the Egyptian context and the
institutional background for readers who are unfamiliar with
it. The second section of the chapter then provides a more
impressionistic picture of housing in Cairo, and the final
section summarizes the provisions of the successive rent
control laws by which price controls have been imposed in
Egypt since 1952. Egypt is a particularly appropriate place
to study the long term impacts of rent controls in a
developing country setting. The rent controls in Cairo have
been in place for over thirty years, long enough for long run
effects to have become identifiable.
2.2 Data
The empirical analysis in this study is based principally
on data from a household survey carried out in 1981 by Abt
Associates with Dames and Moore, the Egyptian General
Organization for Housing Building and Planning Research, and
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the Egyptian statistical agency, the Central Agency for
Planning, Mobilization and Statistics. It was directed by
Stephen Mayo as part of a recent study of informal housing in
Cairo funded by the U.S Agency for International Development.
The household survey consisted of detailed interviews with the
heads of a random sample of 500 households in both the formal
and informal sectors in Cairo; the survey and sampling method
are described in detail in appendix 2 and in Abt 1982a2 . The
survey is referred to below as the Informal Housing Study
Household Interview Survey. The Informal Housing Study also
carried out extensive open-ended interviews focussed primarily
but not exclusively on the informal sector and on small-scale
builders and contractors. In chapter 3, we made extensive use
of transcripts of those interviews. The references to
interviews are coded to refer to the interview transcripts
(Abt 1982b), and are quoted at some length, because the source
is otherwise inaccessible.
2.3 Egypt
Egypt is a large country: its population of thirty-nine
million in 1980 made it the second largest country in Africa
and the largest in the Middle East (excluding Turkey). With a
per capita Gross National Product of U.S. $580 in the same
year, it was grouped by the World Bank among the "middle
income" developing countries. In the 1970's Egypt, which is
largely self-sufficient in petroleum products, though not a
major oil exporter, experienced a period of rapid growth,
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during which real GNP per capita grew at 8.3 percent per year
(1973-84)3. Early in the oil price boom, Egypt became a
major exporter of both white collar and construction labor to
the Arab countries. At the same time its population growth
was, at an annual rate of two percent, low compared to the
rest of Africa and the Middle East.
Egypt is still a largely agricultural country in which
more than half the population live in rural areas (56 percent,
according to the 1976 Census), although agriculture had become
by 1984 the source of only 20 percent of the country's Gross
Domestic Product, compared with almost 30 percent in 1965.
Both the rural and urban areas of the country are densely
populated. Egypt has been described as an oasis surrounded by
desert. The arable land is 3.6 percent of the total of just
over one million square kilometers, along the banks of the
Nile River and in the Nile Delta; the rest of the country is
desert. The urban areas have grown rapidly since the 1952
revolution. Greater Cairo is by far the largest city in Egypt
and the largest city in Africa and the Middle East. Its
population, estimated at 7.5 million in 1976, was projected to
grow to over 11 million by 19854.
The city has grown to that size from a population of 2.6
million in 19475. The second largest city is Alexandria (1.2
million in 1976) and sixteen other cities have a population of
one hundred thousand or more.
The most striking feature of Egypt's geography is the
concentration of virtually all its population on three percent
29
of its land: over 95 percent live in the highly fertile strip
bordering the Nile and in the Nile Delta and Suez canal cities
in the North. The climate is hot and dry and elsewhere
settlement is constrained by lack of water. The rest of the
country's land area is desert and is virtually unpopulated.
As a result, population density is high even in rural areas:
in the settled areas densities exceed 1000 persons per km 2 .
The combination of the hot dry climate and water from the
Nile, together with fertilization from Nile silt during floods
until the Aswan Dam was built, have enabled farmers for
thousands of years to grow up to three crops per year on land
in the Delta and the Nile valley.
Egyptian cities are traditionally densely built.
Nevertheless, urban growth has resulted in continuing
encroachment of the country's growing cities on adjacent farm
land. The resulting loss of irreplaceable agricultural land
has come to be perceived as a major policy problem.
Urbanization and planning policies have emphasized attempts to
direct urban growth into the infertile desert lands and to
inhibit urbanization on agricultural land, using a combination
of regulations, incentives and subsidies. These policies,
which have included new town development, new planning and
building regulations, and subsidized provision of serviced
desert land, have proved both costly and limited in their
effectiveness. Cairo and the country's other urban
settlements have continued to grow outwards on agricultural
land. We will argue that the existence of rent controls has
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created further inducements to informal, uncontrolled urban
growth on land where ground water is available, usually
agricultural land.
Two sets of policy objectives, both of which have been
central to the government's programs since 1952, have affected
the urban housing market in Egypt. The high priority given to
industrialization in the early five-year plans led the
government to choose policies which would keep industrial
costs down. Measures were therefore introduced to keep wages
low by controlling the cost of living, fixing prices of
necessities at low levels, including foodstuffs, heating and
cooking fuels, utilities, and urban transportation and
housing.
The second set of policies was distributional in intent.
In rural areas the government adopted a succession of land
reform measures. The urban rent controls imposed in 1952 were
introduced both as a measure to stabilize and control urban
housing costs and as an urban parallel to the rural land
reforms6 . Subsequent legislated rent reductions constituted
a redistribution of resources from urban landlords to their
tenants; they were intended to protect poorer renter
households7 .
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2.4 Housing in Cairo
2.4.1 Rents
The legal rent levels which were the outcome of the rent
control laws passed between 1944 and 1981 are shown in table
2.1. The rents shown in the last column were still effective
in 1981. No across-the-board upward adjustments in rents were
allowed after 1952, in spite of inflation. Individual
adjustments have rarely been approved, although they are
intended to reflect the cost of major repairs and improvements
carried out by the property owner.
The decline in real rents cane seen from a comparison
of table 2.1 (which summarizes the regulations defining legal
rents) and table 2.3 (which shows the official construction
costs on which legal rents were based) with table 2.2, which
shows the movement of construction costs and of the Consumer
Price Index in the same period. Between 1952 and 1981, the
CPI rose approximately 3.7 times. In 1981, the legal rent for
units constructed between 1944 and 1952 was set at 68 percent
of the market rent for those units when they were first
occupied. That is equivalent to a rent in 1981 of about 20
percent in real terms of what it was when the tenancy started.
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Table 2.1
Rent Control Provisions in Egypt 1941-81
Age of Building
(Date Built )
Initial Controlled Reductions 1981 Legal
Rent Granted Rent
Before 1944 Actual rent in
1945; 10-14%
increases in 1947
depending on
initial rent
None 100% of 1947
1944-1952
1952-58
1958-61
1962-65
1965-77
1977-81
Market rent
Market rent
Market rent
8% of official
construction cost
+ 5% of land cost
8% of official
construction cost
+ 5% of land cost
10% of official
construction cost
+ 7% of land cost
15% in 1952
20% in 1965
20% in 1958
20% in 1965
20% in 1961
20% in 1965
68% of 1944-52
64% of 1952-58
64% of 1958-61
35% in 1965 65% of
none
none
1962-65
100% of 1965-77
100% of 1977-81
1981- 7% of actual
construction cost
+ 7% of land cost
Sources:
Joint Housing Teams 1977: Law No. 121 of 1947; Law No. 199 of
1952; Law No. 55 of 1958; Law no. 168 of 1961; Law No. 46 of
1962; Law No. 7 of 1965; Law No. 52 of 1969; Housing Law of
1977; Housing Law of 1981. Joint Land Policy Team 1977. Abt
1982a
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Table 2.2
Consumer Prices and Construction Prices
Consumer Index of Construction Construction
Price Building Material Labor
Index Materials Cost Index Cost Index
(1967=100) (1967=100) (1967=100) (1967=100)
1950 75.2
1951 81.6
1952 81.0
1953 75.7
1954 72.6
1955 72.4 77.7
1956 74.2
1957 77.2
1958 77.2
1959 77.5
1960 77.7 85.8
1961 78.3 87.4 66.2 46.1
1962 76.0 88.1 68.5 59.9
1963 76.5 85.9 73.7 73.7
1964 79.3 92.8 80.5 85.7
1965 91.0 97.5 82.8 90.8
1966 99.2 100.4 90.9 96.3
1967 100 100 100 100
1968 102.2 105.6 102.0 101.8
1969 103.9 106.2 104.0 104.1
1970 106.3 109.6 107.8 110.6
1971 113.6 110.6 111.0 119.3
1972 116.3 112.8 117.9 129.0
1973 119.4 124.6 180.8 193.5
1974 130.8 144.1 183.4 201.4
1975 148.9
1976 164.2
1977 185.1
1978 205.6
1979 226.0
1980 272.7
1981 301.2
1982 345.8
Sources Consumer Price Index:See appendix 2.
Wholesale Price Index:CAPMAS. Series for 1952-70 with base
1939=100 and for 1967/8-1972/3 with 1965/66=100 converted to
base 1967=100 for comparability with the CPI (Joint Housing
Teams 1976, table 1-19.)
Construction Material and Labor Cost Indices: Ministry of
Housing and Reconstruction. Series with base 1961=100
converted to base 1967=100 for comparability with the CPI
(Joint Housing Teams 1976, table VI-6).
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Table 2.3
Official Construction Prices and Official Monthly Rents
Year Official Construction Prices Offici
(LE/M2 ) (LE per
Low Middle Upper Low
Cost Income Income Cost
1960-65 6- 8 8-10 10-12 1- 5
1965-70 8-10 10-12 12-16 6-10
1970-76 8-12 12-16 16-20 6- 9
n.a. : Not available.
Source: Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction
Teams 1975, table IV-3)
al Rents
month)
Middle
Income
5-10
12-16
11-16
(Joint Housing
One by-product of the rent controls is a significant
distortion in the official cost of living index. The urban
cost of living index produced by the Central Agency for Public
Mobilization and Statistics reflects official housing prices
for occupied, rented dwellings. The cost of housing to new
entranta to the housing market, owners or renters, is not
included. Thus., while first examination of the aggregate
tabulation of the CPI shows an increase in "housing" prices
from 100 in 1966/7 to 114.1 in 1981, closer review of the
detailed tables published by CAPMAS shows that the increase is
due to increases in the categories fuel and electricity, and
in prices of cleaning materials.
The rent index, 100 in 1966/7, stood at 102.0 in 1981.
The only remaining puzzle is the source of the 2 percent rise
in housing prices. The magnitude of the statistical illusion
Upper
Income
n.a.
n.a.
26-32
-A
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is indicated by the movement of construction costs in the same
period. The official aggregate index of construction material
prices, for example, rose from 100 in 1965/6 to 250.3 in 1978
(See table 2.2). A large segment of the Egyptian construction
labor force migrated to the Arab countries in the 1970's,
resulting in an increase in construction labor costs which was
at least as large as the increase in construction material
prices. For new owners and for new renters, housing prices
rose substantially in the 1970's.
The initial rents paid (when they moved in) by renters
who remained in the same unit until 1981 are shown in table
2.4. Rents are shown both in current and constant (1981)
Egyptian Pounds. Between 1951 and 1965, the median Cairo
rents for new movers fell substantially in real terms, while
remaining nominally stable. The median rent paid by renters
(remaining in the same unit until 1981) who moved in 1951-55
was LE 3.87, corresponding to LE 30.42 in 1981 prices. In
1956-61 the median fell to LE 2.5 (equivalent to LE 20.22 in
1981 prices). By 1961-65 the median had risen in nominal
terms, to LE 4.30 but fallen in real terms to the equivalent
of LE 16.09 in 1981 prices, or just over half the median rent
paid by movers ten years earlier. Between 1965 and 1981,
median rents rose slowly in nominal terms, remaining roughly
stable in constant (1981) pounds. The median (in 1981 prices)
was LE 12.59 in 1965-70 and LE 11.31 in 1975-81.
The discrepancy in housing prices between those current
on the market today and those paid by long-standing tenants
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(table 2.4) is striking. In one respect, the rent control law
seems to be respected by most landlords and tenants: rents,
once contracted, remain fixed in nominal terms for the
duration of the tenant's stay in the unit. The median rent
paid by tenants who moved in 1971-3 was LE 5.00, equivalent to
LE 11.72 in 1981 prices. They are still paying a median rent
of LE 5.00 per month. Yet households who moved in 1981 paid a
median rent of LE 10.25 per month, or twice as much. As a
result, Cairo tenants stay a long time in their dwellings.
The median length of stay of renters surveyed was 13 years.
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Table 2.4
Rents in Cairo, 1951 - 1981
Date of
Move
79-81 36
77-79 20
75-77 35
73-75 26
71-73 28
66-71 49
61-66 58
56-61 46
51-56 16
Before 1951 16
Total 330
Movers Rent
Mean
10.9
6.1
10.6
7.9
8.5
4.8
17.6
13.9
4.8
4.8
100.0
Median
Current LE
(1981 LE)
15.28 10.25
(15.47) (11.31)
20.93 8.00
(24.41) (11.32)
7.94 7.00
(16.14) (12.34)
8.03 6.00
(18.11) (12.81)
7.59 5.00
(19.45) (11.32)
6.77 5.00
(22.99) (12.59)
6.13 4.30
(26.14) (16.09)
5.52 3.50
(38.85) (20.22)
5.47 3.87
(41.94) (30.42)
6.11 2.85
(n.a.) { n.a.)
Source: Computed from Informal Housing Study Household
Interview Survey data.
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2.4.2 Residential Cairo: A Description
Housing in Cairo ranges from luxurious villas and small
apartment houses with gardens in Maadi, a garden suburb in the
South, to converted chicken coops on the roofs of existing
slum tenements and graves in the "City of the Dead", the
cemeteries to the South-East of the city.
Upper and middle income housing in Cairo for the most
part consists of apartments, either rented or condominiums, in
buildings constructed as apartment houses, at any time from
the 1930's to the present day. Buildings over three or four
floors high are usually equipped with elevators. Inside, such
middle and upper-middle class apartments are typically of
moderate size by European standards. They are usually, but
not always, built by the "formal sector", housing constructed
with building permits and perhaps bank credits, which supplies
only a fraction of the housing demand in Cairo.
The visitor is struck repeatedly by the contrast between
the high level of maintenance of private spaces inside the
apartments and that of common areas, which are often in
disrepair, needing paint and sometimes cleaning as well.
Newcomers to the city become accustomed to the sight of the
entrances to older as well as new buildings, partly blocked by
construction materials which the landlord is using for
vertical extension of the building, or to complete units which
were not finished when the first units were let.
The bulk of new housing in Egypt is informal housing.
The Informal Housing Study estimated that between 1966 and
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1981 over four-fifths of new housing in Cairo and nine-tenths
of new rural housing was "informal". In Egypt, informal
housing is housing built illegally, either because it
contravenes zoning laws (particularly the laws forbidding
residential construction on agricultural land) or because it
does not conform to building codes.
Dar es-Salaam is an example of a recently developed
informal area on the periphery of Cairo. Fifteen or twenty
years ago, four- fifths of the area was agricultural or
vacant; now it is all subdivided, and much of it is built up,
though on the periphery of the informal settlement there are
still house lots interspersed with cultivated plots. The
former agricultural plots support buildings at various stages
of completion, some skeletal structures, many partly finished
with one or two floors occupied and reinforcing iron extending
from the top floor awaiting the addition of further floors.
Some structures are concrete frame construction; others are
brick or mud brick, one or two storey structures resembling
village houses. Construction work is under way on many
buildings. Vertical expansion as floors are added to existing
buildings is a seen all over Cairo, in formal areas as well as
informal, middle class as well as low income. In informal
areas owners frequently build as they have resources available
to pay for construction materials and labor, starting with the
concrete frame and the first floor and adding others later.
The Informal Housing Study estimated that the number of floors
per building in the areas they sampled in Cairo increased from
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2.09 in 1976 to 2.45 in 1981. The number of dwelling units
per building increased from an average of 3.3 to 3.84 over the
same period.
The roads are narrow, often too narrow for a car to pass,
and all but the main roads are unpaved. Some dwellings near
the main road have piped water; elsewhere in the settlement
the owners drive a well to obtain ground water supplies when
they build, and build a tank under the road in front of the
house to collect waste water and sewage. These tanks
initially empty into the ground; later when solid matter has
collected they have to be emptied by private entrepreneurs who
cart it away. Virtually all the buildings have public
electricity supplies. Solid waste is dumped on vacant lots,
and rarely if ever taken away.
The completed buildings are up to five storeys high,
walk-ups, with one or two apartments per floor; on the main
roads they may have shops on the ground level. About 80
percent of owners live in the building they own (CAPMAS 1976).
Other units in their buildings may be rented, occupied by the
owner's married sons and daughters, or occasionally kept
vacant, either as a speculation or to accommodate the owner's
offspring when they marry.
Uni Wikan has provided a vivid picture of life in a poor
quarter of Giza, one built up earlier in this century, neither
recent informal housing nor one of the historical slums of
mediaeval Cairo:
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The district is divided into main streets and back
streets (shariya and hara). The main streets are the
official traffic routes, and the only parts of the area
of which the better-off inhabitants of Cairo, or
foreigners, may ever catch a glimpse as they pass through
the district.. .The main streets are "a nice area" to the
really poor, compared to their own back streets. They
are at least three times wider... and far cleaner, with
larger houses and far better maintained facades...The
[back] streets are like alleys, often no more than 2.5 or
3 meters wide. They are floating in refuse and filth,
often stinking so badly that the stench hits you as you
turn round a street corner... .Along both sides there are
houses standing wall to wall from 5-6 to 9-10 per block.
They are built of brick, and are mostly three storeys
high with two flats per floor, but some have four storeys
and some have only one flat per floor. The same front
door and stairs are used by all the people living in one
house; that is between twenty five and forty adults and
children. Most houses are also back to back with others
which have their front doors facing the next parallel
little street. In most cases, there is no backyard to
separate the two rows of houses, but in some places there
may be a shaft about 1.5 metres square where the drains
from the lavatories are. This is then used as a chicken
or pigeon yard by the people living on the ground
floor...
The size and standard of the flats vary. On some of the
rooftops there are temporary wooden shacks, put up to
serve as accommodation for the poorest of the poor.
Other people have only an earth-floored basement room at
their disposal, often without a window and share sink and
lavatory with others in the entrance hall. Both these
arrangements are called "rooms"(oda] by the poor, whereas
a flat [shaqqa] consists of at least two rooms... .All
flats have running cold water, none have hot water. The
kitchen is usually a tiny nook with a bench, pots and
tubs, and one or two gas rings. It is always next door
to the lavatory... The lavatory itself is a room of about
one metre square with a hole in the floor for waste, a
water tap and a shower on the wall. (Wikan 1980, 17-20)
Physically, the poor areas of Cairo resemble each other
in their density even when they were built at different
periods. Bulaq is an area which was first built up in the
14th century, when as a relatively new island formed by shifts
in the Nile, it was opened as a place for the wealthy to build
their winter homes. From the 15th to the 19th centuries Bulaq
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was the major port for the Greater Cairo area; Mohammed Ali
transformed the area into an industrial center, much of which
was built up in the nineteenth century. Andrea Rugh describes
the area:
Unpaved streets of hard packed earth, too narrow for any
vehicles except small delivery trucks, wind in maze-like
profusion throughout the area, allowing access only by
foot in most places. The oldest houses are solidly built
with stone foundations and walls; their potential
weakenss is found in the ancient wood-lined ceilings and
less durable stairways. They are generally from two to
four stories tall, rarely more, reflecting a time when
many were spacious single-family dwellings. Recent
construction, filling in the gaps between the more
sturdily built sructures, is frequently of less expensive
and less durable sun-dried or kiln-dried brick or, more
recently still, concrete block construction. Population
increases... have stimulated yet another kind of structure
that frosts the rooftops of Bulaq, small shacks banged
together from bits and pieces of wood or flattened oil
cans scavenged from various sources and decked with tin
roofs...Spatially the houses are joined in the pattern of
row houses, opposing rows separated only by a few meters
of space so that shade is conveniently cast during most
of the day in the tradition of medieval Middle Eastern
cities. Shops fill the downstairs quarters of residences
in the main thoroughfares...
The range of living accommodation in Bulaq varies from at
one extreme, a pleasant multi-room apartment to, at the
other, a place beneath a stairwell, a former chicken coop
or an old oven opened up to make a "room". In general
the tendency is towards one or two room dwellings.. .The
basic floor plan of a residential building consists, on
the ground floor of an entrance hallway and about four
rooms opening off it. A stairwell leads upward to one,
two or perhaps more similarly oriented floors above. The
final level is a flat roof which, when not built upon, is
used as a general activity area for the tenants' laundry,
poultry, vegetable prepar-ation, etc. Toilets.. .are
generally located under stairwells or at a landing.
There may be anywhere from one to four toilets per
building, but rarely more than one per floor.. .When
running water is found in a house it is usually in a
centrally placed hallway where all the inhabitants can
have access to it.(Rugh 1979,7-9;13-14)
Sawsan al-Messiri describes housing in an even older and
denser part of Cairo, the center of the Medieval city:
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Medieval Cairene quarters have been divided into
districts (harat).. Some of these harat are small dead
ends and lanes with backyards in which children play and
women meet and chat. In the past the buildings of each
small lane usually belonged to and were occupied by only
one family. But now there are a number of families in
each house, some of the larger flats being divided into
three or four apartments with each apartment being shared
by two or three families. The division within the
apartment is sometimes only a wooden partition.(El-
Messiri 1978, 58)
Nawal al-Messiri Nadim gives a picture of life in one
such harah, in Darb al-Ahmar:
Only thirty-eight of the 117 families have no other
relatives living in the harah; ... some have as many as
twelve related families... .Forty percent of the families
in the harah live in one-room lodging units, some of
which include as many as seven members, while forty-one
percent occupy two rooms. More than half of the lodging
units share a latrine with other units. Approximately
sixty-one percent of the units do not have water taps and
depend on buying water tin by tin from others.. .The alley
is... considered by its residents a private domain.. .a
large number of household activities which in other parts
of Cairo, or even during different historic stages of the
harah, would be restricted to the physical setting of the
dwelling, may take place in the harah passage. The
passage is used for socializing with neighbors, playing
games, raising poultry, cleaning household utensils as
well as washing the laundry... .A resident of the harah
calls his home, matrah, which literally means place. A
house is never described as having a bedroom, a dining
room, and so on, but is always described as having one,
two or three matareh. This classification is an
indication of the lack of differentiation of the use of
space within the lodging unit. Few restrictions are
placed on the type of activity which can occur in a
particular area within the lodging unit itself. Any part
of the unit may be used for sleeping, cooking, eating or
cleaning oneself... .Few lodgings have an area set aside
for cooking or a separate kitchen area. Where such a
facility exists it is used only for cooking, but the
preparation of the food to be cooked takes place either
in any of the rooms, or sometimes in the passage.(Nadim
1978)
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2.5 Egypt's Rent Control: Institutional Background
Rent controls in Egypt have a long history. They were
first imposed in 1920 to counter inflation following the First
World War. A martial law decree promulgated for one-year
periods in 1920 and 1921 and enacted as law by the People's
Assembly in 1922 remained in force until 1924. The measure
limited the rent for unfurnished apartments and houses to 150
percent of the rent in August 19148. Again in 1944, a
military regulation set rents back to their level as of May
1941, and this was subsequently incorporated into Law 121 of
1947, which exempted buildings completed before 1944.
In 1952, after the Revolution, Law no. 199 reduced rents
in buildings built from 1944 to September 1952. A series of
laws was passed in the 1950's and 1960's, each of which
retroactively reduced rents in buildings completed since the
previous legislation by 15 to 20 percent (see table 2.1). Law
no. 7 of 1965 reduced rents in all buildings completed after
1944 by a further 20 percent.
The rent control laws now in force in Egypt initially
froze rents for existing units at their 1952 levels, while
leaving the rents of newly constructed units to be determined
by the market. In response to the distribution of rents for
equivalent housing which emerged as rents in new construction
remained uncontrolled, in the 1950's and early 1960's the
government rolled back rents for newly constructed units by up
to 36 percent. It subsequently attempted to set rents for new
construction so as to just cover the original cost of each
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unit. Since 1962, legal rents have been set by the rent
control decrees as a percentage of the official land and
construction cost of the building.
Official construction costs are set by decree of the
Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction. They are based on the
"official" price of construction materials, which are in
limited supply from regulated outlets and available only to
housing built with building permits and on land zoned for
housing - for formal sector housing, in other words. Between
1970 and 1977, a period during which the official Consumer
Price Index rose by 67 percent, the official construction
costs were not revised. The result was a widening discrepancy
between official prices and the actual cost of construction.
Revisions to the law in 1977 brought official costs close to
actual construction costs, but inflation subsequently made
these costs, too, unrealistic. A revised Rent Control Law
introduced in 1981 attempted to remedy some of the
shortcomings of previous legislation. It proposed to deal
with the discrepancy between official and actual construction
costs by setting up committees to report annually in each
governorate on land values and actual building costs.
2.5.1 Institutions and Procedures
The rent control law is administered by committees set up
by decree of the Governor. Each town or village, or in the
urban governorates each district (kism) of the governorate,
has its own committee. Its members are two engineers (the
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senior engineer is chairman ex officio), one official
responsible for building taxes, two members of the Arab
Socialist Union and one representative of property owners.
Decisions can be made by a quorum of three members, including
the tax official and one engineer. These committees are
responsible for the final determination of legal rents for all
new dwellings (except those exempt by law from rent controls),
and for hearing any requests for modification of legal rents
to take account of costs of repairs or improvements made by
landlords.
The first stage in setting the legal rent level for each
new rental unit is taken when the owner requests planning
permission for construction of the building. When permission
is granted, the planning authority also makes an initial
determination of the legal rents, on the basis of information
on building and land costs provided by the landlord.
Landlords must specify the dimensions of each rental unit and
a proposed rent for each. Planning approval is legally
required for all new construction and additions to existing
buildings. The planning authority permit approving
construction sets a rental value for the building based on
official construction costs, and apportions it among units.
The landlord is required to notify prospective tenants of
these provisional legal rents. After the building is
completed, the owner (and, if the unit is occupied, the
tenant) must notify the rent control board within 30 days.
The local rent control committee is then responsible for:
47
Checking the works and verifying their conformity to the
initial specifications and ensuring that they have the
approval of the committee of coordination and orientation
of constructions and that the building had a construction
permit. (Law no 52 of 1969, Article 9).
It then sets the final legal rent, subject to appeal to the
courts by either landlord or tenant.
The committee setting the rents is supposed to pro-rate
the cost of infrastructure, land and foundations at official
prices on the basis of the maximum density of development
which is permitted on the lot. This proviso is intended to
provide a strong incentive to landowners to build to the full
legally permitted density from the start. However, it
penalizes poorer, informal sector landowners and builders who
have limited access to capital and instead build floor by
floor as funds for construction become available, adding one
story at a time to their buildings. The actual initial cost
of land and of water and sewer connections per unit will be
almost twice as much if only four (say) units are built on a
lot on which up to eight or ten are permitted.
The rule penalizes those who build with materials bought
in the black market because they do not have the permits
necessary for access to official building materials. A
further disincentive to progressive builders (those who add
one floor at a time) is a proviso which prohibits reassessment
of the land when extra units are added less than five years
after the original construction date. New units' legal rent
is based on land values at the time of the original
construction, and not on its current official or market value.
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The linking of planning permissions and rent control is
intended to facilitate the administration of both laws. In
practice it seems to operate as a further disincentive to seek
planning permission in informal housing areas. Even the
tenants in buildings built without permits are less likely to
resort to the rent control committee to determine rents, when
the legal penalty for official notification potentially
includes demolition of the building either because it was put
up without planning permission, or because it is sited on
illegally subdivided land.
2.5.2 Security of Tenure in Rent Controlled Units
The law provides a high degree of security of tenure for
renters. They can be evicted only for persistent non-payment
of rent, or when a building has been certified by the courts
to be in imminent danger of collapse. In the latter case,
however, the court also has the option of prescribing repairs
to be executed by "an authority designated by the Ministry of
Housing", at the landlord's expense. If an occupied building
is demolished, then evicted tenants retain the right to occupy
an apartment in any new building erected on the site.
This security of tenure extends not only to the tenant,
but also to the tenant's spouse, children, parents and
relatives "up to the third degree" who have lived in the unit
for at least one year (or the length of the tenancy if that is
less). Renters, unlike landlords, can evict the occupants of
their apartments: an Egyptian citizen who goes abroad is
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entitled to sublet his rented apartment (furnished or
unfurnished) while abroad, and to evict the sub-tenant at
three months' notice. While the unit is sublet, the owner is
entitled only to "a supplement equal to 70 percent of the
legal rent, for the duration of the subtenancy", while the
rent of the unit, if it is let furnished, is unrestricted.
The original tenant is free to charge a market price.
The 1981 Housing Law, after providing that tenants may
transfer occupancy of their unit to a successor, provides that
the lump sum or key money paid in such a case be shared
between the owner and the original tenant, giving the owner
the option of regaining the use of the unit :
In cases where it is legal to... transfer the use of a
residential unit to others, the original owner is
entitled to half the amount charged for the sale or the
transfer of the tenancy rights... the owner... has the
right to ... purchase or regain the use of the premises by
paying the amount minus the 50 percent he is entitled to
as owner. (Article 21, Housing Law of 1981).
This clause gives tenants more rights than owners.
Tenants can now legally collect the capital value of their
tenancy rights if they move, whereas landlords are still
legally prohibited from collecting key money when a tenant
moves in to a new unit. The only new right gained
correspondingly by landlords is the right to collect up to two
years' rent in advance, provided that the unit is complete
except for finishing, and provided that the rental advance is
repaid to the tenant as rent abatements over the first four
years of the tenancy.
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2.5.3 Maintenance and Operating Expenses
Under the law of 1977 and earlier laws, repairs and
maintenance were legally the responsibility of the owner.
Three percent of the total allowed return of 8 percent on
capital construction costs was designated to "amortization
for capital, expenses of repairs, of maintenance and of
administration" (Article 10). A clause providing that "if the
obligation of the landlord becomes onerous or incompatible
with the product of the rents" then a court order can divide
the cost of maintenance among the owner and tenants, or order
that work be done by a public agency at the landlord's
expense.
2.5.4 Taxes on Property
Urban property is subject to a tax on annual rental
value, levied on all occupied buildings. The tax base is the
value of structures, excluding land, and the annual rental
value is set at 10 percent of official construction costs 9 .
Tenants pay the tax assessed on their unit to the landlord,
and revenues are collected by the government from the
landlord. Revenues from the tax are small, however: not only
because it is based on official values of property, but also
because it is abated for units with low rental value. Since
1968 no tax has been collected for units with rents per room
of LE 5 or less (estimated in 1977 to include 30 percent of
the housing stock). In 1977 the exemption from the tax was
extended to all units renting for LE 8 per room or less.
51
However, various supplementary taxes are assessed on top of
the basic tax: national defense and national security taxes,
street cleaning dues, and a municipal fee. Not all these
taxes are abated with the basic real estate tax. The
effective tax on rental values thus ranges from 6.5 percent of
annual rental value, for dwellings with a monthly rent of LE 3
per room or less, to 63.3 percent on units with a rental
value over LE 10 per room.
2.6 Rent Control: Patterns of Evasion and Avoidance
The following chapters discuss the scope and extent of
evasion and avoidance of the rent control laws in considerably
more detail. This section summarizes the main routes adopted
by landlords and tenants in the Cairo housing market, when
they choose to evade (illegally) or to avoid the law.
2.6.1 Avoidance
An important route for legal avoidance of the law until
1976 was the construction of multi-unit buildings for sale
rather than for rent. Condominiums were exempt from the law.
However, as more and more builders chose this strategy, the
government attempted to limit it by restricting builders to
the sale of only 10 percent of the units in a building (or one
unit in small buildings). Similarly, the 1981 law restricts
sales of units to a maximum of 1/3 of the total. One loophole
which remains, however, is that it remained legal to sell a
bulding to a cooperative or partnership made up of the
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potential buyers. Of the Cairo owners surveyed, about 25
percent reported that they owned only their dwelling (as
opposed to the whole building) and 14 percent that they owned
the dwelling and part of the building; taken together, these
figures indicate that a considerable number of units have been
sold in multi-unit buildings.
The second route for avoidance was the rental of
furnished apartments, whether by landlords directly or as
sublets by tenants paying their landlords the legal rent and
renting their unit furnished. Furnished rents were initially
not subject to controls. Until 1981, the law allowed
landlords to rent one unit in each building as furnished.
Since 1981, the law permits a maximum of one third of the
total space in a multi-unit structure to be sold or rented
furnished. This is one attempt to limit avoidance of the law
in formal sector housing: in large multi-unit buildings in
Cairo, all the apartments would be either let furnished (often
to foreigners) or sold off as condominiums. Both strategems
were mainly restricted to middle and upper class areas and
relevant only to the formal housing market.
The furnishings are in so-called "furnished" units are
often token. It is reported that landlords in "luxury"
housing often provide only a few pieces of furniture and then
call the unit furnished. The rents for furnished units are
very much higher than the rents for corresponding unfurnished
units, but their numbers are small. One estimate suggests
that it affected at most 19 000 units (between 1 and 2 percent
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of all rented units in Cairo) in 197710. The 1981 household
survey data suggest that even that figure may be an
overestimate: its interviewers classified 0.44 percent of all
occupied rented units as furnished apartments, while 1.7
percent of renters reported that their unit was rented
furnished.
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2.6.2 Evasion
The provisions in the law which link notification of the
rent control authority with granting of planning permission
may provide an added incentive to prospective builders to
carry out construction without attempting to obtain the
necessary permits. For informal builders, there were other,
more important, reasons not to register the transaction. Many
rental agreements between landlords and tenants in the
informal housing areas are governed by informal contracts
rather than by the letter of the law. In such areas, many
rents are set by mutual agreement between landlord and tenant.
The nature and enforceability of such agreements is discussed
further in chapter 3, below. Empirical evidence of the
magnitude and prevalence of such rent premiums is presented in
chapter 7.
Key money, or advance payment of rent, has been the form
of evasion which has attracted the most attention. Key money
is a lump sum, which may be equal to any amount up to the
present value of the difference between the shadow rent of the
dwelling and its legal rent for the expected duration of the
tenancy. Its magnitude, like rent premiums, is subject to
bilateral bargaining between landlord and tenant.
The rent control laws have consistently prescribed heavy
penalties for key money transactions, including imprisonment
and fines of double the amount of key money paid. Only
landlords are subject to penalties. Nevertheless the
provisions have proved difficult to enforce. The 1981 Housing
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Law legalized the payment of advances of up to 2 years' rent
by prospective tenants of units in new buildings, requiring
that they be repaid by corresponding reductions in rent over a
period of up to four years. However, by requiring that the
building lack only "finish work" when the landlord receives
the advance, the Housing Law proviso ignores the capital
market constraints facing small landlords and builders, which
implicitly justify the payment of key money or advance rent in
the eyes of both landlords and tenants. Without key money or
advance, the unit cannot be completed.
The salient characteristic of evasion of rent controls in
Cairo is that the controls on rents are commonly evaded but
that tenants once in place pay fixed rent. The part of the
law which gives tenants secure tenure is enforced for most
tenants most of the time. Landlord-tenant contracts
incorporate an agreement that rents are fixed in nominal terms
even when housing values and rents have been subject to
substantial price inflation. Tenants commonly do some or all
of the maintenance, although legally it is the landlord's
responsibility. Landlords cannot evict tenants nor can
tenants easily trade the units they occupy. So, the point at
which evasion of the law takes place is the initial landlord-
tenant agreement on how much rent and key money will be paid.
How does the "legal" rent enter into that contract? The
tenant usually will not know what the "legal" rent for the
unit is, and the landlord may not know either. The owner of a
newly built formal or informal unit has no incentive to call
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on the authorities to assess it. On the other hand, the
formula for assessing legal rents is publicly available (in
principle at least), so both sides in the negotiation can
estimate the legal rent for the unit.
2.7 The Credit Market and Housing in Egypt
Developed country models of rent controls incorporate
explicitly or implicitly the assumption that organized
financial markets exist and that landlords and tenants have
access to them. The landlord, in deciding whether or not to
construct one or more rental units, is assumed to use a cost
of capital which reflects the return he can earn on his own
capital in alternative uses, or the (known) rate at which he
can borrow to finance construction.
In reality, households in Egypt, as in most developing
countries, have little access to commercial credit and only
limited access to formal intermediaries between wealthholders
and borrowers. For example, in Egypt, the total credit
granted by commercial banks to the household sector in 1980
was LE 114 million, compared with household sector deposits
with commercial banks of LE 2426 million in the same year'.
This section sets out some information about the credit market
in Egypt, to support our contention in later chapters that the
assumptions of perfect credit markets made by previous models
of rent controls are highly inappropriate for a developing
country setting12.
Securities markets and consumer credit are virtually
57
absent in Egypt, as in most developing countries. Bank credit
is mainly used for business loans. Conventional financial
institutions are not active in lending for housing, and in
particular they almost never lend for low-income housing
construction or purchase13 . At the same time, unorganized
money markets do exist. In particular, a number of households
interviewed reported that they used rotating credit
associations (gamiya) to assemble money for down payments for
land, or for key money14.
Private individuals can hold their wealth as money (cash
or bank deposits), they can buy assets which they expect will
retain or increase in value (gold, jewelry, land), or they can
acquire direct claims on firms by lending on the unofficial
money market.
In the unofficial money market, interest rates for
borrowers are generally high in relation to those in organized
money markets. Loans are usually unsecured beyond the verbal
promise of the borrower to repay the lender. Lenders are
professional moneylenders, or, for housing, more commonly
relatives or friends of the borrower, or merchants extending
credit. There are wide interest differentials for similar
loans, but not for similar loans to similar borrowers. Unlike
banks in developed countries, which may operate credit
rationing because they are unable to charge different interest
rates to customers for similar loans, the moneylender in the
unofficial money market can take into account his information
about the borrower and his likelihood of default in setting
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the interest rate he charges.
What rates of return could an individual wealthholder
earn with alternative assets in Egypt in recent years? Gold
jewelry is the traditional form in which women hold their
wealth; during the decade 1971-81, the price of gold on world
markets jumped, so that the implicit return on gold acquired
in 1971 and held till 1981 was 31.8% in LE terms. But the
return on holding gold is of course only the result of
increases in its asset value, and over other periods it was
much less. An annual rate of 1.6% in the decade 1951-61, an
annual rate of 5% in the decade 1961-71, or an average of
11.6% for gold held from 1951-1981, to give some examples.
In 1981, certificates of deposit in commercial banks paid
lenders 12% on LE deposits and 19% on deposits in foreign
currency (U.S. dollars). However, that reflected an attempt
to attract the savings of Egyptian migrant workers abroad, or
of their dependents in Egypt; earlier in the 1970's banks paid
only 5 to 6 percent interest on savings deposits (less than
the then-current inflation rate). Moreover, bank interest was
subject to a 40% withholding tax, thus reducing its net return
to lenders in comparison with other assets which are de jure
or de facto untaxed.
The price of urban land in Egypt rose rapidly in the
1970's, reflecting urban growth and the demand for land as an
asset from Egyptian migrant workers in Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf countries. This led both to increases in the cost of
housing and to an increased flow of funds invested in housing
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by households who saw their perceptions of its desirability as
an asset confirmed and expected that land values would
continue to rise. Okpala's comment on Nigeria seems apposite
here: he points out an important reason for continuing
investment in rental property in the face of controls, which
could apply as well to Cairo as to Lagos:
In the short run, rent control can achieve some reduction
in rent... and ..it may be some time before the flight of
capital from the housing industry can become noticeable.
This could be all the more likely in a society like
Nigeria's today where real estate investment is one of
the most secure and durable investments - and fairly
profitable too. Alternative investment avenues that
could be as secure as real property are very limited
indeed. In such a situation, it can be suggested that
rent controls may not noticeably affect investments in
new rental construction (Okpala 1985, 714-5).
Egyptian newspapers from time to time carry stories about
buildings which collapse because of poor maintenance by their
landlords15 . However, buildings in Cairo have collapsed more
often because floors were added (illegally) above the existing
structure when the foundations and structure were inadequate
to support them, than because of poor maintenance. The
phenomenon can be plausibly interpreted as an indication of
the attractiveness of even risky real estate investments in
Cairo, as in Nigeria, in the absence of alternative secure
investment outlets.
The assumption often made in economic models of perfect
capital markets is particularly inappropriate in modelling
housing markets in developing countries. Both landlords
(seeking financing to build rental units) and tenants (faced
with a demand for key money) are unlikely to be able to borrow
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freely against their future earnings. The result is to create
ample scope for bilateral bargaining between a landlord
seeking funds to complete a rentable unit and a would-be
tenant with some liquid assets, or between a landlord who has
invested liquid assets in housing as the most secure
investment and a would-be tenant with a high expected income
flow and no liquid assets.
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Footnotes
1 See appendix 1 for a detailed description of the survey.
2 An additional 250 households in Beni Suef were interviewed
during the survey, using the same questionnaire; the results
of those interviews are not analyzed here.
3 The source for these figures is the World Bank, World
Development Report 1983 and 1986.
4 Population and projection for Greater Cairo (Cairo
Governorate and adjacent urbanized parts of Giza and Kalyubeya
Governorates). Projections prepared by the Central Agency for
Public Mobilization and Statistics for Cairo Entrances Study
Group, January 1976.
5 See Abu-Lughod 1971.
6 Dekmejian writes,for example that apart from agrarian
reform in 1952 and "such modestly welfare-statist measures as
rent control, progressive taxation and anti-corruption laws,
no basic reshaping of the domestic economic order was
attempted in the early years of military rule" (Dekmejian
1971, 123).
7 Dekmejian 1971, 162.
8 Republique Arabe Unie, Annuaire Statistique de l'Egypte,
1922-23Ministere des Finances, Departement de la Statistique
Generale, Imprimerie Nationale, Cairo, 1924, Chapitre XI:
Prix.
9 One source notes that the tax base also includes 10 percent
of land value. (Joint Housing Team for Finance 1977).
10 Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction data cited in Joint
Land Policy Team (1977, 58).
11 Central Bank of Egypt, Economic Review Cairo, 1981.
12 See, for example, van Wijnbergen 1983.
13 See The Urban Edge May 1983.
14 See Nadim 1978 for a fuller description of the gamiya
system.
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in The New York Times in an article on Cairo, reported
"about 9,000 buildings in just two districts are considered on
the verge of collapse" and illustrated it with a picture of a
collapsed building: "when this building fell over a year ago,
more than 16 Egyptians were killed". New York Times February
16, 1986.
Chapter 3
Formal and Informal Contracts Between Landlords and Tenants
3.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the scope for and viability of
"informal contracts" between landlords and tenants in Cairo.
These are contracts which set rents which are determined by
the market and are inconsistent with the rent control
legislation. They need to insure the landlords against
enforcement of the rent control law, and to enable them to
earn an adequate rate of return from their rental units. We
argue that some landlords and tenants can and do enter into
such stable, mutually acceptable "informal contracts" which
make it worth while for landlords to build rental property in
spite of the low rate of return set by rent controls. The
contracts must provide tenants with sufficient incentives to
refrain from reneging on the agreement by evoking official
enforcement of the law, not only before they obtain access to
the rented unit, but also after they move in. Is there any
evidence that such contracts have developed in other rental
housing markets? We review the literature on rental contracts
in developed and developing countries, and find evidence that
tenancies based on informal contracts are both viable and very
common, not only in Egypt but also in the rest of the world.
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What is the likely content of these contracts and the
form such an agreement might take? Why would landlords and
tenants adopt such contracts instead of exchanging key money
payments? The following section (3.3) sets out to define the
conditions which such informal contracts must meet.
Informal (and illegal) contracts of this kind have
hitherto been neglected by economists studying rent controls
on the grounds that they are not enforceable and hence not
viable. The studies reviewed in sections 3.2 and 3.3 suggest
that small scale and resident landlords and their tenants are
more likely to be able and willing to make such agreements.
The more alike landlords and tenants are, the more likely they
are to make such agreements. Section 3.4 therefore examines
the characteristics of landlords, owner-occupiers, and renters
in the Cairo housing market.
The last part of the chapter looks at the terms of
informal contracts in Cairo. We provide evidence from
analysis of the Informal Housing Study household survey that
the rent control laws in Cairo are indeed widely evaded, and
describe the mechanisms by which the evasion occurs. Some
tenants make lump sum advance payments to landlords for the
right to move in, but the magnitude and frequency of key money
payments reported by renters is not enough to compensate
landlords for the difference between market and rent
controlled rents. Many tenants pay rents to their landlords
which are higher than the controls permit, and make sometimes
substantial expenditures to maintain and improve their units.
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3.2 Rental Contracts in the Housing Market
Krohn and his colleagues (1977) documented the importance
of informal agreements between small scale landlords and their
tenants in rental housing in Montreal, Canada. The study
found a dichotomy between the "local-amateur" landlords who
dealt with their tenants through such informal contracts, and
the large landlords who were part of the "national-
professional economy". They argue that:
[local-amateur] landlords are not motivated by high
returns and, unlike... the national-professional economy,
these small owners are able to offer low-rent housing in
older, low-unit buildings... (Krohn et. al. 1977, 1)
In the Montreal neighborhoods they studied, rental
housing was subject to rent controls, but the study found that
they were insignificant in landlord-tenant relations within
the "local-amateur" sector. They found that:
[T]he patterns of landlord-tenant negotiations and the
enforcement of responsibilities represent multifaceted
socio-economic relationships. Owners, especially
resident owners, and tenants have complex motives.. .The
specific terms of a written or even a verbal rental
contract are important only when a third party is
available to enforce them. In rental housing exchange
relationships, agreements are self-enforced. The small
owners and their tenants rely on their personal skills
and bargaining powers during crises, even when the
offenses of one or both parties are clear. Community
norms and volunteer third party enforcement are also
often missing, and the legal system seldom plays any role
in this relationship...Because housing rentals involve
both economic and social benefits, one can be converted
to the other... In the housing relationship conversion
often takes the form of an exchange of labour for reduced
rent or social favours. Frequently a landlord's friends
and relatives repay social obligatins with labour and
time... In a common landlord-tenant exchange relationship,
tenants find friends to fill vacancies. The landlord has
the assurance of renting to a reliable tenant, and in
return may refrain from raising the helpful tenant's rent
(ibid., 4).
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Krohn et. al. contrast the "local-amateur" housing sector
with the "national-professional" economy which :
Is legally instituted in real property and contractual
law, and is conducted by economic sophisticates seeking
financial gain through bargained contracts.. .in a
... context of legal protection and enforcement of
contracts, and administrative regulation
More recently, Guasch and Marshall (1985), analyzing the
Philadelphia rental market, found marked differences between
the market for units in structures with four units or less,
and that for the (usually smaller) units in larger buildings.
Small buildings had lower vacancy frequencies, occupants who
tended to have longer duration of stay, and lower rents for a
given unit size.
The Cairo housing market can usefully be modelled with a
similar conceptual dichotomy. Rental housing continues to be
built and rented out by small landlords and in informal sector
housing in return for payments which are a combination of key
money paid in advance and rents higher than the notional
controlled rents. In contrast, in the "formal-professional"
sector, evasion or avoidance of the rent controls is more
likely to take forms which protect the landlord formally
against opportunistic behavior on the part of the tenant, such
as key money payments or rental as furnished units. Individual
landlords are more likely to be in the informal sector but not
restricted to it. They may prefer contracts with key money
but are constrained by their tenants' lack of capital or
access to a capital market willing to lend for key money
payments. Individual landlords and particularly those in the
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informal sector may have to accept lower rates of return on
their housing capital because they have access to only a
limited range of alternative investments.
In the recent literature on housing in developing
countries, few studies have looked at the rental sector beyond
the economic determinants of tenure choice (owning versus
renting), and the factors influencing landlord-tenant
relations received attention mainly in the context of studies
attempting to place low income landlords in the context of
Marxian or Weberian models of social classes'.
Within the limited literature which deals with the rental
sector in the cities of developing countries, and with
landlord-tenant relations in such contexts, however, we found
evidence that at least in peripheral, informal or squatter
settlements, rental contracts which ignore or are inconsistent
with the requirements of the relevant housing laws are
commonly found2 . Moreover, such agreements are viable where
landlords are usually resident and have relatively small
holdings of rental units. In Colombia, for example, Edwards
found that in Bucamanga landlords are mainly owner-occupiers
letting rooms in their own houses; the rest rarely own more
that two or three properties. He notes that:
Under Colombian law every renter and landlord must sign a
contract... and have it registered with a recognized
renting agency... This contract sets out the terms of the
tenancy and, in theory, protects the rights of both
tenant and landlord. In fact, only a minority of low-
income tenants have contracts and even fewer registered
contracts: among roomers only 5 per cent have contracts
and among renters of unifamily dwellings 50 percent...
Although most arrangements between landlords and tenants
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are illegal, rents are paid at regular intervals and are
set by the market rate (Edwards 1982b, 148-9).
These observations are in striking contrast to the
tenement rental sector which has grown up in Nairobi's shanty
towns. There, (Amis 1984) large scale landlords have come to
dominate the rental market in the unauthorized settlements,
replacing the initial small-scale local rental sector in which
the original squatters built and rented out additional rooms.
In Kibera, the unauthorized settlement which Amis
studied, by 1980 only 10 percent of the rental stock was owned
by landlords who rented out 7 rooms or less, while 25 percent
of the rental units were owned by the 6 percent of landlords
who owned 30 units or more. The great majority of large
landlords were not resident in the buildings they owned: for
example, only 22 per cent of landlords who owned 20 units or
more were resident landlords, living on site with their
tenants, while an additional 14 per cent lived elsewhere in
the settlement (ibid. 91-2).
Landlords in Kibera could earn exceedingly high rates of
return on their investment: Amis estimates a return of 131 per
cent in the first year on the cost of constructing a 10-room
structure, and cites another study which estimated a first-
year return of 171 per cent. Relations between landlords and
tenants also appear to be very different from those in the
"amateur landlord sector" described in the other studies:
Within commercialized settlements landlord and tenant
relations are generally hostile... the rent levels are not
subject to legal controls but their upward movement is
constrained by what tenants can afford to pay..in May
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1980 when the minimum wage was raised and despite
explicit Presidential warnings to the contrary the rent
level also immediately increased... [L]andlord-tenant
relations are centered around the monthly rent payment,
the ultimate sanctions for which are physical violence
and immediate eviction. Examples of both are fairly
common, and horror stories of such behavior abound.
However, there is also some variation in landlords'
behavior towards their tenants' problems which range from
sympathy to total insensitivity. There seems to be no
systematic explanation for this variation, e.g. large
landlords are not consistently tougher (Amis 1984, 93).
3.3 Contracts: Formal and Informal,Complete and Incomplete
When a landlord and tenant make a rental agreement, the
bilateral contract between them does not and cannot specify
fully all the possible contingencies and their consequences.
Indeed, as Krohn points out, tenancy agreements in Montreal
neighborhoods often specified only the amount of the rent and
the duration of the agreement. By its nature, such an
agreement offers scope for "opportunistic behavior" as
Williamson (1979) has called it. Opportunistic behavior takes
advantage of unspecified or unenforceable elements of the
contractual relationship. For example, the landlord may not
provide adequate heat or hot water, or may neglect repairs and
maintenance. The tenant may hold frequent noisy parties, let
his children draw on the walls, damage the furniture or leave
without paying rent.
A rental contract which incorporates a rent higher than
that legally permitted by rent controls is on the face of it a
transaction in which the renters, if they act as the wealth-
maximizing transactors assumed by economic theory, would seem
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to have both the ability and the incentive to renege on the
transaction, taking advantage of the unenforceable elements of
the contractual relationship. A tenant can refuse to pay more
than the controlled rent, reneging on a previous agreement to
pay a higher price and relying on the rent control law for
secure tenure of the unit. A tenant who has paid key money
can resort to a third party (the rent control committee or the
courts) to recuperate the sum paid to the landlord.
Most actual contractual arangements incorporate both
explicit and implicit enforcement mechanisms. Some elements
of performance of both parties are specified and enforced by
third-party sanctions. The residual elements are enforced
without invoking the power of an outside party to the
transaction, but merely by the threat or invoking the threat
of termination of the transactional relationship. A number of
recent papers have looked at the characteristics of such
implicit sanctions in more detail3 . In other contractual
contexts, the solution to a problem of opportunistic behavior
has been found to lie in more or less formalized components of
the contract which minimize the incentive for or the ease of
contract violation by either party.
Economists looking at rent controlled tenancies and the
scope for evasion on the part of landlords have usually
hypothesized that lump sum payments would be the principal
mechanism involved, and sought for evidence of key money
payments large enough to provide the landlord with a market
rate of return. Key money paid by the tenant to the landlord
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is one solution to the problem of opportunistic behavior on
the part of rent controlled tenants. The tenant who has paid
key money equal to the difference between the monthly market
value of his dwelling and the legal rent, and is paying no
more than the legal rent, can engage in opportunistic behavior
only by denouncing his landlord to the rent control
authorities for taking key money. However illegal, such a one-
time transaction is inherently difficult to prove.
The rewards for transactions often take non-monetary as
well as monetary (or monetizable) forms. The purely economic
model of contractual arrangements is most appropriate for one-
time, arms-length transactions which take place in a
marketplace in which there is little or no direct contact
between the buyer and the seller. Rental housing
transactions, are inherently of long duration, and
particularly when the landlord is resident or acts as his own
estate manager, it lies near the personal extreme of the
spectrum of transactions from personal to impersonal.
In all housing markets, relations between landlord and
tenant typically involve many details regulated by implicit
unwritten contracts, and enforced by the parties to the
transaction rather than through third-party intervention
(lawyers, or the courts, for instance). Maintenance and
repairs, for example, are often undertaken even by a tenant
who is not bound to do so by the written rental contract.
Even in the relatively impersonal North American city,
landlord and tenant are often able to reach mutually
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acceptable agreements on improvements to the property and the
corresponding rent increases to be charged. Sitting tenants
provide services to their landlords by introducing new,
reliable tenants for vacant units, thus reducing the cost of
turnover to the landlord. It is not coincidental that tenants
of resident landlords are consistently found to pay lower
rents and have significantly longer stays than tenants in
large buildings and with non-resident landlords. Tables 3.1
and 3.2 summarize actions open to landlord and tenant to
maintain or end a tenancy in a controlled and uncontrolled
housing market respectively.
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Table 3.1
Landlords and Tenants: Actions to Maintain or End a Tenancy
in an Uncontrolled Housing Market
Landlord Tenant
To Maintain a Tenancy
Maintain or repair the
unit to a high level
Make improvements at the
tenant's behest
Perform non-housing services
for the tenant
Offer a tenure discount to good
tenants
Wait for delayed rent payments
Take care of the unit
(repair, maintain it)
Make improvements to the unit
Perform services for
the landlord
To End a Tenancy
(If tenant has no lease):Evict (If no lease) Move out
(If tenant has a lease):Refuse (If lease) Move at end
to renew lease of lease
Evict (for cause) before end Move before end of
of the lease lease, with or without
Raise rent (immediately or compensating the landlord
when lease expires) to
unacceptably high level
for sitting tenant
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Table 3.2
Landlords and Tenants; Actions to Maintain or End a Tenancy
in a Rent-Controlled Housing Market
Landlords Tenants
To Maintain a Tenancy
Maintain and repair to a high
level
Offer tenure discount(from
the shadow or controlled rent)
Be willing to wait for rent
Maintain, repair, and improve
the unit
Perform non-housing
services for the landlord
Rely on third-party
enforcement of security of
tenure granted by rent control
control legislation.
In a small community the
cost may be difficulty in
finding another rental unit.
(Landlords avoid renting to
tenants known to use the law)
if legal protection fails
To End a Tenancy
Evict (legally) with guile
using clauses in Rent Control
legislation which permit e.g.
redevelopment or occupancy by
family members
Evict illegally,
by force
Harass tenant, to induce
him to move "voluntarily"
Move -- cost is not only
direct cost of moving but also
also the discounted present
value of the difference
between current rent and spot
market rents &/or the search
cost to find another
controlled unit
75
Landlord-tenant relations are highly complex and the
scope for conflict is large; yet the transactions cost of
appealing to the courts for third-party enforcement is usually
perceived by both parties as so high that resort to legal
enforcement of rental contracts is notably rare. In tightly-
knit communities, the immediate community may serve as a
further, less costly source of implicit sanctions, inhibiting
behavior on the part of tenants, or tenant harassment by
landlords, at least when that behavior imposes external costs
on neighbors as well.
The landlord has access to a range of actions in order to
end the rental contract. He can evict the tenant, raise the
rent to a level unacceptable to the tenant, or harass him in
an attempt to induce him to move voluntarily. The tenant can
end the contract by moving. The cost of moving to the tenant
includes the cost of searching for a new dwelling and the cost
of moving physically to that new dwelling. That measure of
the cost of moving is appropriate in an unregulated market in
which the rent the tenant currently pays is close to the
current spot market rent. In a market where rents are fixed
at their entry levels by rent controls or where tenants enjoy
substantial tenure discounts, the cost of moving to a tenant
may be substantially higher.
Recent hedonic studies of rents have shown the importance
of tenure discounts. Long-standing tenants in unregulated
housing markets benefit from tenure discounts which approach
in magnitude the discounts enjoyed by tenants in rent-
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controlled units4 . Landlords set lower rents (or refrain
from asking for increases commensurate with inflation) in
order to induce "good" tenants to remain in their current
unit, by making the cost of moving significantly higher for
them. The magnitude of observed tenure discounts is
considerable. Follain and Malpezzi 1980 in their hedonic
estimates of rents in U.S. urban areas (using Annual Housing
Survey data) found tenure discounts after 10 years averaging
9.5 percent in SMSA's in which there was no rent control and
10.8 percent in SMSA's where there was rent control in some
part of the metropolitan area. Boersch-Supan (1984b) reports
corresponding estimates for West German cities (tenure
discounts after 10 years) of from 13 to 20 percent, depending
on location and density within the metropolitan area. He
argues that rational landlord behavior rather than rent
control legislation is the primary explanation of these
observed discounts.
3.4 Landlords and Tenants, Owners and Renters
3.4.1 Who Owns Rental Housing in Cairo? Landlords'
Characteristics
The majority of tenants in Cairo (85 percent) rent from
private owners (see table 3.3). Nearly half of those owners
are resident in the building. Most renters live in apartments
in small multi-family buildings (see table 3.4). Less than 5
percent live in single-family dwellings while 56 percent are
in buildings with two to eight apartments; the median number
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of apartments per building is six.
The private rental market in Cairo is dominated by rented
apartments and by small landlords. table 3.4 shows the
distribution of types of dwellings and table 3.3 shows the
distribution of types of owners. Only 3 percent rent from
real estate companies, cooperatives or charities, and 11
percent lived in public sector housing. Nearly half of the
85.6 percent renting from private landlords lived in buildings
with a resident landlord.
The survey on which this study is based permits us to
derive some information on the characteristics of those
landlords who live in buildings in which they also rent out
units. Because it used dwellings and their occupants as the
unit of survey provides little direct information on the
landlords of the rental housing surveyed. However, in Cairo,
about half the rental units are owned by landlords who live in
the same building (more in informal and less in formal areas).
Thus, survey information on individual owner-occupants who
report that they own the building (and not just the unit) in
which they live, can not unreasonably be interpreted as
information on resident landlords.
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Table 3.3
Renters by_type of Owner in Cairo
Central and local government 2.6%
Public sector and awqaf 7.7
Private institutions 1.9
(Real Estate Company, cooperative)
Individual private owner 85.6
of whom: Resident 42.1
Relative 8.2
Friend 4.1
Other 2.3
Source: Computed from Informal Housing Study Household
Household Survey data.
Table 3.4
Rental Housing_in Cairo by__Type of Building
House or Villa 13.1%
Apartment 71.6%
Separate room or 13.9%
part of an apartment
Furnished apartment 0.4%
Rural house 0.6%
Other 0.3%
Source: Computed from Informal Housing Study Household
Interview Survey data.
Most small landlords start by building a dwelling for
themselves and their family, then go on to add units for use
by their extended family (married sons and daughters) or for
rent: only 15.3 percent of owner-occupiers lived in buildings
consisting of a single dwelling unit, and of those living in
multi-unit buildings, 34.0 percent owned the entire building.
That implies that at least 30 percent of owner-occupiers are
currently the landlords of tenants resident in the same
building. The figure certainly underestimates the number of
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resident landlords among the owner-occupiers, since an
additional 65 owners, almost half of those living in multi-
unit buildings, reported that they owned their own dwelling
and part of the building. Moreover, owner-occupiers in
single-unit buildings may plan to add rental units later: the
single most striking trend found by the Informal Housing Study
was the vertical expansion of the housing stock. In the
districts surveyed during the study's scanning survey, the
number of floors per building and dwelling units per building
had each increased by roughly 20 percent since the 1976 census
(3.4 percent and 3.3 percent annually) (Abt 1982a, 16-17).
Most of the owner-occupants in Cairo acquired vacant land
and subsequently built on it (54.1 percent) or made major
changes in the structure they acquired (17.2 percent). Of
those who reported making major changes, three out of four
reported that they had added one or more apartments to their
dwellings. Thirty nine owners (25.4 percent) acquired their
dwelling in its current condition, and we can speculate that
the majority of these are the owners of condominium units,
rather than of whole buildings.
Fifty percent of owners who bought land acquired it
betwen 1954 and 1970, and 25 percent after 1970. The median
date of acquisition was 1960. Those who bought buildings
acquired them more recently: the median date of acquisition
was 1964, with an interquartile range of 1956 to 1974.
When they built, one in three designed the building
himself or had it designed by the friend; the others were
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designed by the contractor, or (rarely) by professionals.
About half the buildings were reported built by contractors
(48.4 percent); 36.5 percent were built by gangs of workmen
supervised by the owner, and about one in ten (10.7 percent)
were reportedly built by the owner and/or relatives.
Wikan's anthropological study of a poor neighborhood in
Cairo describes the situation as follows:
The houses are privately owned, and both men and women
own them. Most house owners have one, some just a half,
and very few two to three. None of my seventeen families
own houses. One man.. .once owned half a house but had to
sell it due to quarrels between his wife and his sister,
who owned the other half. Many of the house owners live
in the back streets in their own houses; the others come
at the beginning of the month to collect the rent.(Wikan
1980, 19)
3.4.2 Who lives in Cairo Housing? Socioeconomic
Characteristics of Owners and Renters
In Cairo, households which own their housing and renter
households are strikingly alike. Renters made up 69 percent
of the households surveyed and owner-occupants were 31
percent. Renters and owners are quite similar with respect to
age (median age of owner household heads is 45, of renters
42), incomes (median household expenditure per month is LE 100
for owners and LE 87.5 for renters), household size (median
for owners is 5.4 and for renters 4.5), and the time they have
lived in their current dwellings. Their dwellings are also
quite similar. Cairo owners lived in dwellings with a mean of
3.64 rooms; the mean size of renters' units was 3.22 rooms.
In the previous section we noted that at least a third of
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owner-occupants are also resident landlords. Landlords and
tenants who are relatively similar are more likely to be able
to make and enforce informal contracts than ones who are very
dissimilar.
In the United States and in most European countries,
owners and renters tend to have significantly different
characteristics5 . Owners typically have higher incomes,
renter household heads tend to be younger than owner
occupants. Renter households are smaller on average. In
Cairo, renter and owner households are statistically
indistinguishable on all these counts. Again, in the U.S.,
renters tend to be significantly more mobile than owner-
occupants; in Cairo, while renters are more mobile than
owners, the differences between them are much less striking
than we might have expected, based on experience both in the
U.S. and in other countries.
For owner-occupants, as for landlords, housing serves as
an investment good as well as a consumption good. Housing is
the largest single item in most urban households' portfolio of
assets, in developing as in developed countries. In general,
in an unconstrained setting, we would expect most households'
demand for housing as a consumption good to be different from
their demand for housing as an investment good. Landlords are
people whose investment demand for housing exceeds their
consumption demand; they typically occupy a part of their
housing portfolio themselves and rent out the rest6 .
Households are typically constrained to own either no housing
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(to be renters) or to own at least one dwelling -- they cannot
own only a part of their housing consumption.
Owners and renters in Cairo differ in one very important
respect: their place of origin and their migration patterns.
In the households surveyed, the heads of renter households
were more likely to be born in Cairo Governorate, or to have
lived most of their life there. But they were much less
likely to be from either of the other two governorates (Giza
and Kalyubeya) which make up Greater Cairo today.
As table 3.5 shows, 36.7 percent of owners and 44.5
percent of renters were born in Cairo; 27.9 percent of owners
and 7.1 percent of renters were born in Giza or Kalyubeya.
Thus, about one third of owners and half of all renters were
migrants who had been born in other governorates in Egypt.
However, some of these had been settled in Cairo for long
periods: 77.5 percent of owners and 62.8 percent of renters
said they had lived in one of the three governorates of
Greater Cairo for most of their lives. Two thirds of owners
(67.6 percent) and just over half of the renters (53.0
percent) had lived in the same dwelling for ten years or more.
About one household in ten had moved within the previous ten
years from a governorate outside Greater Cairo; about one
fourth of those households were owners and three fourths were
renters.
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Table 3.5
Place of Birth of Cairo Household Heads
Owners Renters
Cairo 36.7 44.5
Giza 10.1 3.9
Kalyubeya 17.8 3.2
Greater Cairo Total 64.6 51.6
Rest of Egypt 33.1 48.0
Missing 2.3 0.4
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: Computed from Informal Housing Study Household
Interview Survey data.
The proportion of household heads born in Giza and
Kalyubeya governorates is much higher for owners (27.9
percent) than among renters (7.1 percent). That presumably
reflects the growth of the Cairo metropolitan area in the past
generation. The urban areas of Giza and Kalyubeya
governorates are now incorporated into Greater Cairo and are
the areas of the city which are growing most rapidly. Many of
those owners were probably - the survey does not permit us to
say with certainty - peasants in former villages which have
now been incorporated in the city. They have either remained
in their family homes (in rural areas owner-occupancy is by
far the most common mode of tenure of housing) or were able to
buy a house with the proceeds of sale of their (now urbanized)
land. This group also makes up a significant proportion of
those who report "no previous dwelling"; that is, they have
lived all their lives in the same place.
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Table 3.6
Where Did the Cairo Household Heads Come From?*
Owners Renters
Cairo 50.1 55.5
Giza 9.3 3.1
Kalyubeya 18.1 4.2
Greater Cairo Total 77.5 62.8
Rest of Egypt 20.5 35.9
Missing 2.0 1.3
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: responses to the question "Where did you spend most of
your life, or where have you been since you were 15?"
Computed from Informal Housing Study Household Interview
Survey data.
A similar proportion of both owners and renters spent
most of their lives in Cairo even though they were not born
there. These household heads, who migrated to the city many
years ago, make up about one owner in eight (12.9 percent) and
one renter in nine (11.2 percent). About one fifth of
households are headed by relatively recent migrants, who
report that they have spent most of their lives elsewhere in
Egypt, though we see from table 3.6 that less than three
percent of household heads moved to Cairo within the past
decade. The proportion of recent in-migrants in the total
population is likely to be higher than that three percent
figure, however, since recent in-migrants are less likely to
be household heads.
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Table 3.7
Most Recent Previous Dwelling of Cairo Household Heads
Owners Renters
Those who have lived
10 years or less in
their present dwelling: Total 32.4 43.4
Of whom:
Previous dwelling location:
Cairo 18.9 30.0
Giza 4.0 3.5
Kalyubeya 6.9 1.9
Greater Cairo(total) 29.8 35.4
Rest of Egypt 2.6 8.4
Lived more than 10 years 34.5 26.4
in present dwelling
No previous dwelling 33.1 26.6
(Same since birth)
Source: Computed from Informal Housing Study Household
Interview Survey data.
Table 3.8
Previous Mode of Tenure of Cairo Household Heads
Owners Renters
No previous dwelling 33.1 26.6
Renter 43.0 52.0
Owner 8.4 4.6
With family 13.4 15.9
With friends/other 0.7 0.5
Total 100.0 100.0
Source: Computed from Informal Housing Study Household
Interview Survey data.
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Table 3.8 shows the previous mode of tenure for household
heads surveyed. The majority of both owners and renters were
tenants in the dwelling they occupied before their present
one; the proportion of renters who were also renters before is
only slightly larger than the proportion of owners who were
previously renters (52 percent compared with 43 percent). A
striking number of both owners and renters have lived in the
same dwelling all their lives (and thus report no previous
dwelling): over a quarter (26.6 percent) of renters and about
a third (33.1 percent) of owners. The high proportion of
renters who have lived all their lives in the same dwelling is
a striking indication of the impact of security of tenure in
rental units in the Cairo market.
In about fifteen percent of the households surveyed, the
household head reported that he (or she) had previously lived
with friends or family; the current dwelling was the first for
these households, occupied when the household was formed. In
unregulated housing markets entry to the rental sector is
easier than entry to the ownership sector, and new households
which are at an early stage in their life-cycle are typically
concentrated in the rental sector. They subsequently move to
the ownership sector when and if they are able to make a down
payment and obtain a mortgage for an owner-occupied unit.
In Cairo, in contrast, the proportion of newly formed
households was about the same for owners (14.1 percent) and
renters (16.2 percent), which suggests that entry to the
rental sector is as difficult as entry to the ownership sector
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in Cairo. This observation supports reports from younger
Cairenes that new household formation is significantly
inhibited by the barriers to entry to the housing market.
Formal (legal) housing is now less than half the annual
supply of new housing in the city. The tenants of informal
housing are typically of more recent vintage than the tenants
of formal housing: renters in formal housing have lived an
average (mean) of 17.7 years in the same dwelling, compared
with an average of 11.8 years for renters in informal housing.
Renters in informal housing are more likely to rent from
an individual landlord, or from a relative or friend, than are
renters in formal housing. In informal housing, renters pay
more for maintenance of their units than renters in formal
housing.
On average, the chances of renters in informal housing
having paid key money are similar to the chances for renters
in formal housing. When we combine that figure with the
shorter average length of stay of informal renters, however,
the picture changes somewhat. The frequency of key money has
increased over time in both sectors, and at any given point in
time, the chances of a renter in the informal sector paying
key money are lower than for the corresponding renter in the
formal sector.
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Table 3.9
Renters in Formal and Informal Housing
Formal
n = 117
Mean initial rent (LE 1981) 22.12
Mean value of dwelling (LE) 11,703
(estimated by occupant)
Mean Number of rooms 2.9
Mean Renter expenditure 38.0
on maintenance
Key money paid - 18.7
(percent of renters)
Mean key money (LE 1981) 1279
Mean length of stay 17.7
(years)
Owner: resident
individual (% 34.0
non-resident
individual (% 34.0
relative or
friend (% 9.8
Source: Computed from Informal Housing
Interview Survey data.
Informal
n = 163
24.07
11,570
3.2
95.7
19.9
1282
11.8
43.1
38.7
15.1
Study Household
89
3.5 Rental Contracts in Cairo
3.5.1 Rent Controlled Rents and Actual Rents
Controlled rents in Cairo reflect dwelling attributes and
not owner or occupant attributes (as they do in jurisdictions
whereents are subject to vacancy decontrol, for example).
We were therefore able to impute the controlled rent for each
dwelling in the survey, using survey data on initial and
current rents, dwelling size and age, together with official
construction and land prices. We then compared actual rents
with the imputed controlled rents. The method used is
described in appendix 3.
The imputed controlled rents are not, of course, wholly
accurate. They are based on the number of rooms in each
dwelling and not the dwelling area, yet official prices (used
to set controlled rents) are based on dwelling area. The
official prices make some allowance for the quality of
construction, but we lacked the information necessary to
discriminate ex ante between dwellings, and so used the
figures for medium quality construction for all dwellings in
the sample. We also lacked detailed information on the local
official land values used to set controlled rents. However,
the return on land values is only a small fraction of
controlled rent. We can thus expect errors of observation in
comparing actual and controlled rents. We probably
overestimated the legal rents for low quality construction and
underestimated rents for high quality construction. However,
we also believe that these errors are not strongly biassed.
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If all occupants are in fact paying the legal rent, we
would still expect some random variation in the ratio of rent
to controlled rent. We therefore chose to look at the median
and the interquartile range of the distribution of the ratio
of rent to controlled rent, which are relatively "robust"
statistics which are less influenced by outliers and other
erroneous observations than is the mean, for example. The
results we obtain are intuitively plausible.
When we look at renters sorted by the dates they moved
into their dwelling in all but the earliest and the most
recent periods (table 3.10), at least 25 percent of households
report paying no more than the imputed controlled rent.
During the period 1961-71, at least 50 percent were paying no
more than the controlled rent. Only 25 percent of mover
households report paying a mark-up of more than 20 percent (in
1961-66) or 50 percent(in 1966-71). This is consistent with
the comment of an informed observer of the Cairo housing
market that in the 1960's the controlled rents were close to
actual building costs and that discrepancies between actual
building costs and controlled rents (which motivate landlords
to take key money or illegal rent) came about as building
costs started to increase rapidly in the 1970's.
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Table 3.10
Ratio of Actual Rent to Controlled Rent by Move Date of Renter
Current Rent/Controlled Rent
Length of Stay Q1 Median Q3
(move date)
0-5 years 1.3 1.7 2.5
(1976-81)
6-10 year 1.0 1.2 1.76
(1971-75)
11-15 years 0.9 1.0 1.5
(1966-71)
16-20 years 1.0 1.0 1.2
(1961-65)
21-30 years 1.1 1.6 2.1
(1951-61)
> 30 years 1.5 1.9 3.0
(Before 1951)
Source: Computed from Informal Housing Study Household
Interview Survey data. See also Appendix 3 for the method used
to impute controlled rents.
Table 3.11
Ratio of Actual Rent to Controlled Rent by Age of Building
Actual Rent/Controlled Rent
Age of Building Q1 Median Q3
0-5 years 1.1 1.4 2.1
6-10 years 1.3 1.6 2.4
11-20 years 1.1 1.5 2.5
21 years or more 1.0 1.0 1.8
Source: Computed from Informal Housing Study Household
Interview Survey data. See also Appendix 3 for the method
used to impute controlled rents.
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Most recent movers are paying a substantial premium in
rent over the controlled rent. All but 25 percent of renters
who moved in 1976-81 appear to be paying rents of 30 percent
or more above the legal rent; half of all recent movers pay
rents of 70 percent or more above the legal rent, and 25
percent are paying 2.5 times the legal rent or more.
We also examined the pattern of the ratio of rent to
controlled rent by the age of the building (table 3.11) since
legal rents are set according to building age. In the most
recent buildings the rent premiums (interquartile range 1.1 -
2.1) are lower than those for movers in the corresponding
period (interquartile range 1.3 - 2.5), indicating that the
premium paid by recent movers entering older buildings was on
average higher than the premium for recent movers into new
buildings. That suggests that movers pay rents at "market"
levels or some approximation of them, and not the much lower
legal rents which apply to older buildings. The premium for
older buildings is as high as or higher than for recent
structures, with the exception of buildings more than 20 years
old, in which only 25 percent of residents pay a premium.
3.5.2 Key Money and Rent Advances
Key money has become much more common in the Cairo
housing market. Table 3.12 shows the increasing magnitude and
incidence of key money in Cairo7 . Among households moving
between 1979 and 1981, the reported incidence of key money was
almost 40 percent, among movers five to six years earlier
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(1975-6), it was almost 30 percent; and among movers ten years
earlier, 10 percent. That is consistent with the informed
view that before 1973-4 the discrepancy between market rents
and those approved by the rent control committees was
relatively small:
Owner and renter would negotiate a rent of LE 25 - 30;
the committee when it visited two or three years after
construction might reduce the rent to LE 23 or raise it
to LE 32. At that time building materials were really
available at government prices (the basis for rent
control committees' imputations of construction cost).
The rent control committees set rents fairly 75 percent
of the time [Architect- contractor, interview by author,
1.9.82].
Key money was paid occasionally but was not widely
prevalent before 1973-4, except in some wealthy neighborhoods,
the same source reported. Rugh, studying households in Bulak
in 1976-8, notes that key money was a new phenomenon:
... Reasons why housing has become so scarce in recent
years.. .A few owners have taken the chance [of building
collapse] and built much better structures on their
property but in such cases they are charging much higher
rents and an initial sum of "key" money that only those
with good credit or a higher income can afford.(Rugh
1979, 27)
Nevertheless, key money was already common enough in the early
1970's that when in 1972 a housing middleman was brought to
trial for charging prospective tenants key money, he was
acquitted. The judge ruled that charging key money had become
so commonplace that it was in effect sanctioned by the
government9 .
In the open-ended interviews interviewees spoke freely
about the existence and magnitude of the key money which
changes hands when a vacant dwelling is rented. While the
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ratio of key money to rent charged varies from neighborhood to
neighborhood, there was substantial agreement between
informants about the levels of rents and key money in a given
area. In Dar es Salaam, an area of informal housing South of
Cairo where many open-ended interviews were carried out,
responses included:
[G-4: Building owner, Dar es Salaam]:As for the key
money, or for the advance money, for every flat or every
apartment in the area, it is from LE 2 000-3 000 and for
the rent, he said that if the flat is two rooms it is LE
45 and if it is four rooms it is from LE 50 - LE 60. He
said that since it is informal housing the government
cannot send somebody to check on how much we charge for
rent and this is better.
(G-5: Building owner, Dar Es Salaam]: Prices of land have
gone up a lot in the past ten years. Eleven years ago he
bought his land for LE 14 a square meter, it is today
worth LE 100. Also rents have gone up. He used to
sublet (sic] an apartment at LE 15 a month, today that
same apartment would be sublet from LE 30-35 a month. He
did not take any key money himself when he sublet his
apartments because key money is illegal but some people
would take key money that would reach about LE 2,000 for
a unit.
[G-8: Building owner,Dar es Salaam]: The real estate are
becoming sky high. He is subletting [sic] three room
apartments eight years ago for LE 10. The extra flats he
is adding now he will sublet the same apartments for at
least LE 45 until the committee of the rent would check
on the building and specify the finishing and the
structure and either would maintain the rent level the
way it is or might decrease it to not less than LE 35 for
the apartment. Concerning key money it is not less than
LE 1000 and of course every owner is trying to make as
much profit as he can out of his building and some people
would even put stores in the ground floor level.
[K-7: Ironworker for reinforced concrete, Dar es Salaam]:
He himself owns a building that he built for himself and
he used the help of some of his friends so they could
build it.. .Concerning key money in that area it is in the
range of LE 2000 to 3000 per unit and the rents from LE
20 to LE 40 per unit. Concerning the price of land it
used to be LE 5 about ten years ago, it is now LE 100.
He thinks there are too many people who are subletting
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rooms in their buildings and the rent of one room would
be LE 8 and the services are common with other rooms.
[K-12: Contractor of reinforced concrete iron, Dar es
Salaam]: Most of the houses in Dar es Salaam are the low
income groups.. .He takes a down payment from the owner.
Most of the owners do not have the necessary money to
finish the entire job all at once but they start by
putting in the foundations and mauybe the columns of the
first floor and next year when they have more extra cash
they pour the floor and then they keep on adding one or
two storeys upward as soon as they get the necessary
money. Most of the units in that area are being rented
and not sold. Normally key money would be about LE 1500
to LE 2000.
[K-17: Masonry Contractor, Dar Es Salaam]: He gives the
following prices. For an average home ranging from about
50 m 2 in floor would need.. .Thus the total cost of that
average 50 m2 apartment would be.. .around LE 2000.. .He
thinks that the owners are becoming very greedy and they
want to finish the work with the cheapest possible cost
as fast as they could so that they could rent it
immediately. Normally they would rent it for LE 20 to LE
25 for an average apartment a month.
[K-22: Contractor and carpenter for reinforced concrete,
Dar es Salaam]: Concerning key money in the area of Dar
Es Salaam it has reached LE 800 to LE 1500 in some areas.
Rents would range from LE 15 for a two bedroom plus a
living room to LE 25 for three bedrooms and a living
room.
A rough estimate based on figures in the interviews
quoted above shows that an apartment of two rooms with 50m 2
in floor space would cost at least LE 4000. That is, LE 2000
for construction (compare the estimate of LE70-100 per m 2 for
construction costs in 1971 for "average" housing (Abt
Associates 1982a) plus LE 2000 for land (assuming six units of
50m 2 built on a site of 120m 2 , worth LE 100 per M 2 ). The
legal rent for such a unit would be set to give the landlord a
7 percent return on land and construction costs. That implies
a legal rent of LE 23 per month at most (the rent control
committees base the legal rents on offical construction costs
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and land values, not on the actual ones reported here).
In other informal housing areas, we find reports of
comparable levels of current rents and key money asked:
[L-6: Investor and land developer, El Basatine]: In the
1960's, rents used to be LE 8 to LE 10 per apartment,
today they are LE 20 to LE 30 an apartment. For key
money it is around LE 2000 to LE 4000 according to the
type of apartment.
[L-1: Tile-maker, Boulak el Dakrour]: For the past five
years, [the] price has gone up to.. .LE 50 for a 3 room
apartment (70-90 M 2 ). The advance rent for such a place
might be LE 1000. the official rent (say 40) would be
reduced in half until the advance had been covered.
[J-4: Contractor, Ezbat el Nakhl]: Land costs LE 50 per
m2 in this region. Therefore to enter the informal
housing market in this area, one would need about LE 4000
for land (assume 80m 2 for a 20m 2 house) and LE 2500 for
unfinished construction of one floor. Respondent claims
there are no cases of condominium type ownership of new
housing. The very poor are left with the option of
renting rooms at LE 10 per month, payable LE 100 in
advance, LE 5 per month for 20 months, and LE 10 per
month afterwards. Three years ago, rents here were LE 1
- 1.50 per room. Ten years ago, there were no buildings
here.
[K-5: Contractor, Mit Oqba (Giza, near Mohandesin)]: LE
1000 is the minimum required to start thinking about
building a house. Most people obtain this money by
either selling land or jewelry. The typical renter needs
to pay LE 2000 to 3000 in advance rent and key money.
Typically one-half of this amount is advance rent and is
used to reduce the normal rent payment by half until the
advance rent is completely paid off. Typical rents in
this community are LE 20 for three rooms and LE 15 for
two rooms. Fifteen years ago land here cost fifty
piasters per M 2 , but now it costs LE 70 per M2.
In higher income areas, key money seems to be
consistently higher, relative to the rents charged:
[K-35: Subcontractor for concrete work, Nasr City] Most
of the houses at Nasr City are concrete skeleton
construction. The design is done by engineers and has to
be approved. The square meter completely finished costs
LE 80 - 120. This does not include the price of the
land.. .The average house at Nasr City would take two
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years to build...The advance money in this area would
reach LE 10 000 and the monthly rent would reach LE 60.
[K-37: Subcontractor for Formwork for reinforced
Concrete, Nasr City]: Most of the buildings in this area
are reinforced concrete skeleton construction. The
designer is the architect.. .The advance money in this
area would reach LE 20 000 and the monthly rent would
reach LE 100.. .He believes that the owner knows the
building laws and regulations. Those laws that are
usually not respected are those dealing with the legal
height of the building. Usually people increase the
number of floors on their block.
The magnitude of key money asked by landlords which was
reported in the open-ended interviews seems startlingly at
odds with the key money which renters said they had paid.
Only about a third of all renters sampled by the household
survey reported paying key money and fewer than one-fourth of
those who paid key money reported paying over LE 1000.
When we examine the survey data on key money, we find
that the majority of renter households report no expenditures
on key money or advance rent. However, among those households
which made any such expenditures, there is a wide variation in
the amount. Some households report paying as little as LE 2
while others reported that the key money they paid was as much
as LE 8000 (See table 3.13). Most key money was paid to
building owners, although some payments to previous tenants
were also reported.
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Table 3.12
Key Money Paid - Changes Over Time
Movers Key Money Paid:
% % of movers
36 10.9
20 6.1
35 10.6
26 7.9
28 8.5
49 4.8
58 17.6
46 13.9
16 4.8
79-81
77-79
75-77
73-75
71-73
66-71
61-66
56-61
51-56
-51
Total 330
4.8
38.9
20.93
28.6
15.4
21.4
16.3
10.3
15.2
0.0
6.3
Key Money
Mean Median
Current LE
(1981 LE)
1556 600
(662)
1568 500
(708)
512
330
112
504
71
118
160
200
(352)
125
(267)
99
(224)
225
(730)
20
75)
40
(231)
(-)
160
(1257)
100.0
Notes:1981 LE
Egypt-Urban.
equivalents calculated using CPI series for
Key money: Means and medians computed over households
reporting key money paid.
IdbarutewComputydddtem IBAeedadnHdatin@o~td9 HaesehvDdter
households reporting the date they moved into their dwelling
(out of a total of 346 renter households surveyed).
Date of
Move
16
99
None of the tenants in housing owned by central or local
government (2.6 percent of households surveyed) reported
paying key money. These observations were excluded from the
econometric analysis, which focussed on the relationships
between individual landlords and their tenants. Some renters
in housing owned by other public sector organizations and by
awqaf (religious charitable foundations) did report paying key
money, mostly to previous tenants, and they were included.
The proportion of resident private landlords to non-
resident private landlords has increased steadily over time,
and key money payments were most frequent in privately owned
housing with non-resident landlords, where 27.1 percent of all
tenants reported paying some key money, as had 19 percent of
tenants in buildings with resident private landlords. Tenants
who reported that they were friends of their landlord had paid
key money in 21 percent of cases as had 3.5 percent of tenants
who were related to their landlords (see table 3.14).
The proportion of tenants who paid key money was similar
for renters living in houses (17 percent), villas (20 percent)
and apartments (23 percent). However, the 15 percent of all
renters living in separate rooms or part of an apartment (not
in self-contained dwelling units) were much less likely to pay
key money (see table 3.15).
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Table 3.13
Summary of Key Money Payments
Recipient Mean Payment
(LE)
Owner
Previous Tenant
Broker
Other
Distribution of Reported Key Money Payments
Recipient Min
Owner 2
Previous Tenant 2
Broker 20
Other 160
Q1 Median
49
150
200
200
Source: Computed from Informal Housing Study
Interview Survey data.
Household
Table 3.14
Owners and Key Money
Type of Owner
Tenants by
key money status:
Paid Did not
Pay
% of all
Tenants
Central/local government
Other public sector & awqaf
Private owner (non-resident)
Private owner (resident)
Friend of tenant
Relative
Other
0.0
11.5
27.1
19.1
21.4
3.5
0.0
100.0
88.5
32.9
80.9
78.6
96.5
100.0
2.6
7.9
42.1
32.2
4.1
8.2
2.9
Total: 100.0
Note: All but one of the tenants in the sample who lived in
central/local government housing had moved in before 1971; 67%
moved in before 1961.
Source: Computed from Informal Housing Study Household
Interview Survey data.
S.D.
831.80
362.76
20.00
285.00
N
2070.49
418.89
0.00
105.00
53
9
2
2
Q3
800
500
Max
12000
1500
20
410
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Table 3.15
Key Money by Type of Dwelling
Tenants by
key money status:
Paid Did not
Type of Dwelling % Pay %
House 17.2 82.8
Villa 20.0 80.0
Apartment 23.1 76.9
Room/Part of Apartment 3.8 96.2
Other 0.0 100.0
Source: Computed from Informal Housing Study Household
Interview Survey data.
While landlords ask for substantial sums in key money for
vacant dwellings, sometimes as much as the construction cost
of new units, they may not always be able to find tenants able
to pay those sums. Tenants may not have assets to pay key
money, and are unlikely to be able to borrow to pay it. Thus,
in poorer districts of Cairo, rents are negotiated between
landlord and tenant:
In many lower-income areas, especially in presently
urbanizing areas (such as Shoubra al-Kheima or parts of
Giza Governorate), informal community custom appears to
be the rule. Rents are set at a rate that seems
reasonable to landlord and tenant. The people appear
content to live as free from government intervention as
possible -- they simply disregard the law (Joint Land
Policy Team 1977).
In such cases, the tenants' rent may be subject to
increases:
In Bulaq, it is common for landlords to refuse to
make contracts with new tenants in order that there be no
stated fixed sum which might be subject to rent control
laws. The prospective tenant, eager to find housing,
does not complain. Another common practice is for
landlords to neglect to give receipts for rent paid so
that at a future date, if he wishes to evict a tenant, he
can claim "non-payment" and the tenant has no proof that
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his money was paid. These two techniques give the
landlord some leverage with the tenants if he
periodically decides to ask for illegal rent increases.
This happens rather frequently in Bulaq, enough to make
significant changes in gross rental averages.. .many
families reported that landlords had demanded higher
rents and that they felt helpless to oppose the
increases.(Rugh 1979)
In other poor neighborhoods, tenants believe that their
negotiated rent is legally protected, once agreed:
The rent is established once and for all when the rental
agreement is entered into -- it is prohibited by law to
change the terms after that.(Wikan 1980, 20)
3.5.3 Maintenance and Building Repairs
The informal housing survey suggests that most Cairo
landlords make little or no expenditures on maintenance, but
that the majority of rented buildings are maintained more or
less adequately by their tenants. The common view of the
allocation of responsibility was summarized by an
anthropologist studying a poor neighborhood in Giza: "The flat
is let unfurnished and the house owner is under no obligation
to maintain it" (Wikan 1980,20).
The Informal Housing Study survey found that in response
to the question "Is this building properly maintained?", 57.8
percent of renters said yes, and only 12.8 percent, no.
According to 92.6 percent of renters, repairs are made at
their own expense; in only 7.9 percent of cases are repairs
made at the owner's expense. Most repairs were reported to be
done either by the tenant himself (40.3 percent) or by
specialized workers at the tenant's expense (42.3 percent)
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Even in those cases where it was reported that repairs were
done by the landlord (only 4.4 percent) , the majority of
those repairs were done at the tenant's expense (See table
3.15).
Table 3.15
Maintenance
Who Pays for Repairs?
Renter Owner
Who Does Repairs? %
Renter 40.3 1.1
Owner 0.8 1.1
Friend/Relative 0.9 0.0
Hired worker 42.3 4.4
Contractor 3.8 0.8
Other 1.7 0.8
Total 89.8 8.2
Did you spend anything on repairs last year?
Yes 48.84%
Nonzero expenditure on maintenance in previous year:
Mean: LE 182.8
Median: LE 50.0
Interquartile Range: LE 14.5 to LE 150
Source: Computed from Informal Housing Study Household
Interview Survey data.
Expenditures on maintenance are a significant part of
renters' housing costs. For those renters (42 percent of the
total) who reported having made expenditures on maintenance
the previous year, the median outlay was LE 50 (compared with
a median expenditure on rent of LE 5 per month.) A smaller
number of tenants (about 10 percent) reported additional
expenditures on improvements and modifications to the
buildings in which they lived; those expenditures ranged from
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LE 2 to LE 12000; the median amount was LE 200. When
household heads were asked whether they had plans to make
(needed) changes and improvements to their dwellings, almost
as many renters (5 percent) as owners (7.5 percent) said that
they did.
Key money payment seems to make little difference to
maintenance arrangements: 84 percent of renters who paid key
money said that they did the maintenance, compared with 80
percent of renters who paid no key money.
The detailed interviews confirmed the general agreement
that maintenance at least inside a rented unit is the
responsibility of the renter, as the following quotations
show. Resident owners do sometimes undertake maintenance of
common areas and of the structure. For non-resident owners in
particular, failure to maintain is motivated by the wish to
induce sitting tenants to leave, as well as by reasons of
economy.
[G-4: Building owner, Dar es Salaam]:[I]f that owner is
living in the building he usually maintains it but if he
is not living in his building he does not care if the
building is maintained or not. To the contrary he would
love that the building would not be maintained the people
would leave the building and after that he can repair it
and perhaps take a key money again or raise the rent for
the newcomer because there is a law in Egypt that they
cannot raise the rent for anybody since he took the
apartment. But if he can kick this guy out and get
somebody else he can raise the price and the rent of the
apartment and take another key money so he said that
maintenance is only if the owner is living in the
building and the owner only maintains his flat but he
does not care about the other people. So for the people
they say why should they maintain something for this
owner but he said mostly the people who live in the flat,
the people who rent this flat they maintain it for
themnselves because they know they will never force the
owner to maintain for them anything.
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[K-7: Ironworker, Dar es Salaam]: Concerning maintenance,
it is very low because the owner is not interested..
Even though landlords may look forward to the day when
their building falls down and its residents can be evicted,
only a few informants knew of actual incidents when this had
occurred, and they were usually in the older sections of
Cairo.
[I-1: Investor, Ataba Square]: He's in the army
department of engineers.. .he's living in an old building
which he expects to fall down soon. When it does, he
will have land on which to build. He will build for
whole family - 3 daughters, 2 sons, as money permits.
[interviewed while inspecting illegally subdivided land
in Ezbat el Nakhl offered for sale by newspaper
advertisement.]
[K-12: Contractor of reinforced concrete iron, Dar es
Salaam]: He does not know of any building that is falling
in that area, because most of the heights are limited,
two or three storeys high. If that happened it would be
the responsibility of the owner...Maintenance is very
poor and is all self-help, everybody in his own unit or
apartment.
[K-32: Brickmason, Dar es Salaam]: He claims that
building maintenance is almost non-existent yet he does
not know of any building which has collapsed although
many buildings would deteriorate by time in which case
they would have to maintain the building by tearing down
some walls and rebuilding them.
The problem of building collapse and poor maintenance is
not a new one in Cairo: a sociologist reporting on research
carried out between 1976 and 1978 in one of the poorest
central neighborhoods wrote:
First, rents are so low, (averaging LE 2.24 per month
including utilities among the group studied) that when
rooms become empty landlords increasingly keep them off
the market believing that they are more trouble to rent
than to leave empty. Second, houses occasionally
collapse and become uninhabitable in Bulaq and owners for
the same reasons are reluctant to invest large sums in
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their repair... (Rugh 1979, 27)
Even tenants in government owned housing find themselves
responsible for building maintenance:
[G-14: Family of renters in public housing in Embaba]:
The appearance of the buildings was somewhat rundown on
the exterior but generally clean on the interior.. .The
family complained that the government does not take care
of the apartments, and that people living in the houses
should maintain the exterior (because the government
doesn't and the rent is so low) but people generally
don't take care of anything but their own dwelling.
3.5.4 Evictions
Legal eviction requires a court order (which is rarely
issued) declaring the building "about to collapse", or proof
that the tenant has failed to pay rent for an extended period
(in which case the tenant can regain his rights by paying the
rent retroactively). Of the 500 households surveyed in Cairo,
2.6 percent (four owners and nine renters) cited eviction from
their previous dwelling as a reason for moving to their
current home. Another seven renter households, out of the 98
who were considering moving, gave eviction as a reason for
considering a move.
Most renters have secure tenure in their units, as
illustrated by responses to the question: "Of the following
reasons, what would cause you to think of moving?" More owner
households (29 percent) than renters (24 percent) selected the
possibility of "being forced to evacuate your dwelling" as a
reason for moving. A similar proportion (2.8 percent) of both
owners and renters foresaw the possibility of moving because
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of housing cost increases.
For most Cairo landlords, then, eviction of existing
tenants is not feasible, but ruses are sometimes used
successfully, as one sociologist studying Cairene families in
a poor neighborhood reports:
In one of the sample families a landlord under pretext of
renovation and painting a dwelling asked the tenants to
move out temporarily. A few weeks later they found their
room rented at a higher price to new tenants. (Rugh
1979).
More recently, a few landlords have reportedly succeeded
in buying out tenants' property rights in their dwellings by
paying them 'reverse key money' to induce them to move out;
more commonly, tenants receive such key money from prospective
tenants, rather than from the landlord:
[G-14: Renters in public housing in Embaba]: This family
has been living in the dwelling since 1970. The
husband's relative had lived here since 1958 [when the
project was built], and when the relative decided to move
to a dwelling which he owned himself, the husband of this
family paid his relative's moving expenses and gave him
LE 100 for paint in his new place. This could be
considered a form of key money.
Another example:
A recent development, probably adapted from middle and
upper-class practices, is one that is aimed at putting
pressure on more remote acquaintances and even in some
instances, total strangers. In these cases prospective
tenants have resorted to giving considerable sums of
money, large by Bulaq standards (LE 100 or LE 200) to
people who will vacate their dwellings so that they can
move in (Rugh 1979, 30).
The incentives for landlords to attempt to evict their
tenants are substantial, particularly in old neighborhoods
where there are big differences between the rents paid by
long-standing tenants and the rents for vacant units:
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[L-6: Door and window maker, Embaba]: Two or three years
ago one of the old buildings in Embaba collapsed. People
are regularly evicted from old buildings in the community
and live in tents for eight months to a year until they
are assigned alternative housing by the government...
Flats in very old houses in this community rent for about
LE 2 to LE 3. He doesn't know what key money would be
for such flats because nobody leaves these flats. For a
new flat the rent tends to be LE 20 to 25 for typically
three rooms. Key money for such a flat might be LE 1500.
Sometimes one-half of the key money can be considered
advance rent.
[M-7: Electrical supplies distributor, Embaba]: Most new
buildings here are of reinforced concrete. No engineers
used. Most buildings informal.. .In this community, land
costs LE 200/M 2 in central area- where accessible to
infrastructure including telephone, and LE 80 per M2 in
the periphery where there is no infrastructure. In the
past 5 years, these prices have increased 10 times.
3.5.5 Contract Enforcement: Community Norms
A recent study of the norms in "popular" neighborhoods in
Cairo sheds some light on the forms of contract between
landlords and tenants. It appears that the norms of the
traditional, Cairo working class are being replaced by others
as the population has come to be dominated by in-migrants from
smaller cities and from rural Egypt.
Ibn el-balad is "a real Egyptian", Cairene-born, usually
living in the old, traditional areas of Cairo, a working man,
occupied mainly in traditional occupations. El-Messiri
identifies the baladi (local, traditional) Cairene community
as the inhabitants of the mediaeval quarters: al-Darb al-
Ahmar, Jamaliyya, Bab al-Shariyya, Bulaq and Misr al-Qadima.
According to Abu-Lughod (1971), these are the districts which
are the heart of Cairo's traditional urbanism; they are
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densely populated and much of the housing is in a state of
extreme deterioration. In such a neighborhood, people's
identity is closely tied with the place where they live:
Dwellers of these harat identify themselves as awlad al-
hitta. Literally, hitta means place, but in the sense of
one's territory or neighborhood... (el-Messiri 1979, 59)
People residing in the same hitta do not necessarily know
each other or have face-to-face relationships, but they
do consider themnselves bound by vicinal ties (al-Messiri
Nadim 1975, 43)
Typically, people interact on a personal basis with no
formal contracts, bills or receipts. In these
arrangements a man is "tied by his tongue", that is,
bound by his word" (ibid., 66). An ibn al-balad is to be
trusted because he is a man who keeps his spoken promise,
[whereas] an ibn al-zawat [an upper-class man who acts
like an European] does business with impersonal contracts
and bills.. .If one asks an ibn al-balad for a hundred
pounds, he will give it without a receipt. An ibn al-
balad who owns a building will rent apartments without a
contract. When one of the lessees tries to object, the
ibn al-balad says "a man is tied by his tongue"...the
awlad al-balad have more faith in traditional business
procedures than in modern ones. (ibid, 84)
The household survey found that the great majority of
renters - about 85 percent - did have a contract with the
owner of their dwelling. That suggests that more formal,
urban norms have prevailed over the custom that "a man is tied
by his tongue" in rental housing transactions. However, most
recent movers lived in peripheral and informal housing areas,
where the traditional norms described by el-Messiri have been
replaced by those of the rural in-migrants who predominate.
The rapid growth of the population of the city of Cairo
has meant that in-migrants are shaping the culture of the city
as much as they are adjusting to it9. Residents who have
lived in the city for twenty years or more often comment on
the ruralization of the city. Abu-Lughod noted the tendency
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for in-migrants in Cairo (as in most third world cities) to
find housing in areas near others from their place of origin.
It remains plausible, then, that the baladi institutions which
served to enforce informal contracts in the past, such as the
futuwa, or community leader (El-Messiri 1978, 66) have been to
some extent replaced by other, rural community norms: as Abu-
Lughod points out: "the cohesiveness of the neighborhood is
strengthened by the tendency for persons from the same village
to settle together"(Abu-Lughod 1961).
3.5.6 How New Construction is Financed
There is a great deal of evidence that at least among
certain segments of the population, housing and land for
housing construction are seen as attractive, secure
investments, and this continues to extend to rental housing
which is a marginal addition to an owner- or family- occupied
structure:
[G-4: Building owner, Dar es Salaam]:Mohamed was a
carpenter of furniture and of windows and doors.. .He
built his building in three floors and he built the first
floor with shops and a flat of two rooms and bathroom and
kitchen. As for the other [two] floors each floor has
two flats and each flat has three rooms and kitchen,
bathroom.. .Mohamed said that mostly the poor people like
to build their houses, to have a place, a shelter for
them and their children. He said that he prefers to have
a house for him and his children better than his wife
having a necklace on her neck, that is better he said and
is more secure for him....
My seventeen families can only see two potential ways of
investing. One is a building-lot (in the country by the
Pyramids) and the other is education. Two of the women
in the study have about LE 70 invested in a building-lot,
but it is doubtful whether their dream of a house of
their own will ever be realized. Their husbands are not
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interested in the enterprise and in August 1972 both of
them owed between five and eight monthly payments of LE 5
(the full price is about LE 350). I know however two
families (outside the sample) who moved out to the
Pyramid area in the summer of 1972 and started to build a
house with their own hands. They preferred a primitive
and provisional life in a shack-like house of their own
for a while rather than go on "losing" the rent of LE 5 a
month in the back street (Wikan 1980, 154).
Many of those building housing which they will occupy,
but which will include rental units, are investing savings
they accumulated from work in Saudi Arabia or the other Arab
countries:
[G-5:Building owner, Dar es Salaam]: He was an employee
of the government and he is a graduate of Faculty of
Commerce. Then he went to Saudi Arabia and worked for
five years. When he came back he heard from one of his
relatives who was living in the area of Dar Es Salaam
that there were many lots being sold in that area and he
did have some capital, thus he did invest it into
land.. .He has built a house on that land, two storeys
high, and a ground floor, plus the foundations which was
designed for six floors. His capital did not allow him
to build higher at that time because he was working as a
small employee in the governmennt. This is the only
building that he owns and it is for himself and his
children and he is investing a part of it for
subletting... .His building includes two apartments, each
one with two rooms and a living room, which he is
subletting [sic], one as a clinic and the other as a
regular apartment. The other two floors have two other
apartments on each floor.
[G-7: Building owner, Bulaq]: His income is his salary
from his job at the government plus an income from
agricultural land of 20 feddans which brings him some
money each season. He bought 110 square meters.. .the
square meter was LE 1 and he left the land until he had
enough money to build on it...He went to Saudi Arabia
where he worked in a contracting company.. .After three
years he ended his work in Saudi Arabia and he came back
with the money. His wife is working in teaching in
primary school and thus she is giving private lessons
that help in building the house. He started by building
the ground floor, then he built two other floors...the
square meter cost him LE 50.. .He is living on the ground
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floor and he rented the two other floors to some
relatives in order to have a stable income for his
children.
[G-8: Building owner, Dar es Salaam]: He is an
electrician originally and he travelled to Saudi Arabia
for four years. When he came back he had some capital so
he bought a piece of land.. .because it was near where he
originally used to live...and also his price was very
reasonable and it was the best investment for himself and
his sons in the future. He has put sound foundations and
he has built a three storey building. He built the
foundations and one storey in the beginning and then a
few years later he put the other two floors. This was
all ten years ago immediately following his coming back
from Saudi Arabia and he is now adding an additional
floor.
Owners without large accumulations of savings from work
in the Arab countries are more likely to build progressively,
constructing additional floors when their resources permit, or
financing additions partly from renters' key money and
advances.
[G-10, Tenants, Helwan]: Key money to rent in the area is
LE 1500; if the dwelling is being build, LE 750 is
advance payment, the rest paid off in installments to the
owner. Rent is usually LE 7 plus an installation fee of
LE 7, making the actual rent LE 14. A renter may help
the owner of a piece of land finance the building of a
dwelling. The renter pays LE 750 key money, then lends
some money to the owner at no interest to help in
construction and [the owner] pays it off by taking it off
his rent payments.
The in-depth interviews picked up many cases of owners
who were themselves engaged in the building trades. This
probably reflects their relatively greater efficiency in
constructing rental housing, but may also be illusory,
reflecting the fact that the open-ended interviews focussed on
individuals in the construction industry.
[G-16: Owner, Shoubra el Kheima]: Mr Y has lived in
Shoubra al Kheima for at least 30 years and has worked in
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a factory since 1958 in order to accumulate enough
capital to start a small glass-cutting business. He just
this year purchased land and will soon begin construction
of a home for himself, his wife and eight children. He
plans to build vertically until he can house his children
and their families and will hopefully have enough room to
rent an apartment or two for income. his main
objective... is to house his family not to use the house
as a rental property investment.
[H-2: Owner-Contractor, Matarayah]: Began as a radio and
television dealer. The took on a job supervising
construction work, where he gained experience. In 1978
began building. LE 80 per m 2 for six story building with
shops on first floor - would have cost LE 100-120/m 2 if
he had hired a contractor. He began by constructing the
ground floor for shops and two floors. Then got advance
rents from tenants (claims LE 1000 each) and built the
rest. Each floor has total of 225 m2 covering two 3-
room apartments and one 2-room apartment.. .Rents in
community are LE 7-8 for one room, LE 14 for two rooms,
LE 20 for three rooms and LE 30 for four rooms. In 1978,
land cost LE 40 per M 2 ; now he thinks it costs 80.
Tenants paid an advance rent (he claims LE 1000). He
doesn't know what rents will be assessed by government,
but won't collect until advance rent has been covered.
Sometimes owners find other sources of credit, from
contractors or materials suppliers:
[J-3: General contractor, Heliopolis]: Sometimes he will
build houses on credit taking a lien on rental payments
for housing as collateral.. .We asked him.. .what is his
incentive for changing the rents over to the actual owner
when the full cost of the housing has been covered? He
said that his reputation in the community would be at
stake if he did not do this.
The open-ended interviews provided some confirmation of
the impression gained from the survey that middle-class,
better educated household heads are somewhat less likely to be
owner-occupiers or landlords -- for example:
[L-5: Manager of workshop and Manufacturing plant for
tiles]:He does not own any property himself, he is just
the manager of the plant and he is not rich enough to own
such property. Originally he is a PhD and he was a
teacher at the University of Cairo.
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3.6 Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed the evidence for the existence
of informal contracts for rental housing which extend and
replace the formal terms of leases foreseen by the rent
control law. We found that evasion of rent controls is
widespread. Key money, while far from universal, increased in
frequency in the 1970's, changing hands in 16 percent of
transactions at the beginning of the decade and in 39 percent
of transactions by 1979-81. In the same period, the
proportion of units with rents higher than the controlled rent
increased from under 50 percent to over 75 prcent.
The general agreement on the order of magnitude of rents
and key money asked by landlords for vacant units in informal
housing areas is evidence of the existence of a market - even
though the rents are higher than those permitted under rent
control and key money is illegal. At the same time,
landlords' asking prices are often substantially higher than
the key money which finally changes hands in many cases. That
is, of course, consistent with a market in which landlords
with vacant units are engaged in a process of search for
tenants willing to pay high rents or key money.
The Egyptian Government implicitly recognized the force
of some of the informal contract terms in its 1981 revision of
the rent control law. The market has developed contracts
under which only a part of the key money which the tenant pays
is retained by the landlord; a part is an "advance" which the
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landlord can use to cover construction costs in order to
complete a dwelling under construction, and which the tenant
then recovers by paying only a half of the agreed-on rent for
the next two years. Such rent advances were legalized by the
1981 law.
Key money and rent advances developed to meet the dual
needs of owners and tenants: as the housing market tightened,
the key money asked rose to a level at which few low income
renters could raise the necessary amount. Yet as construction
costs rose after 1973-4, landlords needed larger and larger
sums up front to finance the construction of additional rental
units. The legalization of advance rents may make it an
amount which renters are able toorrow, repaying the lender
as their landlord repaid them over the first two years of the
tenancy.
Another of the informal contract terms we have identified
which was incorporated in the 1981 revision of the rent-
control law makes maintenance and repairs the responsibility
of the tenant in rent-controlled housing; hitherto, the
landlord was nominally responsible for maintenance.
Informal contracts are viable and widespread in the Cairo
housing market. They derive their strength from the
acceptance of both renters and tenants that controlled rent
levels have risen too slowly in recent years to permit
landlords to build new units. They existence of controls has
encouraged the growing dominance of the rental market by small
scale landlords, often informal areas, who are quite similar
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to their tenants both socially and economically. In formal
areas of Cairo, occupied by the upper middle class and the
wealthy, key money is substantially higher relative to rent.
These tenants are more likely toave access to savings with
which to pay key money; they are also more likely to be able
to use the provisions of the rent control law to renege on a
landlord if they choose to do so.
When a landlord is resident in the building or (to a
lesser extent) in the neighborhood, the dealings between
landlord and tenant are better characterized as a
relationship, not as a transaction. The security of tenure
which the Cairo rent control legislation grants to sitting
tenants serves to strengthen the ties between landlord and
tenant. Tenants with secure tenure and long expected stays in
the building are in effect shareholders in the building in
which they live. They undertake maintenance tasks and pay for
them, and they make improvements which are sometimes very
costly, relative both to their incomes and to the legal rent
for their units. It is this aspect of the dealings between
small, often resident landlords and their tenants which has
been overlooked by economists seeking to characterize the
impacts of rent controls. If landlords fail to maintain their
buildings, then tenants sometimes take on all or part of that
task. If legal rents are too low to permit new construction,
then tenants dealing with a small, resident landlord may be
willing to pay rents higher than the law permits, provided
they are perceived as reasonable (not exploitative).
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2 For example Gupta and Okpala both argue that the main
mechanism for the widespread evasion of rent controls in India
and Nigeria respectively is neglect: "rents paid by tenants
anrealized by houseowners have generally remained outside
the purview of rent control measures"(Gupta 1985, 160),and
"neither the landlords nor even a good many tenants or
prospective tenants pay much attention to the rent control
law" (Okpala 1981, 715).
3 Klein 1980; Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978.
4 See Thibodeau 1981, Malpezzi, Ozanne and Thibodeau 1980,
Boersch-Supan 1984a;1984b, Goodman and Kawai 1985, and Guasch
and Marshall 1985.
5 See Harloe (1975) for a detailed description of the
differences between owners and renters in the U.S. and Western
Europe.
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7 Some renters may have been unwilling to tell interviewers
the true amount they paid in key money. However, the
generally open attitude to key money demonstrated by the
willingness of other interviewees, including landlords, to
discuss it, combined with the fact that only receiving key
money is illegal, and not paying it, makes this unlikely to
have been significant. It has also been suggested that
because the interview schedule was ambiguously phrased in
Arabic, the interviewers or interviewees interpreted the
question as referring to "advance rent" (what in the USA is
known as the "security deposit" of one or two months' rent),
and not to key money. On the other hand, the fact that a
number of renters did report substantial key money payments
reduces the plausibility of this hypothesis. The question of
how accurately key money payments were reported is discussed
in greater detail in chapter 6.
8 Springborg 1974.
9 Abu-Lughod 1961.
Chapter 4
Models of Rent Controls with Evasion and Black Markets
4.1 Introduction
In housing markets like Cairo's, where controls exist but
are widely evaded and evasion takes on a multiplicity of
forms, neither theoretical models of controls which assume
perfect enforcement, nor models of uncontrolled housing
markets are appropriate. To model the transaction between
landlord and tenant in this environment, we need to take
account of the most salient characteristics of the economic
environment, such as imperfect capital markets and the
uncertainty associated with rent control enforcement. The
model should explain such phenomena as price dispersion among
contracts made in any one time period; continued construction
of new rental housing in the face of ostensibly stringent rent
controls; coexistence of key money and period-by-period side
payments (illegal rent); the fact that tenants paying illegal
rent do not cease making side payments once they gain
occupancy; and positive correlation between rents and key
money.
The next section reviews previous models of housing
supply under rent controls and examines how they explicitly or
implicitly model enforcement and the scope for evasion. We
then outline two alternative models of rent controls with
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evasion as it occurs in Cairo. The models set out alternative
portrayals of the underlying rationality of the black market
for rental housing which was described in previous chapters.
The first setting is a neo-classical world in which both
landlords and tenants are fully informed about the spot black
market price of rental housing, transactions costs are small
and a multiplicity of owners and would-be renters establish a
competitive market for rentals. Rents are controlled and side
payments are illegal but enforcement is imperfect and
landlords can estimate the probability of evoking punishment
under alternative courses of action. Landlords seek and
tenants offer side payments which bring the market into
equilibrium. We investigate the form and magnitude of those
side payments and the impact of imperfect capital markets.
The second model outlines a world in which landlords with
vacant units have some monopoly power. Landlords use that
monopoly power in setting the price they seek for a vacant
unit and in establishing an optimal strategy in searching for
tenants. In this world prices (rents and side payments) are
set by a process of search and bilateral bargaining.
4.2 Review of Previous Research
4.2.1 Models of Rent Controls
Rent controls have been the subject of an extensive
literature. The output of papers on this topic peaked twice,
once in the aftermath of the controls imposed during or
immediately after World War II in many large cities of the
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U.S.A. and Western Europe'. The second came in response to
the 'second generation' of rent controls which were adopted in
U.S. and Canadian cities in the 1970's2.
The political case for rent controls has usually rested
on the premise that by transferring some property rights in
controlled dwellings from the landlord to the tenant they
correct inequities or inefficiencies present in an unregulated
housing market. Much of the economic literature has focused
on modelling the market response of landlords to rent control.
The conclusion usually drawn is that in the long run tenants
as well as landlords suffer welfare losses from the imposition
of controls.
Opponents of controls emphasize the large number of
participants on both sides of the housing market and conclude
that in the absence of controls it comes close to being a
perfectly competitive market3 . These models explicitly or
implicitly define the uncontrolled market as one in which
prices are set by a multiplicity of transactions between
informed buyers and sellers; they assume that transaction
costs are negligible. The (rare) formal papers by advocates
of rent controls have usually focussed on the short term
inelasticity of supply in housing markets and the resulting
short term monopolistic position of landlords in those
markets4 .
The thinness of the theoretical literature on rent
controls is particularly remarkable in view of developments in
a number of closely related areas of economics in recent
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years. A model of rent controls should incorporate recent
theoretical and empirical understanding of a number of
features of unregulated housing markets. For example, the
rent control literature continued to assume that uncontrolled
housing markets generate a unique price for housing services,
but a considerable volume of work on the economics of housing
markets has focussed on the existence and magnitude of price
dispersion in rental housing5 . The assumption that buyers
and sellers in the housing market are fully informed has been
replaced by models of search behavior which take account of
the cost of acquiring information6 .
The paradigm of unregulated housing markets was further
modified when analysts pointed out that households in
developed countries face 'individualized prices' for housing,
and that their behavior reflects the prices they face and not
a uniform market price. These individualized prices reflect
the tax-deductibility of some housing expenditures.
Households with different incomes and different tax status pay
different prices for housing. When mortgage interest and
property taxes (as in the USA) or rents (as in Greece) are
fully or partially deductible from pre-tax income, households
face different effective prices for a given dwelling depending
on their marginal tax rates (King, 1980). Similarly, in both
Great Britain and the U.S.A., income-related housing subsidies
result in households facing different prices for the same
housing.
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Other models have emphasized the importance of moving
costs as a determinant of consumers' housing behavior (Venti
and Wise 1984). At any point in time, even in a market not
subject to rent controls, we can observe only a few households
which are consuming exactly their preferred quantity of
housing services. Many others are consuming more or less than
their optimum quantity of housing because the utility lost by
staying put is less than the net gains (monetary and non-
monetary) from moving.
Theoretical models of the impacts of price control in
housing markets usually assume a prior (uncontrolled) market
which clears through the price mechanism. Price controls are
specified either as a ceiling on the price per unit of housing
services (with different dwellings supplying varying
quantities of housing services) or as a ceiling on the rent
for each dwelling7 . The way in which controls are specified
also affects the scope for evasion by landlords.
To clarify the distinction, we define Pmand Pcas the
market and controlled rents respectively , and pmand pcas
the market and controlled price per unit of housing services.
(Table 4.1 provides a summary of all definitions used in the
formal models in this chapter). For a dwelling unit which
produces q units of housing services at a market price of p
per unit, the rent before controls is Pm= pmq. Under rent
controls which set a ceiling on the price per unit of housing
services, the controlled rent will be pcq. The controls
'bite' (are effective) if pc < p m .
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When controls set a ceiling on the rent for each
dwelling, the controlled rent will be Pr and the controls
'bite' if c< Pm. The quantity of housing services provided
by the dwelling, q, will decline gradually if the landlord
reduces or eliminates expenditures on repairs and maintenance.
A reduction in q would reduce the legal rent in the first
case, but not in the second.
Early models of rent controls assumed the first type of
price ceiling and deduced that it would result in excess
demand for housing whenever the controlled rent was lower than
the market rent. They imply that controls always reduce the
supply of housing: lower rents eliminate the incentive to
landlords to construct new rental housing and lead to gradual
withdrawal of the existing stock from the rental sector.
These models did not directly address the issue of how the
excess demand at the controlled rent is allocated among
available units.
4.2.2 Models of Evasion: Reduced Maintenance
The first formal models of landlords' evasion of controls
portray rents as fixed at the controlled level (Pc ).
Landlords subject to rent controls respond to secular
increases in demand and to increases in input costs by
lowering the level of maintenance in their buildings. They
thereby reduce the flow of housing services from each unit, so
qc< qID where qcand qmare the quantity of housing services
provided by the unit in the market and under rent controls.
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Table 4.1
Notation for Chapter 4
Pm Market rent for dwelling
pM Market rent per unit of housing services
PC Controlled rent for dwelling
pC Controlled rent per unit of housing services
q Quantity of housing services
M Tenant's expenditures on maintenance
Ma Level of maintenance expenditures required to
maintain unit at current level of repair
D ( Pm) Demand for housing at the market price
S ( P") Supply of housing at the market price
P1 Illegal, black market price for housing
P1  Illegal side payment of rent (premium paid in
addition to the controlled rent)
K Key money
Pk Annual equivalent of key money
K ( t ) Key money in time period t
r Discount rate
LS Tenant's expected completed length of stay
t time period
B Present value of all side payments (bribes)
D Returnable deposit
ZI Probability that a tenant will renege on a
contract in which side payments take the form
of illegal rent
Zk Probability that a tenant will renege on a
contract in which side payments take the form
of key money
R Landlords' expected return (controlled rent
plus side payments)
KL The (minimum) amount that a landlord demands
as a key money payment
KT The (maximum) amount of money that a tenant
is prepared to pay
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This process continues until Pc/ qc= p"'. By reducing
maintenance, landlords maintain their revenues per unit of
housing services. Alternatively, tenants may increase their
maintenance expenditures to maintain q = qO In that case, if
tenants and landlord are equally efficient providers of
maintenance services, Pe+ M = PO where M represents the
tenants' expenditures on maintenance. The implication is that
rent controls will lead to building deterioration and eventual
abandonment if tenants do not assume the responsibility for
maintenance, but that for an extended initial period landlords
could continue to earn market or near-market returns on
existing buildings by reducing their maintenance expenditures
9
. If tenants assume the responsibility for maintenance, the
cost of housing to them will rise and the period during which
landlords can earn market or near-market returns will be
extended.
4.2.3 Models of Evasion: Side Payments
Formal models of the formation of black markets for
rental housing under rent controls were neglected until
recently, although numerous papers comment on the scope for or
describe the practice of side payments in individual rent
controlled housing markets. Side payments are most commonly
reported as payments from an incoming tenant to either the
landlord or the sitting tenant, or more rarely from a landlord
to sitting tenants to induce them to vacate their unit'".
Becker (1971) models the impact of rent control when
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enforcement is less than perfect. He specifies the penalties
for side payments as a discontinuous excise tax on all prices
(or rents) above the legal maximum. Wheaton (1981) was
perhaps the first to acknowledge formally the role of side
payments: he suggests that key money payments in the Cairo
rental market equilibrate a competitive market for vacant
dwellings at controlled rents.
Skelley (1985) examines the effects of rent control in a
theoretical framework'' which explicitly specifies the
contracts formed between landlords and tenants. Her model
demonstrates formally the existence and magnitude of the
wealth transfer from landlord to tenants when rent controls
are introduced and how they are contingent on the rights of
sitting tenants, on the form of tenure protection, and on the
maintenance privileges assigned to tenants. The effects of
rent control are examined in a framework which explicitly
specifies the contracts formed between landlords and tenants,
deriving a "rent controlled housing market equilibrium". The
equilibrium depends on contractual assignment of the right to
occupy and maintain the dwelling, in return for the rent and
key money paid to the landlord. The model is used to identify
the terms of rent control legislation which can sustain such
an equilibrium.
In Skelley's model, rent control motivates a formal
contractual shift of the responsibility for specific
investment (maintenance expenditures) from landlord to tenant.
It provides an incentive for the development of long-term
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contracts between landlords and new tenants in the market for
controlled rental housing. The author models contracts in
which the landlord receives a lump sum key money payment and
rent equal to or less than the controlled rent. In return, he
sells to the tenant the legal claim to occupancy of the unit,
the right to maintain it at the level of housing services
desired by the tenant, and the right to sell the occupancy and
maintenance privileges to a household of the tenant's choice.
The model of a competitive rent controlled market
proposed here draws on the work of Skelley. However, she
postulates a black market without penalties or risk, in which
side payment contracts are fully enforceable. A lump sum side
payment (key money) prices initial occupancy in each rent
controlled apartment. The key money which the incoming tenant
pays is determined by the market, and equals the present
discounted value of the market rent the dwelling would earn in
the uncontrolled sector, less the maintenance costs saved by
the landlord and the contract rent collected in each period.
In one model the tenant's rights are fully transferable and in
both tenants are free to detemine the level of services from
the units they occupy. Skelley assumes a perfect capital
market in which a renter can borrow against the present value
of future earnings, in order to pay key money or to make
maintenance expenditures. Her model thus makes assumptions
incompatible with the reality of third world rental markets,
which are precisely those in which rent control evasion is
observed. In those markets, both risk and penalties attach to
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black market contracts, both landlords and tenants are subject
to capital rationing, and tenants' rights to the rented unit
are rarely transferable.
In their model of the behavior of the firm and the
industry in the case of price controls with evasion (black
markets), Browning and Culbertson (1984) emphasize the
importance of specifying the penalty structure. Assuming an
average penalty per unit which increases as black market sales
increase, they point out that it is equivalent to a flat per
unit penalty on black market sales, paid if the firm is
apprehended and convicted, when the probability of
apprehension and conviction increases with the volume of the
firm's sales on the black market. Firms then face a downward
sloping demand schedule for black market sales, since the
penalty structure implies decreasing marginal revenue from
additional units sold, while the demand schedule for legal
sales is horizontal.
Browning and Culbertson argue that firms in a perfectly
competitive industry faced with price controls will maximize
profits by selling their (homogeneous) product in both the
legal market (at the legal price) and the black market. Their
model assumes the existence of a resale market, and thus is
not directly applicable to rental housing, but one conclusion
is relevant: a firm will divert successive units of output
from the legal to the black market so long as the black market
price they receive exceeds the opportunity cost of doing so.
Profit maximization is realized with the firm equating
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marginal cost and marginal revenue in the black and legal
markets respectively. Equilibrium with black markets in their
model is characterized by excess capacity and inefficiency
because firms will not be operating at the minimum point on
their average cost schedule.
4.2.4 Models of Rent Controls: Property Rights of Owner and
Tenant
A grant of security of tenure to sitting tenants is
included in almost all rent control legislation. The
objective is to ensure that landlords cannot respond to
controls by evicting sitting tenants and charging key money to
new, incoming tenants. If tenants who cannot be evicted
cannot transfer their right to occupy the unit, then the
effect is to render ownership of a number of property rights
indeterminate. Landlords retain the right to maintain, to
make additions and changes to the structure, and to select
future tenants. Tenants have the right to occupy the unit,
but cannot transfer it. If on the other hand controlled
tenancies are transferable, then tenants unambiguously receive
a transfer of wealth when controls are imposed.
The grant of security of tenure to renters increases the
risk faced by landlords because it makes it difficult or
impossible to evict troublesome tenants. As a result,
landlords under controls will engage in longer searches for
suitable tenants. The effects of security of tenure have been
examined by Loikkanen (1983) and Boersch-Supan (1984).
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Cheung has focussed on security of tenure in his work on
rent controls in Hong Kong. Describing the pricing behavior
of a large developer, Cheung (1977) documents the monetary
value of the right to choose tenants:
The Hong Kong Land Investment Company [is] the largest
and often regarded as the most efficiently managed
developer in the colony.. .Hong Kong Land constructs
premises primarily for lease and at rentals acknowledged
to be about 10% lower than the market. In a monumental
court case... the opposing lawyer questioned the manager
of Hong Kong Land as to the truth of the assertion that
their rentals were significantly below the market. The
manager replied that it was the company's policy to
maintain a "healthy queue"...such a competitive check on
undesirable behavior may reduce management costs to the
point of more than off-setting the cut in rents. Any
litigation is costly, and matters such as arrears of rent
or damage beyond "ordinary wear and tear" often present
no clearly enforceable rule in law. Thus a simple
eviction becomes the best alternative, and a substantial
queue makes that threat convincing.
An occupied rent controlled unit has a lower sales value
than an unoccupied unit. A landlord with a vacant unit can
collect side payments or sell the unit to an owner-occupant,
or redevelop the site. Even when controlled rents approximate
"market rents", the introduction of secuty of tenure for
sitting tenants increases the risk attached to earning those
returns and means that the investor landlord is no longer free
to decide when to dispose of his asset or to redevelop his
property. Cheung (1975,1979) argues that in Hong Kong strict
interpretation of renters' security of tenure under the
colony's rent controls would have seriously inhibited physical
redevelopment but for the judicial interpretations of the law
which allowed landlords to buy out their sitting tenants in
return for compensation when they wished to redevelop their
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property (hence the name "shoe money" paid for the tenancy
rights of controlled renters).
4.3 Model I: Competitive Market with Price Controls and Side
Payments
4.3.1 Illegal Market Equilibrium
We consider first the impacts of price controls with
evasion when the level of side payments is set by a
competitive market. We expect housing rental markets to be
competitive: the minimum efficient scale of operation is small
relative to market demand, so that small resident landlords
are often at least as efficient as large scale individual or
corporate owners in maintaining and managing rental housing12
. The market for vacant dwellings clears at the black market
price which includes both legal rent and side payments. Side
payments can be exchanged because the price controls are not
effectively enforced. We assume that the market for rental
housing works well in other respects. That is, landlords and
tenants are both fully informed about the spot black market
price for rental housing, and do not face significant
transactions costs. The spot market (for vacant units) is
made up of a large number of landlords and tenants.
Renters have secure tenure once they move in to a
dwelling and their rent, once set, is fixed for the duration
of the tenancy. The spot price for each dwelling depends on
unit characteristics. However, once a rental contract is
agreed, the tenancy of the unit cannot be transferred to
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others. That precludes arbitrage in a secondary market for
tenancies in which renters can sell their occupancy rights to
others. Thus, spot prices depend on unit characteristics, and
at a given time the same price (or price schedule) applies for
all transactions, but many of the contracts still in effect at
a given moment will reflect past market conditions".
Rent controls set a legal maximum rent; they only "bite"
if the controlled rent is lower than the rent at which the
market clears. Figure 4.1 shows graphically the effect of
controls if the imposition of controls does not lead to a
shift in either demand or supply. The market rent, Pm, is
the equilibrium price which matches demand and supply. That
is, D( Pm) = S( Ps). At price Pc, the rent controlled
price, demand exceeds supply.
In the absence of a black market, the mode of allocation
of available units among households is indeterminate.
However, when the supply of housing is at S( Pc) some renter
households are willing to pay as much as PI (an illegal,
black market price) for housing. PI is the illegal price
which an individual landlord could charge in an environment
where all others are law-abiding. However, if more than a few
landlords are willing to supply housing at illegal rents above
Pc , then we need to incorporate their behavior into our
model.
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show the effect of rent controls when
landlords are willing to supply housing at illegal prices
greater than Pc. The landlords' new supply schedule above
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Pc is set by a new (higher) cost function, which includes the
cost of breaking the law. It includes the expected penalties
for law-breaking (the legal penalty, multiplied by the
probability of getting caught) or the higher cost of making
more elaborate contracts designed to evade the law14.
If expected penalties or the chances of getting caught
are high, there may be no landlords willing to supply housing
at an illegal price. That case is shown in Figure 4.2 and is
the one implicitly assumed by most writers on rent controls
when they model its long run impacts as reducing the stock of
controlled rental units and halting all construction of new
(controlled) rental units. Figure 4.3 shows the case in which
housing is available at a black market price. There is a
single black market price for housing at which the market
clears and both landlords and tenants are informed about that
price.
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In the long run, rent controls may cause shifts in demand
as well as supply. For example, if there is no black market
then the imposition of rent controls is likely to make
households face a longer, more difficult search process. If
the probability of finding an appropriate unit is equal for
all searchers, the time to find a match will rise as the
number of searchers increases. The reduced probability of
finding a unit may affect household formation. Figure 4.4
therefore shows shifts in both supply and demand schedules,
with a new equilibrium at a (black market) price different
from the original equilibrium. In Figure 4.4, we show P1>
Pm the illegal equilibrium price is greater than the initial
one. The new "illegal market price" (the legal rent and the
lump sum or period to period side payment) may be higher or
lower than the original one, depending on the elasticity and
magnitude of the shifts in the demand and supply curves.
The discounted ratio of rent plus side payments to value
must give a normal rate of return if housing is to be built in
the face of controls. We conclude from these simple graphic
models that controls with evasion can lead to an illegal
market equilibrium price for rentals, but that we cannot
specify whether that illegal market price will be higher or
lower than the market price which would exist in the absence
of controls without specifying the impact of controls on
demand and the penalty structure and its impact on the supply
function. If there are no effective penalties for evasion,
then neither landlords nor tenants will modify their behavior
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as a result of rent controls. In that case, Pm= Pr where
Pmis the equilibrium price without controls, and P'is the
illegal rent prevalent in the market with controls.
If the law provides for penalties, and is enforced, then
its effects will depend on the magnitude of the penalties and
the probability that they will be imposed. We present below a
model of the impact of penalties on landlords' decision as to
what side payment to seek and whether it should be in the form
of a lump sum payment in advance or regular rent premium
payments.
4.3.2 How large are side payments?
The rent which a landlord can legally charge for a vacant
unit is limited by the rent control law to a fixed amount Pc,
That rent is set when the tenant moves in to the unit and
remains unchanged for the duration of the tenant's stay in
the unit. The tenant has secure tenure for as long as he
wants to stay there.
The present value of side payments or bribes (B) will be
equal to the present value of the difference between the
controlled rent and the illegal market rent for the unit over
the expected duration of the tenancy:
LS
B = I [ Pm- c] / (1 + r ) I
t=1
= [1/ri [ Pm- pc .
Maintenance expenditures of Mawill keep the unit in its
current state of repair. In the contract either the landlord
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or the tenant is assigned the right to maintain the unit.
Consider first the case in which the tenant undertakes
responsibility for maintenance of the controlled unit. If the
incoming tenant does not have (or cannot enforce) the right to
nominate and collect key money from successor tenants, then a
tenant who expects to leave is likely to allow the unit to
deteriorate towards the end of his stay.
The landlord can ensure that maintenance remains at level
Maby charging a returnable deposit (D) which is reimbursed to
the tenant on departure provided he maintains the unit at
level of repair Ma We then get:
LS
B+D= I [Pa- pc- Ma] / (1+r )t
t=1
If, however, the renter with secure tenure can
effectively transfer that tenure to a successor tenant, then
the landlord no longer has an interest in ensuring that
maintenance remains at level Ma , and the present value of the
side payment paid by the first tenant will be:
LS
B = I {[ Pm- pc- M] / (1 + r )t 1
t=1
= [1/r] [ P.- Pc- Ma],
where B is the present value of side payments, Pmis the
illegal market rent, Pcis controlled rent, Mais the constant
periodic expenditures necessary for maintenance at level a
(its current state of repair), r is the discount rate and LS
is the expected length of stay. If the initial tenant leaves,
he collects side payments from his successor, and so on.
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If the landlord retains responsibility for maintenance,
and the tenancy is transferrable then the landlord has no
incentive to maintain the unit if the present value of
maintenance expenditures exceeds the present value of side
payments and rent still to be received. If the tenancy is
non-transferrable (reverts to the landlord when the tenant
moves) then the landlord has no incentive to maintain before
time period LS+1 (after the tenant leaves)1 5 .
4.3.3 The Form of Side Payments: Key Money or Rent Premiums
We proposed above that in this competitive market with
controls and evasion, the market clears at the black market
price: all transactions incorporate a side payment from tenant
to landlord. The side payment represents the difference
between the legal rent and the illegal market price; it may
take the form of key money (a lump sum payment in advance) or
of a higher, illegal rent payment.
Previous models assumed that because landlords could
never count on continued payment of a rent premium, once
tenants with protection from eviction moved into a unit, all
side payments would change hands before tenants gained access
to the unit. In chapter 3, however, we reviewed evidence that
the informal contractual relationship between individual (as
opposed to corporate) landlords and their tenants is such that
contract terms which are not legally enforceable may
nonetheless be effectively enforced by social pressures and
neighborhood norms. Individual landlords who enter into
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informal contracts with tenants which include a mutually
agreed rent, even though that rent may be higher than the
legal rent for the unit, can thus expect that the contract
will be enforced.
When landlord and tenant agree on payment of rent
premiums instead of key money, the landlord faces an
enforcement problem. Once in occupancy, a tenant can renege,
discontinuing the side payments; the landlord has no legal
recourse. Social pressures and neighborhood norms may
nonetheless discourage tenants from such a move, and
institutional factors make it difficult for the tenant.
In Cairo, for example, it is possible but time-consuming
and costly for tenants to call on the rent control
administration or on the courts to ensure that they pay no
more than the controlled rent, and landlords know this in
setting their asking price. Tenants choosing to renege on the
rental agreement must ascertain the legal rent, or
unilaterally decide to pay only what they estimate is the
legal rent. When the contract is agreed the tenant usually
does not know what the legal rent for the unit is. If the
unit is new or recently built, the landlord may not know
either: he has no incentive to call on the authorities to
assess it. The formula for assessing legal rents is publicly
available, so both sides in the negotiation can estimate the
legal rent for the unit.
Landlords are likely to prefer to receive key money:
tenants who have paid key money and who choose to renege must
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report the payment to the authorities, but it is difficult to
prove that a single cash payment changed hands. In practice
finding tenants able to pay key money may prove difficult.
Models which assume that all side payments will be paid
in advance assume perfect capital markets in which renters are
free to borrow against their future income. Capital markets
in less developed countries are far from perfect, and it is
usually difficult for households to borrow even when
collateral is available (for example, to buy a house). Only
households with enough liquid wealth or with access to an
informal credit source willing to lend against their future
earnings or other illiquid wealth can pay key money. The
lower the controlled rent level relative to black market
housing prices, the greater the key money required. With a
large gap between black market and controlled rents and
imperfect capital markets many would-be renters will be unable
to pay the full side payment as key money. They would,
however, be willing to pay it out of income as a higher,
illegal rent payment.
We first assumed that landlords charge the same (black
market) price to all tenants. In this section we have
suggested that some tenants pay it period-by-period, while
other tenants pay some or all of the difference between the
black market rent and the controlled rent in the form of an
advance payment or key money. If this hypothesis is correct,
then we expect that high key money payments will be associated
with lower rents, and vice versa.
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In a competitive market landlords perceive the risk of
penalties as a cost of doing business. It is not necessarily
the case, however, that all landlords perceive the risk of
penalties identically. Consequently, differences in
landlords' perception of the likelihood of getting caught, in
their risk aversion, and in their assessment of the non-
monetary cost of getting caught, will lead to a dispersion in
rents. The following section examines the parameters of that
dispersion.
Landlords collect side payments from incoming tenants.
In addition they collect the legal rent from those same
tenants. They face a risk of getting caught and punished.
The risk of getting caught and punished increases as the ratio
of side payments to the market value of the dwelling
increases. The risk also depends on the form of the side
payment.
If the landlord takes only the controlled rent, he
receives pcwith certainty. If the landlord takes illegal
rent payments or key money, he faces the risk that the tenant
will renege on the agreement, either by halting payment of the
additional illegal rent, or by reporting the key money
transaction to the authorities. We define the probability
that the tenant will renege on the agreement as Zi for
illegal rent and Zk for key money. The probabilities are
defined symmetrically as functions of Pt the illegal rent
premium, and of Pk the annual equivalent of the key money
payment, respectively. That is:
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Zi= Zi ( P'), Zk= Zk ( Pk ).
The higher the illegal payment the landlord seeks, the greater
the probability that the tenant will choose to default. If
the tenant perceives that he has a 'good' deal relative to
market prices, he is less likely to default:
Zi' > 0 , ZI" < 0 , Z ' > 0, Zk " < 0.
Landlords maximize their expected return E[PV (R)]. The
total return over the entire length of a tenancy consists of
the present value of the controlled rent, PV( Pc) which is
always paid, plus the present value of the illegal rent
premium PV( PI), and the key money. The last two components
are uncertain, so for the expected total return we have:
E [PV( R )] = PV( PC) + PV [ ( 1-Zi) ri + ( 1-Zk )K .
If tenants abide by the deal agreed with the landlord, then he
receives the combination of legal and illegal rent plus key
money. If tenants renege, then he receives the legal rent
alone, and must subtract any legal penalties which ensue.
It is more convenient to work in annual terms. To
Ex [R thelandlord sets a rent premium Pi and key
money K in each period. Because of our assumption that
reneging on the agreement on illegal rent and on key money may
occur independently, the maximization is equal to maximizing:
Zi (P) PC+ [1 - Zi (Pi)] (PC+ Pi)
and:
Zk (Pk ) PC + [1 - Zk (Pk )] (PC + pk
separately.
The first-order conditions of these two problems may be
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put as follows, respectively:
Zi = 1 / ( 1 + Ej)
and Zk= 1 / ( 1 + Ek)
where tiand Ekdenote the elasticities of Ziand Zkwith
respect to their respective arguments. The relative
magnitudes of the Z's depend upon their respective
elasticities. The higher the elasticity, the lower the key
money or illegal rent paid, respectively.
If these functions are identical, then Pi= pk at the
respective optimum. On the other hand, at the same premium or
annual key money equivalent Zi> Zkwould imply that it is
easier for a tenant to default on illegal rent payments than
to successfully recuperate key money through legal action once
it has been paid. That implies that illegal rent payments
would be more costly than the corresponding key money
contracts for the same unit ( Pl> PR). That is, in fact,
confirmed by the above model, under suitable assumptions abou-t--
elasticities. Whether the elasticities ELiand Ekdecrease or
increase with the respective premium reflects the
institutional environment and, in particular, the
effectiveness of enforcement.
The one-period model above could easily be extended to
many periods. Yet the essential flavor of the result would
remain. The model could also be extended to deal explicitly
with landlords' attitudes towards risk. If landlords differ
in their perception of the risk of default and its
relationship to the magnitude of rent or key money, (that is,
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with respect to their Z's) this will generate a range of
observed prices charged by different landlords for otherwise
similar units. Moreover, a landlord who is relatively more
risk averse will keep Pior K down to ensure smaller, but less
risky, gains.
How, then, is the decision whether to exchange key money
or illegal rent made? We argue that the form of side payment
(rent, key) is determined by the preferences of the landlord,
the tenant's ability to pay key money, and a process of search
in the market to find a match.
4.3.4 Hypotheses: Implications of the Model
In a competitive market setting we expect that everyone
pays the same black market price. If consumers are rational
and fully informed about the prices being charged in a market,
there can be only one price in equilibrium. However, where
information about the distribution of prices is costly, price
dispersion can persist. Where side payments are used to evade
rent controls, we expect a dispersion in rents (the sum of
legal rent, key money and illegal rent premiums) reflecting
landlords' different risk aversion, their estimation of the
risk associated with each type of tenant, and type of payment,
and their different rate of time preference.
We have already noted that when renters' occupancy rights
are not transferable, or transfer is subject to prohibitively
high transaction costs, occupied rental units are not trade-
able goods. As a result, we expect to find a dispersion in
148
rents to result from inflation which is not fully anticipated
by landlords. Rents are set when units are occupied, and in
the informal contracts in force in Cairo they are not normally
subject to increases, except as a result of negotiation
between landlord and tenant, usually as a result of landlord-
financed improvements to the building. Inflation will result
in price dispersion because the date when tenants moved in
will be an important factor in determining the rent they pay.
Where capital markets are imperfect and contracts for
illegal rents are enforceable (albeit informally, and hence
with some risk), some landlords will accept rent premiums as
an alternative to key money. If the risk associated with key
money is less than the risk associated with rent premiums,
then the total contract rent for tenants who pay key money
should be less than for tenants who pay rent premiums and no
key money.
The competitive market model implies that every tenant
pays key money or illegal rent or a combination of the two,
and that we should observe a tradeoff between rents paid and
key money. Tenants who pay high key money should be observed
paying lower rent than others with contracts concluded in the
same period who paid less or no key money. In the long run,
we should expect to find that the discounted ratio of rent and
key money to value gives a normal rate of return. Landlords
should be indifferent between rent and key money as long as
they get the money with same present value, while tenants
choose whether to offer key money or period by period
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payments.
How then do the characteristics of the tenant and the
landlord enter into rent determination? Landlord and tenant
characteristics affect access to capital markets and therefore
should affect the key money-rent tradeoff but not the total
amount paid. Household characteristics will be significant in
determining rents and key money insofar as they are used as
proxies for risk by landlords or are indicative of household
ability to pay key money. Both formal and informal enforce-
ment costs may vary with tenants' socioeconomic character-
istics. For example, better educated household heads will
find it easier to get help from the rent control bureaucracy,
and renters who are from the same village or governorate as
the landlord or who have family or other ties with him are
less likely to renege on a side payment contract.
In general, however, household characteristics should
have opposite effects on the magnitude of rents and of key
money. We expect to find high income households paying key
money and low income households paying rent. If
socioeconomic variables have strong negative correlations with
rents (the poor pay higher rents) and if socioeconomic
variables have strong positive correlations with key money
(the rich pay key money) then that supports the hypothesis
that the black market price for rental housing in Cairo is a
competitive price. That is, landlords charge the same (shadow
market) rent to all tenants, but for the rich side payments
are usually paid as key money, and for the poor as rent.
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If this hypothesis is correct, then high key money
payments will be associated with lower rents, and vice versa.
Household characteristics will be significant in determining
rents and key money if either they are used as proxies for
risk by landlords or they are indicative of household ability
to pay key money.
4.4 Model II:_ImperfectCompetition, Bilateral Bargaining
and Price Discrimination
4.4.1 _Imperfect ComRgetition and Rent Controls
The previous model suggested that where rent controls
exist and are widely evaded, excess demand is allocated among
available units by a black market price. In that model,
landlords and tenants were both so numerous that no individual
could influence the black market price for rental housing.
This model explores the implications of a world in which a
landlord with a vacant unit has some monopoly power.
Owners of vacant rental housing always have a small
measure of monopoly power because of product differentiation:
housing is heterogeneous, and each location is unique. The
smaller the number of similar products on the market the
greater is each landlord's monopoly power. When housing is
not tradeable once a rental contract is agreed, owners and
tenants of occupied units are no longer potential competition
for owners of vacant units. The result is that little housing
is on the market at any one time, and the market power of
owners of vacant units is increased.
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In this world, each transaction is a process of bilateral
bargaining between landlord and tenant. The level of total
compensation (legal rent and side payments) as well as the
mode of payment are subject to negotiation. The terms of
negotiation may still be bounded by information about the
distribution of prices in recent transactions available both
to the would-be tenant and the landlord (some may be better
informed than others). But the characteristics of landlord
and tenant will enter into the negotiation. In particular,
landlords will attempt to exercise price discrimination,
setting higher total rent for tenants able to afford them.
4.4.2 Price Discrimination
The non-tradeability of occupied dwellings means not only
that landlords have some monopoly power but also that they can
increase their profits through price discrimination, charging
higher prices to some tenants than to others.
If landlords charge different rents to different tenants
in the same market the differences will persist because
arbitrage is excluded. Occupied units cannot be sublet by
low-rent tenants to higher rent tenants. A precondition for
successful price discrimination is that arbitrage between
consumers is impossible. In controlled rental markets,
typically housing cannot be transferred without the landlord's
consent from one consumer to another. Landlords will
initially seek tenants who can pay the highest attainable
"market rent" for the vacant unit. However, some landlords
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will be unable to find such tenants, and will accept tenants
at lower rents.
If all landlords can clearly identify would-be renters'
willingness to pay, then each landlord can charge more to
wealthier tenants, as long as all his competitors do the same.
In a competitive market, such a strategy would represent an
unstable equilibrium, depending on the willingness of all
landlords to abide by the same policy of price discrimination.
Where each landlord can maintain a degree of monopoly power,
as we suggested above, however, a policy of price
discrimination is feasible for each firm within its sphere of
monopoly power.
For price discrimination to be effective, the seller must
be able to identify which group the buyers belong to. It
requires that there be more than one type of buyer with
different demand functions (those with access to capital to
pay key money and those without, for example). A profit
maximizing entrepreneur will charge a higher price to
consumers whose demand is less price elastic, and a lower
price to consumers whose demand is more price elastic. Most
empirical research on the price elasticity of demand for
housing has adopted specifications which impose uniform price
elasticity of demand for all income groups. A few studies'6
have adopted the linear expenditure system which implies that
the price elasticity of demand increases with income. That,
if true in Cairo, would suggest that price discriminating
landlords would charge higher prices to low income would-be
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tenants. The implication, however, derives strictly from the
assumptions of the linear expenditure system.
The full price of housing includes the search time
required to find a dwelling (a price in the form of time
rather than money) and low income households are likely to
put a lower value on their time and therefore are willing to
spend a large amount of time searching for housing. We could
argue, then that the characteristic which distinguishes
consumer elasticity of demand is the willingness and ability
to engage in a lengthy search.
Reasonable questions to ask in this context are: What
should the magnitude of side payments be when landlords
exercise price discrimination? Do people who paid key money
pay higher or lower rent? Why might the rich (who we observe
paying higher rents and key money) be those with the most
inelastic demand for rental housing? Can we predict the
effect of landlord and tenant characteristics on the
bargaining outcome? What renter characteristics will affect
the price asked by landlords, what landlord characteristics
will affect it, and what will affect the price tenants are
willing to pay?
One determinant of landlords' asking price in a market
with price discrimination will be those renter characteristics
which affect the price elasticity of demand (or tenants'
willingness to pay). A second is those characteristics which
affect tenants' expected length of stay in the unit.
Landlords in an inflationary environment will fear getting
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tied in and prefer tenants with a shorter expected length of
stay. Landlords will search for tenants who will pay key, who
won't renege, with a short expected stay in the unit, and who
will maintain and won't destroy the unit. Tenants search for
landlords with low key money requirements, who will take
illegal rent, who won't abandon the building, who will
maintain or see that other tenants do so.
We could model landlords' and renters' search behavior
by assuming that renters are of two types: high-price renters
face higher search costs, either because they are newcomers to
the city, and so less well informed, or because they put a
higher value on the time spent on search, or have a higher
discount rate (are less willing to wait in order to find a
low-price unit). Low-price renters face lower search costs
(the value of their time is less, they are better informed),
or have a lower discount rate. Landlords maximize profits by
exercising price discrimination and adopting a search strategy
in which high-price renters are preferred initially, but after
some point landlords accept low-price renters rather than keep
their unit vacant. The switch will take place when the
expected net profits of having a tenant of type i equal the
expected discounted net profits when searching for a tenant at
time t. If there is some uncertainty of getting a high-price
tenant, then the landlord must decide at what point in time
low-rent tenants become acceptable.
Assuming that the landlord is risk neutral, the
landlord's optimization problem can be formulated as follows.
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The landlord is searching for a nant for his vacant unit at
time t, and he has to determine what type of tenant candidate
is acceptable such that the present (expected) value of the
stream of legal rent and side payments is maximized.
4.4.3 Limits to Tenants' and Landlords' Bids
Tenant and landlord characteristics will be significant
in determining the total amount paid as well as the proportion
of side payments which take the form of key money or rent.
Households have different search costs, and different access
to information about the housing market and hence different
bargaining power. Newcomers are likely to have less access to
information than long-term residents, and high income
households may face higher search costs. These factors will
affect the relative bargaining power of landlord and tenant.
The following model of the bargaining situation
incorporates both tenants' and landlords' concerns. Let KL
denote the (minimum) amount that a landlord demands as a key
money payment, and Krthe (maximum) amount of money that a
tenant is prepared to pay. An observation of key money is
characterized by the event:
KL KT ,
Conditionally on a deal being made, the key money may be
determined through bargaining. The outcome reflects market
conditions, as they affect the alternatives of the two
parties. Thus, for some deals, K =Kr , for others K = KL,
and yet for others it may be a complicated function of (KL,
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KT ), which expresses the outcome of bargaining and of the
alternative courses of action open to the two parties.
4.4.4 Hypotheses: Implications of the Model
If socioeconomic variables operate positively in both
rent and key money equations, then that is evidence of price
discrimination. If this model holds, then we expect to find
that household characteristics will be significant in
determining the rent paid for a dwelling, holding dwelling
characteristics constant. Key money is likely to be
significant and positive in the rent equation, serving as a
proxy for the tenant's wealth and income, and signalling to
landlords the tenant's ability to pay a higher price for
housing. If household characteristics have significant
coefficients when they are included in the rent regression,
that suggests that some form of discrimination by landlords is
taking place. We have suggested that willingness to pay key
money may be used by landlords as a measure of renters' income
and ability to pay higher rent as well. Landlords may also
use tenant characteristics such as income or household size,
as proxies for unobservable characteristics such as
willingness to maintain the unit or expected length of stay in
the unit17.
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4.5 Summaryand Conclusions
We find the expected penalty function and capital market
constraints important in determining the form taken by side
payments (key money or rent premiums) and the magnitude and
distribution of side payments in both models. The first model
suggests that there will be relatively little dispersion in
the price of housing. Some contracts will incorporate rent
premiums, while others reflect an initial key money
transaction. The second model implies that landlords with
vacant rental units have considerable monopoly power, because
rented units are not tradeable. They will use their monopoly
power to maximize profits in bargaining with would-be tenants.
Tenants' characteristics (income, wealth, education) will be
used by landlords in pricing vacant units (in rents and key
mony).
This chapter has argued that previous work on rent
controlled housing markets has neglected some of their most
important features. Most models either assume that controls
are fully enforced, or charicterize evasion as taking the form
of key money or reductions in maintenance. Neither assumption
seems fully appropriate when we consider housing markets in
developing countries. The administrative resources necessary
for enforcement are in short supply and evasion is typically
widespread.
We suggest that many landlords charge an illegal price
for their rental housing, which may take the form either of
key money or of illegal rent premiums. Both the form and the
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magnitude of the illegal price will depend on the landlord's
risk aversion, on his perception of the riskiness of a would-
be tenant, and on his rate of time preference. Key money
payments are less risky for landlords and therefore a cheaper
way for tenants to pay the (illegal) market price for housing,
but rent premiums represent an alternative for wealth-
constrained tenants.
Because capital markets in this environment are far from
perfect, most tenants are likely to be wealth-constrained.
However, the right to add units to an existing building
remains an important right retained by landlords in Cairo, and
because capital markets are imperfect, landlords may be
willing to accept lower payments from would-be renters in
order to complete rentable additions to an existing building.
Landlords with a low rate of time preference may be
willing to keep units vacant for significant periods in order
to seek tenants willing to pay a high key money price. The
high asking prices in key money reported in chapter 3 probably
reflect the fact that such units will spend more time vacant
and hence be sampled with greater probability than units whose
owners are willing to accept lower key money or illegal rents.
Willingness to pay key money also appears to be a readily
identifiable tenant characteristic which is used by landlords
to exercise price discrimination. Wealthier tenants - those
who pay key money - also pay higher rents, on average. That
difference, we suggest, can be explained as an unstable
equilibrium in which all landlords set rental prices depending
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on what the would-be tenant can pay, maximizing profits by
charging higher prices to wealthier tenants.
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Footnotes
' For descriptions of the "first generation" rent controls in
Europe and North America see Block and Olsen (eds.) 1981;
Gelting 1967; Lindbeck 1967; Howenstine 1977,1979; and Harloe
1985.
2 For descriptions of the impacts of the "second generation"
rt controls in North America, see Niebanck 1984 and Rosen
1985.
3 See Walker et.al. 1975; Cheung 1975,1979; Olsen 1972; Kern
and Lichtenstein 1983; and Heffley 1983.
4 See Gilderbloom 1981,1983.
'See Boersch-Supan, 1984 and Follain and Malpezzi 1980.
6 See Ioannides 1975 and Loikkanen 1982.
7 This crucial distinction was pointed out by Frankena
(1975).
8 See Moorhouse 1975 and Arnault 1975.
9 There is some evidence that the cost of producing a unit of
housing services in a controlled apartment in the US is higher
than the cost of producing a unit of housing services in the
uncontrolled sector (Olsen 1972, 1097).
10 Becker 1971; Moorhouse 1972; Arnault 1975; Frankena 1975;
and Wheaton 1981.
11 First proposed by Henderson (1977).
12 Highly concentrated ownership of rental units is
frequently the result of concentrated ownership of land (in
parts of central London, for example).
13 As a result, observations of household expenditures on
housing will mirror market conditions at the time each
contract was made.
14 An example of the latter is furnished apartments in Cairo
and in Great Britain is the 'company lets' contracted by some
landlords for which companies are set up by the tenant, with
the landlord's help, for the sole purpose of renting a unit,
because units rented to companies (as opposed to individuals)
are not subject to rent controls (House of Commons 1979).
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15 An alternative to the deposit of D in the second case is a
contract clause requiring the tenant to restore the unit to
its initial level of maintenance at the time of his departure.
Such clauses are sometimes included in agricultural land
leases (See Currie 1981). However, they are less likely to be
effective in leases for urban housing, where maintenance has
more dimensions and is less easily observed or measured than
the quality of agricultural land. Indeed, it was the virtual
impossibility of enforcing legal maintenance requirements for
landlords led to the first models of landlord evasion of rent
controls (Moorhouse 1972 and Arnault 1975).
16 See Mayo (1981) for a summary of these studies.
17 Loikkanen (1983) describes similar behavior by landlords
in the rent controlled Helsinki housing market.
Chapter 5
Is There a Market Price for Housing in Cairo?
Hedonic Estimates of Housing Values
5.1 Introduction
Prices in housing markets signal consumers' preferences
for housing attributes to suppliers. In the real world, both
tenants and landlords are imperfectly informed about the
"market price" of rental property. Even in uncontrolled
housing markets where all rental transactions take place at
"market prices", there is significant dispersion in the prices
actually paid. A part of that dispersion is attributable to
the cost of obtaining information, particularly for the small
landlord who owns few properties, and for newcomers to the
city. When the "market" price is a black market price, the
dispersion of rental prices is likely to be significantly
greater, since both tenant and owner face substantial imped-
iments in acquiring information about current transactions.
Identifying and comparing prices in housing markets is
relatively difficult because housing is not a homogeneous
good: each dwelling can be thought of as a bundle of diverse
characteristics such as a number of rooms, in a particular
location, of a certain age, with access to specific public
services (water, sewers, electricity, paved roads), and so on.
When we compare two dwellings we compare the specific
attributes of those dwellings, and we expect the total value
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of each to reflect its attributes. One way to consider the
"market" price of housing, then, is as a vector of shadow
prices of housing attributes.
In this chapter we estimate a hedonic regression for the
(sales) value of housing in Cairo. Hedonic models decompose
expenditures on housing into measurable prices and quantities;
the name hedonic derives from the idea that the "implicit"
price of each attribute reflects consumers' valuation of the
satisfaction derived from it. A hedonic equation therefore
regresses expenditures (rents or values) on housing
characteristics to generate estimates of the implicit market
price of each measured attribute'.
The hedonic regression here has two purposes. The first
is to estimate a consistent measure of the value of each
rented dwelling, which will permit us to make comparisons
between the rents paid for them. The models in chapter 4
assumed that both landlord and tenant are informed about the
"market price" for each unit, and that the shadow market rent
plays an important role in explaining the price it which a
dwelling will be rented, even though the price at which each
unit is rented will depend in addition on a host of other
factors. To estimate such models empirically, we need a
measure for the shadow market rental value of each dwelling.
Imputed sales values for rented units based on the hedonic
rearession reported here are used in the next chapter as a
prox-y for shadow market values2 in estimating the probability
that renters will pay key money.
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The second objective of the hedonic estimates reported
here is to investigate whether renters as well as owners are
informed about housing values, and whether renters and owners
share a common perception of value. We do not usually expect
renters, who have only the right to occupy their dwelling for
the duration of a fixed lease, to be informed about its value
on the sales market. We noted in chapter 3, however, that
rent controls in Cairo have created a housing sector in which
renters share the rights commonly conceived of as
corresponding to ownership of housing. We argued that there
can be de facto (albeit illegal) "contracts" agreeing on an
allocation of these shared rights between landlords and
tenants. In each case renters with secure tenure granted by
rent control have significant de tacto property rights to
their dwellings. If renters are in effect part owners of the
hcusing they occupy, however, we might well expect them to be
aware of the market sales value of that housing. This chapter
tests that hypothesis: it examines the determinants of the
value of dwellings in Cairo, using owner-occupiers' and
renters' estimates of the market value of their units.
5.2 The Data: Estimating Housing Values and Rents
The Informal Housing Study household survey asked
household heads to report the value of their dwelling: the
questions they were asked were not phrased alike, but both
referred to current market values. Renters were asked: "If
you wanted to buy this place or a similar place around here,
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about how much do you think it would cost?". Owners were
asked: "Suppose you wanted to sell your dwelling, how much
could you get for it?". Not all renters or owners surveyed
were willing to estimate the value of their dwelling, but
estimates were provided by about half the owners (70 out of
154 owner-occupiers) and over one third of renters (121 out of
346 renters). No systematic differences were found between
respondents and non-respondents with respect to income, family
size, or housing type (formal or between informal, one-family
or multi-family dwellings).
In housing economics, particularly in the U.S.A., there
is a long history of reliance on owners' estimates of the
value of their dwellings3 . The most accurate measure of the
value of a dwelling is the sale price at the time it changes
hands. Housing is a commodity which changes hands relatively
infrequently, however, so that the original purchase price of
the majority of dwellings at any given time no longer measures
the market valuation of the quantity of housing services
currently supplied. The cost of professional appraisers'
services has ruled out their use in most studies of housing
values.
In a number of European countries, up to date
professional appraisals for tax purposes are more often
available and where they are available, researchers have
tended to prefer them. For example, in order to estimate
housing demand, King (1930) used the imputed annual rental
values appraised for all U.K. dwellings for property tax
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purposes, and Englund, Brownstone and Persson (1935) use
assessed values from the Swedish tax records. In studies of
the U.S. housing market, dwelling values are more often based
on owners' estimates of the current market value of their
dwelling. Both the U.S. Census and the Annual (now American)
Housing Survey base housing values on owners' estimates.
The frequent reliance on owners' estimates in the past is
not enough to justify its use to measure housing values in
Egypt. Fortunately, several studies have compared owners' and
professional appraisers' estimates of the values of dwellings,
and their findings provide a yardstick for evaluating the
accuracy of owners'estimates of value. Kish and Lansing
(1954) compared owners' estimates of the value of single
family houses with estimates obtained from qualified
professional appraisers. They found that the discrepancies
were relatively small. Owners tended to overestimate the
value of their homes, relative to assessors' estimates, but
the mean difference between them was only about 4 per cent of
the value of the house. They found large discrepancies in the
values for individual homes, but small differences in the
overall distribution of values. That is, the errors were not
systematically associated with houses with higher or lower
values.
Kain and Quigley (1972) replicated the Kish and Lansing
analysis and extended it to owner-occupied multi-family
buildings. They found that owners of single family homes
tended to underestimate the value of their homes, but that the
167
mean percent difference between the owner's estimate and the
appraised value was under 2 percent of the value and was not
statistically significant. However, owner-occupants of
multiple unit properties were found to overestimate housing
value by 6 percent, and this difference was statistically
significant.
Finally, to our knowledge, only one study has compared
owners' and assessors' estimates of the value of dwellings in
a ldc context. Jimenez used both owners' and assessors'
estimates of the values of squatter dwellings in Manila. He
found that the means of owner and appraiser estimates were
statistically indistinguishable, and was able to conclude that
"on average, owners evaluate their dwellings consistently with
valuations obtained from accepted appraising practices"
(Jimenez 1932, 743). However, as both earlier studies
reported, individual estimates sometimes showed discrepancies.
The average absolute value of discrepancies between owner and
appraiser estimates in Manila was approximately 55 percent of
the mean appraised valie, compared with 20 percent in Kain and
Quigley's U.S. sample. When both owners' and professional
valuations were used as dependent variables in hedonic
regressions of building and lot characteristics on value, the
overall results were similar and the coefficients were of
similar sign and roughly the same order of magnitude.
In the informal housing markets which often prevail in
developing countries, as well as in the U.S., then, owners are
well aware of the market value of their dwellings, or at least
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able to impute values about as accurately as professional
appraisers could. In the Egyptian sample, the high rate of
non-response raised further doubts about the validity of the
data: 55 percent of Cairo owners failed to report the value of
their dwelling, compared with 5.6 percent in the Kish and
Lansing study (where all owners lived in single-family
detached dwellings) and 40.3 percent in the Kain and Quigley
study. Kain and Quigley found a higher rate of response from
owners of single-family dwellings (37.6 percent failed to
estimate value, compared with 45ercent of owners on other
structure types). In Cairo, the overwhelming majority of
structures were not single-family detached dwellings, so that
the non-response rate is comparable to that reported by Kain
and Quigley.
Kish and Lansing found that the appraisers' estimates of
values in cases where respondents' estimates were not
ascertained were distributed broadly similarly to the rest of
the sample. The least and most valuable dwellings were very
slightly under-renresented in the data generated by owners'
estimates of value. In the lower tail, 28 percent of
dwellings whose owner's estimate was missing were valued at
under $5000 by the appraisers, compared with 16 percent of the
sample as a whole, while in the upper tail, 19 percent of the
units for which owners' estimates were missing were valued by
appraisers at $12,500 or more, compared with 13 percent of the
sample as a whole. Kain and Quigley, with a much higher
nonresponse rate (comparable to that for the Egyptian sample),
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found systematic differences in the characteristics of
respondents and nonrespondents. Nevertheless, the differences
in mean values between the dwellings of respondents and
nonrespondents was relatively small. The mean appraised value
of dwellings with owners' estimates was 6.1 percent higher
than the mean value of dwellings for which an owner's estimate
was lacking.
In the Cairo data set we have no appraisers' estimates
with which the owners' and renters' estimates can be compared.
It is, however, encouraging thate found no systematic
differences between owners' and renters' characteristics and
those of dwellings for which values were or were not reported.
5.3 The Hedonic Model
Housing is a commodity with multiple attributes, each of
whichontributes to the market value of a given dwelling
unit. The basic premise of hedonic price analysis is that
there is a reasonably well-specified relationship between the
market price of a good characterized by multiple attributes
and the characteristics of the good. Even though no two
dwellings which change hands may be identical, the market
price for each characteristic is formed by the intersection of
the demand and supply schedules for the characteristic, the
result of multiple transactions between buyers and sellers
(Rosen 1974). The relationship can be expressed as:
V = V ( At ,A2 ,As.,... All)
where: V is the market value of the dwelling
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and: A1,A2 ,A , ... ,An is a vector Df attributes of the
dwelling which affect its value.
Theory gives very little guidance as to the appropriate
functional form to be used in the specification of the
relationship V( ). Economic theory provides neither the
correct representation of the vector of housing attributes nor
the appropriate functional relationship, even though hedonic
models have become one of the most used tools in empirical
analysis of housing markets. A hedonic price equation is a
reduced-form equation reflecting both supply and demand
factors; hence the appropriate functional form for the
equation cannot in general be specified on theoretical
grounds4. No empirical study to date has to our knowledge
rigorously derived an appropriate functional form from
specification of the parameters underlying demand and supply
(from a specified utility function, for example); instead, ad
hoc criteria have been used to select a functional form for
the relationship to be estimated. The theoretical models
which have been proposed' all give rise to the desired
hedonic relation only under quite restrictive conditions.
Nevertheless, repeated attempts to estimate hedonic relations
have produced results consistent with simple intuition.
The majority of studies estimate the general function:
V = V (Ai,A2 ,A3., .... ,An
as a linear relationship:
V(A) = t i cP i uAiic+ . t
There is no theoretical j;ustifficat ion for this, it is merely a
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convenient functional form. The dependent variable and some
independent variables may be expressed in logarithmic form.
More recently it has been sgested that the Box-Cox
transformation be used they give a better fit in estimation
and that they indicate that the appropriate functional form is
neither linear nor logarithmic6 . This is, of course, an ad
hoc criterion, rather than one derived from a behavioral model
of choice. This study uses both linear and log-linear
specifications. That is, we estimated equations of the form:
V = PiA1+ PzA2+ P' Aa+.... + P A,+ 
and:
Log(V) = PiA1+ P2 A,+ P3 Aa+.... + Pu An
Where the Pi are prices in thte market and Ai the attributes of
the dwellings and the land on which they are located.
5.4 The Variables
We assume that housing values and rents iepend on the
characteristics or attributes of the dwelling:, of the
building, of the land on which it is located, and of the
neiQhborhood. Reported value is also potentially affected by
resident characteristics. The market value of rent-controlled
housing occupied by tenants with secure tenure is also
influenced by resident characteristics. If we are to use the
imputed hedonic values to abstract from these factors, we need
to measure their influence. We hypothesized that in Cairo,
reported value micht be affected by the length of time the
:ccupant (owner or renter) had been resident there, since that
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might affect their information about current :arket values.
Since many owner-occupants were owners of the multi-family
building in which their dwelling was located, and some of
those owner-occupants seemed to have trouble distinguishing
unit from building values, we found it necessary to include a
dummy variable identifying all those owners who lived in
multi-family buildings and who reported that they owned the
entire building. This can be interpreted as a measure of the
value of the land, or of the development rights associated
with the land when the building has a single owner. Values of
independent variables are given in Table 5.2. for owners and
renters, and for the pooled sample.
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Table 5.1
Definition of Variables in Hedonic Equation
CONSTANT: Dwelling with one room and one bathroom
ROOM2,ROOM3:Take the value 1 for second and third room
ROOMS4+:
XBTH:
XTOIL:
OTOIL:
NOBTL:
SBTL:
SKIT:
NOKIT:
ELEVGE5:
ELEVLT5:
GARDEN:
FLOWERS:
NOTBRICK:
GOODCOND:
B AD COiND:
AGELT60:
AGE7176:
AGE76:
DISTANCE:
in the dwelling respectively.
Number of rooms for units with 4 or more rooms (+)
Takes the value 1 for units with more than one
bath; 0 otherwise
Takes the value 1 for units with more than one
toilet (without bath); 0 otherwise
Takes the value 1 for units with toilet only (no
bath) ; 0 otherwise
Takes the value 1 for units with neither bath nor
toilet ; 0 otherwise
Takes the value 1 for units with shared bath or
toilet ; 0 otherwise
Takes the value 1 for units with shared kitchen
O otherwise
Takes the value 1 for units with no kitchen; 0
otherwise
Takes the value 1 for units with elevator and more
than 5 floors; 0 otherwise
Takes the value 1 for units with elevator and
fewer than 5 floors; 0 otherwise
Takes the value 1 for buildings which surveyors
noted had a garden; 0 otherwise
Takes the value 1 for buildings which surveyors
noted had flowers in windowboxes or on balconies
or in gardens; 0 otherwise
Takes the value 1 for buildings made of materials
other than brick; ; 0 otherwise
Takes the value 1 for buildings noted in good
condition by surveyors; 0 otherwise
Takes the value I for buildings noted in bad
condition by surveyors; 0 otherwise
Takes the value 1 for buildings constructed before
1960; 0 otherwise
takes the value 1 for buildings constructed
1971-16; 0 otherwise
takes the value 1 for buildings constructed after
1976; 0 otherwise
Distance from downtown Cairo to the centroid of
the survey zone. (Central Cairo identified as the
centroid of the zone bounded by Embaba Station,
Tahrir and Ataba Squares, the three hubs of the
public transportation system in the city).
Printed output based on map distance; to convert
to km, 1 unit measured = 635 meters.
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Table 5.1 (continued)
Definition
NOGRBG:
SLIGHTS:
PAVEROAD:
WIDEROAD:
SIDEWALK:
GOODAREA:
OWNBLDG:
of Variables in Hedonic Equation
Takes the value 1 for neighborhoods which
surveyors noted had no loose garbage in the
vicinity; 0 otherwise
Takes the value 1 for neighborhoods with street
lighting; 0 otherwise
Takes the value 1 for paved road in front of
buildinq; 0 otherwise
Takes the value 1 for wide road in front of
building (3 meters or more); ; 0 otherwise
Takes the value 1 for road with a sidewalk in
front of building; 0 otherwise
Takes the value 1 for neighborhoods which
surveyors noted had a majority of middle and
upper class residents; 0 otherwise
Takes the value 1 for owners who report they own
the whole buildinQ and lot; 0 otherwise.
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Table 5.2
Mean Values of Variables in the Value Equation
All
Dependent variable
ESTVAL (LE)
Households
10953
Independent variables
(expected sign)
Sanitary
XBTH
XTOIL
OTOIL
NOBTL
SBTL
SKIT
IOKIT
Dwelling
ROOMS
Building
ELEVGE5
ELEVLT5
GARDEN
FLOWERS
NOTBR ICK
GOODCOND
BADCOND
AGELT60
AGE7176
AGE76
facilities:
(+)
(+)
(-)
(-)
(-)
(-)
(-)
Size
(+)
3.4
19.2
18.1
1.1
10.2
2.8
18.1
3.42
Characteristics
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
(-)
5.1
2.3
6.8
3.4
5.6
50. 3
13.6
46.9
15.8
6.8
Neighborhood Characteristics
NOGRBGE (+) 29.9
LIGHTS (+) 57.1
PAVROAD (+) 39.0
WIDROAD (+) 3.2
SIDEWALK (+) 39.5
GOODAREA (+) 24.8
Other
DISTANCE(km) (-)
OWNBLDG (+)
3.9
19.2
4.5
16.7
31.8
3.0
15.1
4.5
19.7
3.61
3.0
0.0
4.5
0.0
7.6
40.9
21 .2
50.0
16.7
9.1
19.7
54.5
28.8
25.8
31.8
16.7
4.0
51.5
2
20
9
0
7
1
17
7
1
9
0
8
1
3.31
6
3
8
5
4
55
9
45
15
3
36
58
45
21
44
29
0
5
0
6
1
7
3.8
n.a. (0.0)
Owners
10755
Renters
11071
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Table 5.3
Ordinary Least Squares Model of HousingValues
Dependent
the Value
variable HSGVAL: Owners' and Renters' Estimates of
of their Dwellings in 1981 (LE)
CONSTANT
XBTH
XTOIL
OTOIL
NOBTL
SBTL
SKIT
NOKIT
ROOM2
ROOM3
ROOMS4+
ELEVGE5
ELEVLT5
GARDEN
FLOWERS
NOTBRICK
GOODCOND
BADCOND
AGELT60
AGE7176
AGE76
DISTANCE
NOGRBGE
LIGHTS
PAVEROAD
WIDEROAD
SIDEWALK
GOODAREA
OWNBLDG
Number of
R2 :0.59
Parameter
Estimate
-1592.02
7554.26
3657.11
307.01
-325.51
3456.88
-1591.45
-2553.71
3266.01
3375.09
7975.85
5401.62
17107.57
6495.40
3489.60
2007.40
2305.38
-1354.19
-1033.44
-2226.70
-1129.36
-212.34
3994.95
2927.06
2291.63
5141.45
-1354.24
5002.06
4147.12
Observations:
Standard
Error
3677.64
4738.62
2040.17
2288.26
4706.95
3546.39
5133.68
2655.42
3306.03
3542.89
3550.06
3416.18
11288.52
3061.83
4722.10
3018.39
1684.72
2521.28
1790.20
2254.87
3032.52
122.10
1822.16
1601.30
2263.29
1936.05
2332.68
2191.28
2000.02
T for HO: Prob >!T
Parameter=0
-0.43
1.59
1.79
0.13
-0.07
0.97
-0.31
-0.96
0.99
0.95
2.25
1.58
1.52
2.12
0.74
0.67
1.37
-0.54
-0.58
-0.99
-0.37
-1.74
2.19
1.83
1.01
2.66
-0.58
2.28
2.07
0.67
0.11
0.07
0.89
0.94
0.33
0.76
0.34
0.32
0.34
0.03
0.12
0.13
0.04
0.46
0.51
0.17
0.59
0.56
0.32
0.71
0.08
0.03
0.07
0.31
0.009
0.56
0.02
0.04
176
Adjusted R2 : 0.51
F: 7.64
Prob > F: 0.0001
Root M.S.E.: 8838.27
Mean of Dependent Variable : 10922.35
C.V.: 80.92
Ref.:91984:130612
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Table 5.4
Ordinary Least Squares Model of Housing Values
Dependent
Estimates
variable LGHSGVAL: Logarithm of Owners' and Renters'
of the Value of their Dwellings in 1981 (LE)
Parameter
Estimate
Standard
Error
T for HO:
Parameter=0
Prob >|T!
CONSTANT
XBTH
XTOIL
OTOIL
NOBTL
SBTL
SKIT
NOKIT
ROOM2
ROOM3
ROOMS4+
ELEVGE5
ELEVLT5
GARDEN
FLOWERS
NOTBRICK
GOODCOND
BADCOND
AGELT60
AGE7176
AGE76
DISTANCE
1OGRBGE
LIGHTS
PAVEROAD
WIDEROAD
SIDEWALK
GOODAREA
OWNBLDG
Number of
R 2 0.42
6.
0.
0.
0.
-0.
0.
0.
-0.
0.
0.
1.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
-0.
-0.
-0.
-0.
-0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
51
04
01
24
46
44
24
35
78
62
43
35
83
57
42
80
48
07
16
49
54
00139
28
30
08
55
27
30
67
Observations:
0.59
0.73
0.32
0.35
0.74
0.56
0.79
0.41
0.55
0.57
0.58
0.52
1.73
0.47
0.72
0.48
0.26
0.39
0.27
0.34
0.47
0 . 02
0.28
0.24
0.35
0.30
0.36
0.34
0.31
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Adjusted R2 0.31
F: 3.79
Prob > F: 0.0001
Root M.S.E.: 1.35
Mean of Dependent Variable: 8.45
C.V.: 16.03
Ref.:101184:1134
10.94
0.06
0.04
0.69
-0.63
0.78
0.30
-0.85
1.43
1.07
2.45
0.66
0.48
1.21
0.57
1.67
1.86
-0.17
-0.59
-1.43
-1.16
0.07
1.01
1.23
0.24
1.84
0.76
0.89
2.19
0001
95
96
49
53
44
78
40
15
28
01
51
83
23
57
10
06
86
56
15
25
94
32
22
81
07
45
38
03
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5.5 Estimation Results
The equation was first estimated using ordinary least
squares for the pooled sample and for owners and renters
separately. An F-test (Chow 1960) was used to establish
whether the data from owners and renters could be pooled or
whether separate owner and renter regressions should be
estimated. The test gave an F-value of 1.40, with 29 and 119
degrees of freedom. We therefore were able to accept the null
hypothesis that the same regression coefficients apply to both
subsets of the data. The results of the pooled regression are
given in Tables 5.3 and 5.4.
The linear regression model explains about half of the
observed variation in housing values (corrected R2 .51)
About half the coefficients are significant at the 0.125 level
or better. Most of the coefficients are of the expected sign
and plausible magnitudes. The negative coefficient for the
age of newer buildings is consistent with findings in Jiminez
and other studies of housing values in developing countries
that because buildings are typically occupied before they are
completed, their values are positively correlated with age.
The coefficient for shared bath or toilet is positive, but not
significantly different from zero at the cutoff level of
significance we have chosen. The small magnitude of the
coefficients for the second and third rooms in a dwelling is
also somewhat surprising. An alternative specification using
a single variable for the number of roons may be preferable.
Both the positive coefficient for shared bath and toilet and
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the relatively small coefficients for second and third rooms
in a dwelling may reflect the greater rental (and hence sales)
value of single rooms rented without kitchen or bath
facilities.
The fact that it is feasible to estimate a hedonic model
for housing values in Cairo, pooling owners' and renters'
estimates of the values of their dwellings, suggests that we
can reasonably talk about a "market" for housing even in a
market environment as strongly subject to regulation and
government intervention. The agreement between owners' and
renters' estimates suggests that renters as well as owners
were implicitly estimating values in the owner-occupied
(uncontrolled) sector of the market and not, for example, the
value of their landlords' residual property rights in the
dwellings the renters now occupy (the value of an occupied
rent-controlled unit).
The log-linear equation appears to fit rather less well
to the data.
5.6 Statistical Problems
The regression model assumes that the error term is
normally distributed. We might expect the market value of a
fully occupied rent-controlled building to be much lower than
the value of the corresponding vacant units, and even, given
the apparently effective eviction controls, lower than the
market value of the land alone (if vacant). If some
respondents reported dwelling values as the price of occupied
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rented units and others as the price of vacant units, then the
dependent variable might have a bimodal distribution. In
practice, occupied rent controlled buildings and individual
units rarely change hands, and we were unable to find even
casual assessments of the market values of such buildings.
The renters surveyed consistently reported the value of their
units in terms of the market value of a vacant unit.
A major problem in estimating the equation is the
likelihood of error in observation of the independent
variables. Error in the independent variables of course
produces bias and inconsistency. However, we attempted to
include proxy variables, measured with greater accuracy to
enable us to obtain consistent estimates; the relatively large
sample size increases the likelihood that our estimates are
reliable, given that they are consistent. Multicollinearity
does not appear to be a problem: condition numbers were
examined and found to be low. However, the Durbin Watson
statistics are low, suggesting the possibility of that some
serial correlation is present, associated with the character
of the observations which are derived from cluster sampling.
If present, this serial correlation will not affect the
unbiassedness or consistency of our estimates, but may bias
downward the standard error of the equation. However, if
present, the pattern of serial correlation is likely to be
complex, and we have followed the usual pattern of cross
section studies in making no attempt to correct for serial
correlation.
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Table 5.6
Owners' and Renters' Estimates of the Value of their Dwelling
Rental Value (LE/Month) Sales Value(LE)
Owners Owners Renters Owners Renters
(Furnished) (Unfurnished)
Mean
134.8 8.69 8.89 14,703 11,501
Maximum
2500.0* 55.00 150.00 300,000 100,000
Q3
100.0 10.37 8.6 15,000 15,000
Median
50.0 5.00 5.00 7,000 5,000
Q1
25.0 2.18 3.04 2,000 1,500
Min
3.0 1.00 0.80 6 20
Number of Observations
47/154 104/154 330/346 70/154 121/346
Source: Computed from Informal Housing Study Household
Interview Survey data.
5.7 Conclusions
We found that about half of the variation in housing
values (estimated by dwellings' occupants) can be explained by
dwelling and neighborhood characteristics, and that renters'
and owners' estimates are not statistically distinguishable.
The results suggest that both owners and renters perceive a
unique sales "market" for housing in Cairo. Numerous owners
and renters are informed about property values and the
relationship between rents and values in the market.
The results reported here have potentially useful
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applications. Hedonic models have been widely used to measure
demand for housing attributes. In the case of local public
g.oods, demand can be indirectly observed by observing the
demand for land. The value of amenities such as public roads,
water and sewer systems, or local police, schools and fire
protection, or local levels of air pollution is capitalized in
the value of the land and housing at that location. Numerous
studies have used this concept to attempt to measure the
demand for public goods or amenities7 . Policymakers in Cairo
and cities like it are in need of information about public
demand for services.
In Cairo, government intervention in the rental housing
market is extensive. The government also intervenes in both
land and other input markets for new owner-occupied housing;
and the rate of turnover of both owner- and renter- occupied
housing is very low. The results reported in this chapter
suggest that useful information about the valuation of housing
attributes including public goods (such as infrastructure)
and private goods, (such as the number of rooms in the
dwelling) can be derived from hedonic modelling in such a
context. Even if each renter household faces an
"individualized price" for the space it occupies, based on the
rent agreed upon with the landlord when the tenant moved in
(or set by rent control legislation), substantial numbers of
renters at least are aware of a common set of market prices,
the sales value of vacant owner-occupied units.
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Footnotes
See Rosen 1974 for the theory underlying this application.
Hedonic equations are discussed in more detail below. A more
detailed non-technical explanation of the method is given in
Malpezzi, Ozanne and Thibodeau 1980.
2 King (1980) notes that taxes in the UK and USA bias the
relationship between values and rents, because owners receive
tax relief on some housing expenditures, whereas renters do
not, and the relief is income-related. The relationsip of
rents to values in the systems with such a tax break is
complex. In Egypt, however, income taxes affect only the
highest deciles of the population and there is no such special
treatment of housing in the tax code, no such problems arise.
3 Kain and Quigley (1972) give a list of such studies.
4 See Rosen 1974; Halvorsen and Pollakowski 1931.
5 For a review of such studies see Malpezzi, Ozanne and
Thibodeau 1980, chapter 2.
6 See, for example, Quigley 1982; Kaufman and Quigley 1982.
7 See Scotchmer 1984 for a theoretical model of the
information contained in land and housing prices; Harrison and
Rubinfeld 1978 and Freeman 1979 for applications of the method
in the U.S.A. and Quigley 1982 and Kaufman and Quigley 1982
for an application to a developing country housing market.
Brown and Rosen 1982 discusses the problems of estimation.
Chapter 6
Key Money: Empirical Analysis
6.1 Introduction
We saw in the previous section that the rent control
literature has hitherto acknowledged in passing the potential
importance of side payments or key money, at the same time
both theoretical and empirical analysis of the phenomenon were
neglected. This chapter uses micro (household) data from the
Informal Housing Survey (see Appendix 1) in order to test
hypotheses from the models in chapter 4. The determinants of
key money payments are broken down into the qualitative
aspect, whether key money is paid, and the quantitative, that
is, how much is paid.
The analysis in this section is possible because the
random sample of renter households interviewed for the survey
were asked whether they paid any advance or key money when
they moved in, and if so, how much they paid and to whom:
owner, previous tenant, broker, or other recipient (for
example a finder's fee). Of the 346 renter households
interviewed in Cairo, 71 (20.5 percent) reported paying some
kind of advance or key money. Of those 71 households, 60 (84
percent) reported the amount paid. Table 6.1 summarizes the
overall distribution of key money payments. The largest
number of renters had made payments directly to their
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landlords (53, or 74 percent of those reporting payments). A
further nine households (12.6 percent) had made payments to
previous tenants of their units. In some cases, payments had
been made to more than one recipient. Both mean and median
key money paid to landlords was higher than that paid to
previous tenants.
6.2 Some DescriptiveStatistics
Over the thirty years since the current generation of
rent controls was established in Cairo in 1951, there have
been substantial changes in both the magnitude and frequency
of key money payments. Reported key money payments have
become larger and their frequency has increased over time.
Half the households who moved in the two years before the
survey was conducted (1979-81) reported paying some kind of
advance or key money; among households who moved in 1975-6 the
incidence was 30 percent while among those who moved before
1961, it was only 9 percent.
Household heads who paid key money were more likely to
have lived principally in Cairo. They had marginally smaller
households on average, higher incomes, and had moved more
recently. They had paid an average of almost LE 1300 in key
money (in constant 1981 Egyptian Pounds), and paid rent
averaging LE 12.5 per month. However, their average rent was
equivalent to LE 25.3 in 1981 prices at the time they moved in
to their units.
Higher income and more recent moves increase the
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probability of paying key money substantially. For example,
only S percent of households with expenditures below the
median and household size 3-6 had paid key money, compared
with 48.6 percent of households moving after 1971 with the
same household size, and total expenditures above the median
(Table 6.1).
Households which paid key money (as compared with those
who did not) are less likely to live in buildings with
resident owners, more likely to have moved recently, and live
in dwellings of higher value, with more rooms. They also have
on average smaller households, are better educated, and have
higher income (a mean of LE 155 per month for those who paid
key money and reported their income, compared with LE 105 for
those who did not pay key money).
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Table 6.1
Characteristics of Households Which
Money
Did Not Pay
Principal Residence
of household head
Greater Cairo
Other
Mean Household Size
Mean Household Income
(LE per month)
Total Expenditure
(LE per month)
Mean stay in dwelling
(Years)
% in Top Income
Quartile
% in Lowest Income
Quartile
58.7%
41.3%
5.0
108.4
108.8
15.6
24.7
22.8
Note: "Principal residence" is
you spend most of your life or
were 15?".
Source: Computed from Informal
Interview Survey Data
Paid and did not Pay Key
Paid Key
77.0%
23. 0%
4.9
161.1
132.3
8.9
14.3
42.9
response to question "Where did
where have you lived since you
Housing Study Household
Table 6.2
Characteristics of Households which Reported Paying Key Money
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
Length of stay
Key money paid
Key money in
1981 prices
Value of
dwelling
(tenant estimate
31 Observations)
Value of
dwelling(est.by
hedonic)
Current Rent
Initial Rent
in 1981 prices
No. of Rooms
Source: Computed
9.2 yrs
719 LE
1,296 LE
14,649 LE
9,122 LE
12.5 LE/mo.
25.3 LE/mo.
3.8
7.6
1,799
2,606
20,055
11,281 1,0
15.5 1.
23.45 2.
1.1
35
12,000
15,993
20 100,000
39 72,691
8 120.00
61 159.92
1 6
from Informal Housing Study Household
Interview Survey Data
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Table 6.3
Building and Owner Characteristics for Tenants who paid Key
Money
Informal 57%
Formal 43%
Owner non-resident 52%
individual
Owner resident in 31%
building
Building over 15 34%
years old
Units added since 29.8%
renter moved in
Condition has 19.4%
worsened since
renter moved in
Renter has made 19.4%
changes in unit
Source: Computed fromn Informal Housing Study Household
Interview Survey Data
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Table 6.4
Probability of Paying Keyi'oney for Different Types of
Household
Probability of Mean Household Mean Total
Paying Key #Rooms Size
Expenditures
All Renters in
private unfurnished
units
Moderate Size
Households'
Total Expenditure
> Median
Total Expenditure
< Median
Moderate Size
Households*
Expenditure > Median
Moderate Size
Households^
Expenditure < Median
Recent Movers**
Moderate Size*
Expenditure > Median
Recent Movers*,
Moderate Size^
Expenditure < Median
Notes: A Moderate size
members.
20.4% 3.1
22.0 3.2
26.3 3.4
15.7 2.9
30.7 3.6
8.0 2.6
48.6 3.4
11.4 2.6
households are
5.0
4.4
5.4
4.7
4.5
4.3
4.3
4.1
97.78 LE
102.51
174.07
38 .21
182.64
56.84
185.14
57.95
households with 3-6
^A Recent movers are households which moved between
1971 and 1981.
Source: Prepared from Informal Housing Study Household
Interview Survey Data
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6.3 Simple Models _of Key ioney in Cairo:
6.3.1 Models 1 and 2: The Decision to Pay Key Money
Consumer theory implies that households choose lifetime
consumption profiles, including choice of housing, by
optimizing an intemporal utility function subject to
intertemporal budget constraints whose stucture depends on the
capital market. Theoretical models have been developed which
can explain joint choice of shelter consumption levels, moving
and tenure. The decision to pay key money adds a further
layer of complexity to such already intractable models. In
the Cairo context, the assumption by such models of a perfect
capital market is clearly inappropriate. They can, however,
be used to motivate the qualitative features of empirical
demand models.
Conside3r the decision to pay key money. The life-cycle
model suggests that in each period, given a current state
described by wealth, current housing and demographic
characteristics, the household compares the present value of
utility for alternative consumption plans with or without a
key money payment. We could model the key money decision as
having two related components: a qualitative component, which
may be modelled as a discrete choice, and a continuous choice.
The discrete choice is to pay or not pay key money as a part
of the contract with the landlord. The continuous choice is
the amount of key money to pay. However, that model would
neglect important information in the sample. Some of the
households which reported paying no key money might have been
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willing to do so, but unable to do so because they were, for
example, unable to borrow against future income to pay the key
money asked, or they might have paid key money but not
reported it
Most renter households report that they made zero
expenditures on key money or rent advances. Among the
households who paid key money, there is wide variation in the
amount reported. Thus, when we look at the key money
expenditures in the renter sample, there are a lot of
observations concentrated around zero.
Key money payments are an example of a variable limited
in its range because of the underlying stochastic choice
mechanism. We need to model the household's decision to pay
key money as well as the amount of key money which the
hcusehold pays and the factors which determine it. We are
concerned with a qualitative variable (the household pays or
does not pay key money) as well as a continuous variable (the
amount of key money paid).
In the simplest case, the data we have on key money
payments are generated by households which first made the
choice to pay or not pay key money.
Let K denote observed key money expenditures and X a set
of independent variables which explain the amount of key money
paid. Let C be the criterion function which determines
whether key money is to be paid and reported or not, and Z a
set of variables which determine that function.
This model could be formulated as:
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K = XS + u
C= Zr + v.
We assume that u and v are normally distributed with mean
zero and variance 02 and that u and v have a bivariate normal
distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix:
02 u Ou
llv 1
We do not observe C, but we do observe an indicator
variable I, which takes the values:
I = 1 when ZF + v > 0
I = 0 when Zr + v s 0
We observe K when I = 1.
When I = 0 we observe K=0.
The criterion function C theoretically originates in a
comparison of lifetime utilities and should thus be considered
a reduced-form relationship. A realistic sequence of
decisions, as shown below, plays a part in determining the
thresld, which may be different for each household.
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Households face the following sequence of choices:
Want to rent
Willing
to pay illegal
key money
Able to find
landlord who
takes key
money
Find acceptable
unit with key
money
Have enough assets
(or can borrow) to
pay key money
Not willing
Not able
Cannot find
Not enough
(v) Report paying
key to survey
Not report
r observations of key money paid by renters are a case
of censored data I That is, the process generating our data
is such that we observe the independent variables for all
observations, but in explaining the magnitude of key money, we
observe only those who actually paid, and who were willing to
report how much they paid.
Some or all of the households which reported zero
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
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expenditures either did pay key money (and failed to report
it) or were willing to pay key money but unable to find an
acceptable dwelling for the key money they were willing to
pay.
We observe independent (exogenous) variables for all
households in our random sample of Cairo renter households.
However, when K, the amount of key money, is the dependent
variable, we have data for some households but for others we
only know whether or not they are below the threshold.
In a fully specified model of the decision to pay or not
pay key money, we should estimate the determinants of a number
of different qualitative variables, corresponding to the
choices identified in the decision tree.
(i) K^ > Lit (willing to make illegal payment)
(ii) KAi> L2 i (key-taking landlord found)
(iii) KAi> Lai (willing to pay)
(iv) KAi> L4i (able to pay)
(v) KAi> Lni (willing to report paying)
Each condition would be described by a separate but
nested discrete choice model, and the renter would report
paying key money only if all these conditions are fulfilled.
The following factors are likely to affect the
thresholds:
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(i) Not known
i) Tenant Cairo-born
Type of landlord (resident/non-resident,
acquaintance/stranger,
needs cash to finish building)
Market tightness (period when renter was
searching for a unit)
(iii) Expected length of stay
(iv) Wealth
Income (access to loans)
(v) Interviewer
Supervisor of interview
Education of renter
Length of time since the transaction
Rather than attempt the computationally complex (and
perhaps intractable) simultaneous equations model outlined
above, we chose to estimate the criterion function by a
reduced form probit equation, in which all the independent
variables represented above are included. Our sample had too
few observations to make work with a nested model appropriate.
Where information on variables was not available, proxy
variables (correlated with the missing variable and
uncorrelated with the error term) were used. The variables
included in the probit equation are described in Section 4.4,
below.
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6.3.2 Model 2: Key Money as the Landlord's Decision
We also considered an alternative model of key money
which postulates that the payment or non-payment of key money
is an attribute of the dwelling and its landlord, and of
housing market conditions. The variable LINGER was included
to account for the number of years since the rental agreement
was concluded, for the same reason as in the first model: that
the tightness of the Cairo rental market has increased over
time.The imputed controlled rent for the unit (see chapter 7)
was included (in 1981 Egyptian Pounds per month), together
with dwelling attributes.
6.4 Variables in the Probit Equation
6.4.1 Variables Included in Models 1 and 2
The explanatory variabl-s which we expect to affect the
probability that tenants will pay key money fall into several
groups. The variables are listed here as they correspond to
the sequence of decisions shown in the decision tree in
Section 6.3.1. They are:
(i) Determinants of willingness to make illegal payments
These are unknown and there are no priors from the
literature. The assumption that such willingness is randomly
distributed among the population is as good as any that we are
able to make. It may be correlated with either high income
(the ability to wield influence and get away with law-breaking
behavior) or low income (individuals who have little to
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lose).
(ii) Determinants of ability to find a landlord seeking
key money
The tighter the market, the more likely landlords are to
ask for key money. The Cairo market appears to have become
progressively tighter since 1950, when the first controls were
introduced. The best indicator available to us is time. We
therefore include LINGER, the number of years since the tenant
moved in as a proxy for the progressive tightening of the
housing market over time.
Resident owners are more able to collect "informal rent"
and less likely to charge key money to their tenants. The
variable LIOWN incorporates this factor as an indicator
variable which takes the value 1 when the landlord is resident
and zero otherwise. The proportion of renters who paid key
money who had resident landlords was lower than the proportion
of all renters with resident landlords (27 percent compared
with 42 percent).
A renter with greater familiarity with the housing market
and with a wider network of friends and acquaintances may find
it easier to find a dwelling with an (illegal) key money
contract. In Model 2 we introduce this factor with the
variable CAIRES, an indicator variable which takes the value 1
for observations in which the household head reported that he
was born or spent most of his life in Cairo or urban Giza or
Kalyubeya governorates, and zero otherwise.
In informal housing areas, where dwellings lack building
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pernits or are built on land notoned for residential use
(typically land reserved by law for agricultural use in
Egypt), enforcement of the rent control laws is, we
hypothesize, laxer and landlords are more likely to be able to
collect "illegal rent". We expect a fewer households to pay
key money in informal areas than in formal housing. To test
the hypothesis we include the variable INFORMAL, an indicator
variable taking the value 1 for dwellings which are informal
and 0 for formal dwellings.
(iii) Determinants of willingness to pay key money
The longer the tenant expects to stay in the unit, the
more willing he is likely to be to pay key money. We imputed
the expected completed length of stay for all renters, (see
Appendix 3). It is included in the probit equation as ESTLOS.
The ratio of rent to property value (at the time of the rental
transaction) is an indicator of the rent bargain which the
tenant is getting by paying key money. Information on property
values is available only for 1981. The variable ORNTVAL is
the ratio of the original rent (in 1981 prices) to the
dwelling value in 1981 (estimated from our hedonic model,
described in chapter 5).
(iv) Determinants of wealth (ability to pay key money)
We expect that wealth will be associated with a greater
ability to pay key money. Since the survey did not collect
data on household wealth or savings directly, we chose to use
education as an indicator of likely access to savings. In
Egypt, education beyond primary level, though highly
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subsidized, involves significant direct and indirect costs,
and education to or beyond high school may be seen as an
indicator of the presence of family assets. Education is
represented as an indicator variable EDGEHS which takes the
value 1 for household heads with education to or beyond high
school completion. In Model 2, additional variables were
included for income, relaxing the initial assumption that
capital markets impede households from borrowing against
future income to pay key money. Income was represented as an
indicator variable for income in the lowest quartile (INCQ1)
and another for households reporting income in the highest
quartile (INCQ4). We concluded that the possible errors in
measurement in a continuous income variable justified the
alternative use of the indicator variables.
(v) Self selection
The last of these factors is particularly important.
Individuals reporting key money are a self-selected group who
have chosen to report to the surveyors the amount of the
illegal key money payment they made. Unless those who choose
to report their payments are randomly selected, the self
selecon will introduce a bias into the regression estimating
the determinants of the magnitude of key money payments. It
is obviously important to look at the self-selection or
reporting bias which may exist in a survey which attempts to
collect data on illegal transactions such as key money
payments, and discuss ways in which we can test for the
existence of such a bias. An indicator variable, INT2, was
200
included as an independent variable in all the probit
regressions. Section 6.5 summarizes the reasons for including
it.
6.4.2 Model 3
The third model emphasizes factors influencing a
landlord's decision to charge key money. We include the
imputed controlled rent for the dwelling (RCRENTP81) in
constant (1981) Egyptian Pounds. The lower the controlled
rent relative to the value of the dwelling the greater the
landlord's incentive to charge key money. Wealthier tenants
are both more able to pay key money and likely to want larger,
more valuable dwellings. In Model 3, therefore, we introduced
characteristics of the dwelling directly -- number of rooms
(ROOMS), number of baths (BATHS) and number of separate
toilets in the dwelling (TOILETS) -- expecting them to have
positive coefficients. Separate rooms (not self-contained
units) are likely to be less valuable than self-contained
houses or apartments. We expect the indicator variable SEPRM
to have a negative coefficient. Older buildings are likely to
be less valuable, so the variable OLD is included. It is
imputed as the median of the age category of the building in
which the unit is located.
Since the reporting error due to one supervisor would
apply to this model as well, the variable INT2 was also
included.
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6.4.3 Selection Bias inthe Informal Housing Survey Data on
Key Money
Payments of key money are illegal in Cairo, but only
landlords are subject to legal penalties for participating in
key money transactions. The Informal Housing Study household
survey collected data on key money from renter households; it
did not attempt to survey landlords. Nevertheless, the
illegality of the transaction makes it plausible that some
renters who paid key money did not report it to survey
interviewers.
The survey attempted to minimize such misreporting in
Cairo by using students as surveyors and training them to
probe for sensitive information. The accuracy of responses to
questions about illegal behavior was a central concern in the
survey design because the focus of the survey was informal
housing (housing which is illegal either because it is built
on land zoned for other uses, particularly agriculture, or
because the building or the subdivision in which it is located
lacks one or more of the legally required building or planning
permits). Student surveyors were used because it was believed
that they would get more accurate answers to questions on
illegal behavior than official interviewers from CAPMAS (the
government statistical agency, which is part of the Ministry
of Defense).
Reporting bias may be caused by unwillingness to report
illegal payments, by forgetfulness or by ignorance. Unless we
can assume that reporting bias is randomly distributed across
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the households surveyed, it will bias the estimates of the
magnitude of key money. Hence we must quantify and correct
for it.
We assume that reporting bias operates to reduce the
frequency of reported key money payments. That is, those who
did not pay key money will reply accurately, but some of those
who did pay may report (inaccurately) that they did not. An
indication of the importance of non-response attributable to
non-recall of key money payments can be gained by comparing
responses to questions on a legal topic requiring comparable
ability to recall.
Only 52.6% of owner-occupiers responded to the question
"what was the purchase price of the land and the property, or
the purchase price of the property?". That required recall
broadly comparable to the key money question, since owner-
occupiers' and renters' average lengths of stay were similar.
Some non-respondents inherited their units; others were
probably reluctant to reveal how much they paid, or unable to
recall the amount. Of the 73 missing values, 47 were coded as
don't know, 20 as not applicable, and the rest as missing.
In contrast, very few renters'responses to the first
question about key money ("Did you pay anything as an advance
[key money] before you moved in?")were missing . If non-
recall were responsible for the low observed frequency of key
money payments -- if, for example the current household head's
father was initially responsible for renting the unit and
making any key money payment -- we might expect those
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household heads to give "don't know'" answers; instead,
responses were unambiguously coded as "no" in all but those
2.8% of cases.
Misreporting due to unwillingness to report illegal
transactions is inherently difficult to identify or measure.
One form of it, however, can be measured and corrections made
to account for it if it is found. Non-response for this
reason will probably be non-random with respect to the
interviewers: some interviewers will be more successful than
others in eliciting information about illegal payments such as
key money. The frequency of reported key money payments was
cross-tabulated against the identification codes of the
interviewers and survey supervisors who caried out the survey.
The large number of interviewers (35) made it difficult to
identify any pattern; however, there did seem to be
considerable variation in the frequency of key money payments
reported in interviews conducted under different supervisors.
We hypothesised that interviewers under different supervisors
might induce higher or lower proportions of renters to respond
accurately to the questions about key money: a reporting bias
would be introduced if some interviewers were trained to probe
more in response to negative answers about key money, while
others failed to probe at all. Moreover, some supervisors or
interviewers might interpret the questions about key money and
advances as addressing only legal rent advances, and not
illegal key money payments.
To test the hypothesis of reporting bias we estimated a
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probit regression of the probability of paying key money
(using the model which is discussed in more detail below), to
which we added dummy variables for the six supervisors. (The
excluded category was a group of observations for which the
supervisor code was missing.) When indicator variables were
used for all supervisors, none had a coefficient significantly
different from zero at the .05 level. However, the sign of
the coefficient for one of the supervisors was opposite to the
rest. When a second specification was estimated in which an
indicator variable was included for that supervisor alone,
that variable had a coefficient of -. 88, significantly
different from zero at the .05 level in a two-tailed test
(t=2.47). That is, in interviews conducted under one of the
six supervisors, significantly fewer key money payments were
reported, even when all other relevant explanatory variables
were accounted forZ.
6.4.4 Comments on Observations
The probit estimates include all observations for which
data was available for the variables included, except for
renters in publicly owned housing (none of whom reported
paying key money) and renters in furnished apartments. One
renter in the latter category reported paying very high key
money even though furnished apartments can be rented at
uncontrolled rents. That observation reported key money of LE
12000 and rent of LE 120. Closer examination of the coding
sheets suggested the likelihood that this observation should
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have been recorded as LE120.00 (an advance payment of one
month's rent rather than key money). This is likely, since
some quantities (rent, for example)were to be recorded in
piastres (LE1 = 100 piastres) and others (key money, for
example) in Egyptian Pounds (LE). When this observation was
included with key money of LE 12000 it was a highly
influential outlier. Regression diagnostics were performed,
and partial regression leverage plots prepared3 . It was
shown to be influential both in the overall variation of the
regression (when it was included, R 2 were on the order of .50
to .66) and in the coefficients of the independent variables.
In particular, the coefficient of current rent was changed by
more than 3 standard deviations when this observation was
excluded. We concluded that while this might be a correctly
influential outlier, the weight of the evidence suggested that
it reflected a coding error which should therefore be
excluded.
6.5 Results of the Probit Estimation
The results of the estimation of the probit equations for
the probability of paying key money are summarized in Figures
6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 (Model 1), 6.5 (Model 2) and 6.6 (Model 3).
A summary of the variable definitions used is given in Table
6.8.
Because the Cairo housing market has become tighter over
time, and hence included the variable LINGER, to capture the
time trend. To test whether it was appropriate to estimate
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identical coefficients for all observations, rather than
estimate separate coefficients for recent movers, we estimated
model 1 separately for movers 1976-81 and for those households
which moved before 1976 (see figures 6.3 and 6.4). A chi-
squared test was used to compare the log-likelihood of the
model estimated for the full sample with the sum of the log-
likelihoods for the two sub-samples estimated separately. The
test rejected the hypothesis that the coefficients for the two
periods are different. We found that:
-2 * (LLALL - (LL<75 + LL76-81) = 11.19
but:
chi-squared for 8 degrees of freedom, at the 5% level of
significance = 15.51.
We therefore concluded that it was appropriate to assume
identical coefficients for all renters.
It is, however, interesting to compare the estimated
coefficients for the two samples estimated separately. All
the coefficients which are significant at the a = .10 level or
above have the same sign and values within one standard error
of each other. For the earlier period, coefficients are
tighter, with smaller standard errors.
Comparing the variable means for the two groups, we see
that length of stay (LINGER) is of course greater for the
earlier movers. The proportion of renters paying key money is
much higher for the recent movers (43 percent compared with 21
percent) and in both groups the mean length of stay for those
who paid key money is less than for those who did not pay.
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Those who paid key money have a shorter expected length of
stay in both periods. They are better educated and fewer of
them live in informal housing. Both for those who paid and
those who did not pay key money, the recent movers are more
likely to live in informal housing. The proportion living in
buildings with resident owners has risen over time for both
those who paid and those who did not pay key money. The most
striking change over time is the 27% increase in the ratio of
initial rent to dwelling value, for those who did not pay key
money (from .005 to .0066), while the same ratio was virtually
unchanged over time for those who did pay key money.
Turning to the results of the estimation for the whole
sample (see figure 6.2), all coefficients had the expected
sign. Three coefficients (LINGER [length of stay in the
dwelling], EDGEHS [household head has high school education or
more], and INT2 [the dummy for one interview supervisor]) were
significant at the a = .005 level or better, and further one
(INFORMAL) was significant for a=.01. The strongest effects
are those of EDGEHS in increasing the probability of paying
key money and INFORMAL in reducing it. The large coefficient
for INT2 indicates the magnitude of distortion from one form
of misreporting.
Three coefficients (ESTLOS [estimated complete length of
stay], ORNTVAL [the ratio of original rent in 1981 prices to
value of the dwelling in 1981] and LIOWN [owner resident])
are not significant. The failure to reject the hypothesis
that these coefficients are equal to zero may be attributed to
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the inadequacy of the measures we had to use, in the case of
the first two variables. It is unlikely that the probability
of paying key money is unaffected by the tenant's expectation
of how long he will stay in the dwelling. It thus belongs in
the equation. But our estimate is imputed (see Appendix 3)
and is certainly measured with substantial error. The fact
that all Cairo households have similarly long expected stays
makes it hard to measure well and to capture variation in the
independent variable. Excluding a variable which belongs in
the equation would bias the other coefficients, so we retain
the variable in spite of its poor proxy.
ORNTVAL - the ratio of original rent (measured in 1981
Egyyptian Pounds) to value - also clearly belongs in the
equation but is measured with error. The greater the ratio of
original rent to the dwelling value, the lower the probability
that key money will be paid. Renters pay key money in order
to get a good rental price; if the rental price is relatively
high, then they are less likely to pay key money. The
relevant value is the value of the dwelling when the renter
moves in and the key money contract was made. We had to use
estimated 1981 value as a proxy. The proxy is only good to
the extent that values of all dwellings have increased in the
same proportion over time, clearly a poor hypothesis in the
context. We had hoped for a more significant coefficient for
ORNTVAL in the estimates for recent movers (1976-81). For
this group, 1981 values should be an adequate proxy for value
when the unit was occupied by the tenant. The T-statistic for
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the coefficient of ORNTVAL in 1976-81 is only marginally
higher than for the whole sample (and substantially higher
than for the earlier movers) but not statistically
significant.
The third variable with an insignificant T-statistic,
LIOWN, is less likely to be measured with error. It was
included to identify renter-landlord relationships in which
the landlord would find it easier to charge "illegal rent".
We cannot reject the hypothesis that resident landlords are no
less likely to charge key money than non-resident private
landlords.
In model 2 (figure 6.5) we added a variable identifying
long-term Cairo residents (CAIRES) and two indicator variables
for households in the highest and lowest income quartiles
(INCQ4 and INCQ1). The signs for the new variables are as
expected, and both CAIRES and INCQ4 are sigificant, the former
at the a = .10 level and the latter for a = .025. With the
inclusion of a measure of income, EDGEHS (the proxy for
wealth) has a smaller but still positive coefficient and is
still significant at the a = .05 level. In terms of
magnitude, the strongest effects are those of EDGEHS, INCQ4
and CAIRES in increasing the probability of paying key money,
and INFORMAL in reducing the probability.
The third model (figure 6.6) focusses on the dwelling
unit's attributes rather than the tenant's. It incorporates
INT2 to take account of misreporting and LINGER to include the
effect of changing market conditions over time. The imputed
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controlled rent has a negative coefficient as expected but is
not statistically significant. Because this variable is
imputed, the variable is certainly measured with error,
although we assume that the error is uncorrelated with the
error in the dependent variable. The housing characteristics
are included to measure the effect of dwelling value on the
probability of paying key money, controlling for the (legal)
rent. As expected, ROOMS has a positive coefficient,
significant at the a = .01 level.Each additional room
increases the probability of paying key money by 24%.
Separate rooms, older buildings and tenants who moved less
recently are all associated with lower probability of paying
key money.
The negative, albeit statistically insignificant
coefficients for BATHS and TOILETS are puzzling but consistent
with the results of our and other hedonic studies, which have
found negative coefficients associated with these facilities.
One reason may be error in the independent variable:
baths and toilets are not a homogeneous good. When baths or
toilets are shared by multiple dwellings they may mistakenly
have been included as private baths or toilets by the survey.
Figure 6.1
Summary of Variables included in the Probit Regressions
Dependent Variable:
PDKEY Takes the value 1 if the household reports
paying key money and zero otherwise.
Independent Variables:
Models 1 and 2:
211
LINGER
ESTLOS
EDGEHS
ORNTVAL
INFORMAL
LIOWN
INT2
Model 2 only:
CAIRES
INCQ1
INCQ4
Model 3:
RCRENTP81
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
SEPRM
OLD
LINGER
INT2
Number of years since the household moved in
to the unit.
Estimated completed length of stay in the unit
Takes the value 1 for households with
education to or beyond high school level and
zero otherwise.
Ratio of initial rent for the unit (in 1981
Egyptian Pounds) to the dwelling value in 1981
Takes the value 1 for dwellings which are
informal (lack building permits or are built
on land not zoned for housing) and zero
otherwise.
Takes the value 1 if the landlord is resident
in the building and zero otherwise.
Takes the value 1 if the interview was
supervised by supervisor 2 and zero otherwise.
Takes the value 1 if the household head was
born or spent most of his life in Greater
Cairo and zero otherwise.
Takes the value 1 if the household has income
in the first (lowest) quartile and zero
otherwise.
Takes the value 1 if the household has income
in the fourth (highest) quartile and zero
otherwise.
Estimated rent controlled rent for the unit in
1981 Egyptian Pounds.
Number of rooms.
Number of complete bathrooms.
Number of toilets not in complete bathrooms.
Takes the value 1 for a separate room (not a
self-contained dwelling).
Age of the building in years.
Number of years since the household moved
into the unit.
Takes the value 1 if the interview was
supervised by supervisor 2 and zero
otherwise.
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Figure 6.2
Probit Model 1 of Key Money Payment as Renter Decision: All
Move Dates
Dependent variable: PDKEY (renter reports paying key money).
Maximum
Likelihood
Estimates
Standard
Error
T-Statistic
CONSTANT
LINGER
ESTLOS
EDGEHS
ORNTVAL
INT2
INFORMAL
LIOWN
-0.20
-0. 58x10-
0. 15x10-1
0.58
-10.40
-0.95
-0.53
-0.10
(-2.0) times log likelihood ratio: 48.11
Number of observations: 289
pdkey = 0: 229
pdkey = 1: 60
[ref:13:36,102584]
Variable Means for K=0(no key money) andK=1 (key money paid)
All Move Dates
LINGER
ESTLOS
EDGEHS(%)
ORNTVAL
INT2(%)
INFORMAL(%)
LIOWN(%)
Mean (k=0)
n = 229
15.89
25.95
31.9%
0. 54x10-2
25.8%
56.3%
31.4%
Mean (k=1)
n = 60
9.15
23.37
51.7%
0.49x10- 2
3.3%
56.7%
33.3%
.42
0. 15x10-
0. 18x10-
0.19
16.20
0.35
0.21
0.20
-. 49
-3.77
.87
3.02
-. 64
-2.76
-2.49
-0.51
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Figure 6.3
Probit Model 1 of Key Money Payment as Renter Decision: Movers
1976-81 only
Dependent variable: PDKEY (renter reports paying key money).
Maximum
Likelihood
Estimates
Standard
Error
T-Statistic
CONSTANT
LINGER
ESTLOS
EDGEHS
ORNTVAL
INT2
INFORMAL
LIOWN
1.13
-0.25
-0. 62x10-2
0.74
-28.74
-2.96
-0.65
1.27
0.14
0. 49x10-
0.42
36.96
4.65
0.53
-0.79x10-1 0.38
-2.0 times log likelihood ratio: 11.612
Number of observations: 56
pdkey = 0: 32
pdkey = 1: 24
[ref:16:36 102684]
Variable Means for K=0(no key money) and K=1 (key money paid)
Movers 1976-81 only
Mean (k=0)
n = 32
LINGER
ESTLOS
EDGEHS(%)
ORNTVAL
INT2M(%)
INFORMALM(%)
LIOWN(%)
3.31
21.97
31.3%
0. 66x10-2
9.4%
81.2%
Mean (k=1)
n = 24
2.58
21.02
54.2%
0. 50x10-2
0.0%
79.2%
40.6% 33.3%
0.89
-1.80
-0.12
1.76
-0.78
-0.63
-1.21
-0.21
214
Figure 6.4
Probit Model 1 of Key Money Payment as Renter Decision: Movers
Before 1976
Dependent variable: PDKEY (renter reports paying key money).
Maximum
Likelihood
Estimates
CONSTANT
LINGER
ESTLOS
EDGEHS
ORNTVAL
-0.51
-0.42
0. 15x10-1
0.53
-6.25
-0.87
LIOWN -0. 52x10- I
Standard
Error
0.46
0.18x10-1
0.19x10-1
0.22
15.93
0.35
0.24
T-Statistic
-1.12
-2.26
0.80
2.36
-0.39
-2.46
-0.21
(-2.0) times log likelihood ratio: 25.31
Number of observations: 233
pdkey = 0: 197
pdkey = 1: 36
[ref:15:36 102684]
Variable Means for K=0(no key money) and K=1 (key money paid)
Movers Before 1976
Mean (k=0)
n = 197
Mean (k=1)
n = 36
LINGER
ESTLOS
EDGEHS(%)
ORNTVAL
INT2(%)
INFORMAL(%)
LIOWN(%)
17.93
26.60
32.0%
0. 52x10-2
28.4%
52.3%
13.53
24.94
50.0%
0.49x1- 2
5.5%
41.7%
29.9% 33.3%
INT2
215
Figure 6.5
Probit Model 2 of Key Money Payment as Renter Decision: All
Move Dates
Dependent variable: PDKEY (renter reports paying key money).
Maximum
Likelihood Standard T-Statistic
Estimates Error
CONSTANT -0.63 0.48 -1.31
LINGER -0.52x10-1 .16x10-1 -3.24
ESTLOS 0.17x10- 1 0.20x10-1 0.87
EDGEHS 0.37 0.22 1.68
ORNTVAL -6.58 17.74 -0.37
INT2 -0.93 0.35 -2.62
INFORMAL -0.42 0.22 -1.89
LIOWN -0.79x10-1 0.21 -0.37
CAIRES 0.31 0.20 1.50
INCQ1 -0.15 0.27 -0.57
INCQ4 0.47 0.24 1.96
(-2.0) times log likelihood ratio: 47.81
Number of observations: 271
pdkey = 0: 216
pdkey = 1: 55
[ref:23:53 110485]
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Variable Means for K=O(no key money)
All Move dates
Mean (k=0)
n = 216
LINGER
ESTLOS
EDGEHS(%)
ORNTVAL
INT2(%)
INFORMAL(%)
LIOWN(%)
CAIRES
INCQ1
INCQ4
15.80
25.71
32.9%
0. 54x10-2
25.5%
56.5%
30.6%
55.1%
23.6%
21.8%
andK=1 (key money paid)
Mean (k=1)
n = 55
9.40
23.11
50.9%
0. 48x10- 2
3.6%
56.4%
32.7%
72.7%
12.7%
40.0%
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Figure 6.6
Probit Model 3: Key Money Payment as Owner Decision: All
Observations
Dependent variable: PDKEY (renter reports paying key money).
Maximum
Likelihood
Estimates
Standard
Error
T-Statistic
CONSTANT
RCRENTP81
-0.44
-0. 34x10-2
ROOMS
BATHS
0.24
-0.13
-0.24
-0.63
TOILETS
SEPROOM
OLD
LINGER
INT2
0. 23x10-
-0. 29x10-
-0.68
0.39 -1.13
0.14x10-1 -0.24
0.96x10-1 2.53
0.31 -0.41
0.25 -0.96
0.39 -1.61
.13x10-1 -1.83
0.17x10-1 -1.74
0.36 -1.88
(-2.0) times log likelihood ratio: 48.11
Number of observations: 284
pdkey = 0: 223
pdkey = 1: 61
[ref: 11:55 113085]
Variable Means for K=0(no key
All Observations
money) and K=1 (key money paid)
Mean (k=0)
n = 223
Mean (k=1)
n = 61
RCRENTP81
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
SEPROOM(%)
OLD(years)
LINGER(years)
INT2(%)
12.81
3.09
0.81
0.35
20.0%
22.9
15.6
24.7%
13.49
3.79
0.88
0.28
3.3%
14.3
8.7
3.3%
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6.6 Continuous Choice: How much key money do people pay?
The market model of key money contracts outlined in
chapter 4 suggested that the most important factors in
establishing how much key money changes hands are the
(controlled or agreed) rent the tenant pays each month, the
value of the dwelling, and the tenant's expected stay in the
dwelling. In our estimated model of the magnitude of key
money, we therefore should include as independent variables
the initial rent, the tenant's (imputed) expected stay in the
dwelling, and the value of the dwelling.
Ideally, we would like to be able to refer to the
circumstances when each rental contract was made. Failing
that, the relationship should be estimated only for recent
movers. In our case, the size of the data set makes it
necessary to include movers from several years. The only
proxy for the value of the dwelling when the renter moved in
which is available to us is the (imputed) value of the
dwelling in 1981. We therefore decided to use movers in 1976-
81, hoping that relative values of dwellings in Cairo would
not have changed very much in that period. In order to make
all the observations comparable, initial rents and key money
are converted to 1981 Egyptian Pounds. A time trend is also
included, to take account of changing housing market
conditions.
In estimating our model of the amount of key money paid
we need to consider the censoring of our dependent variable.
Returning to the model outlined in section 3 above:
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K = XB + u
C = ZF + v
We do not observe C, but we do observe an indicator
variable I, which takes the values:
I = 1 when Zr + v > 0
I = 0 when Zr + v 0
We observe K when I = 1.
When I = 0 we observe K=0.
We assume that ( u, v ) and u and v have a bivariate
normal distribution with means zero and covariance matrix:
oz o uv
ouv 1
K is observed key money expenditures and X is a set of
variables which explain the amount of key money paid. C is
the criterion function which determines whether key money is
to be paid and reported or not. Z is a set of variables
which determine that function.
Because we only observe K when I = 1, the estimation of
K = XB + u using only observed values of K must take the
sample selection in to account. If ui is independent of vi,
the conditional mean of ut is zero and the sample selection
process into the incomplete sample is random. Regressions of
K fit on the subsample for which K > 0 will then yield
unbiassed estimates of B.
In the general case, the mean of uiconditional on I = 1,
that is, ZiF + vi 2 0 is a function of Zi. The effect of
such sample selection is that variables in Zi that do not
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belong in Xiwill appear to be statistically significant in
equations fit on selected samples. Where that is not the
case, we need to analyze the joint distribution of Ki and Ci
(and hence Ii).
E [ui vi F'zi] = E [auv vi i vi F'zi]
=ou v o(r'zi )/s ,'zi)
= a V Mi ,
where Miis usually referred to as the Mill's ratio.
So we can rewrite the equation
K = XB + ui,
as:
K = XB - auvMi + et
where ei are the new residuals with zero conditional
means:
ei= ut + CuV Mi
The term auvMi s usually referred to as the Heckman
correction.
To estimate the equation for K we use the following two-
stage procedure: we obtain an estimate of r, F *, using the
standard probit maximum likelihood method, with observations
on It o obtain r*. We then obtain estimates of Mi ,
substituting F* for F. We can then estimate the equation for
K using ordinary least squares, substituting Mi for Mi
This gives us consistent estimates of B and Ouv 4.
By including the Mill's ratio from the probit regression
as a variable in the ordinary least squares estimation of the
determinants of the magnitude of key money paid, we can thus
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correct for the bias introduced by the censoring of
observations on the dependent variable, key money.
6.7 Variables Included in the Continuous Choice Model
estimated
The dependent variable is the amount of key money paid
(or the log of key money). Since there are few observations
in any one year, we needed a common numeraire to enable us to
use data from many years. Key money paid was converted into
current 1981 Egyptian Pounds, using the series for the
consumer price index given in appendix 1. The resulting
variable, KEYP81, records all reported key money payments to
landlords and previous tenants in 1981 prices.
In order to have a large enough sample, we need to use
observations from several years. We therefore included a time
trend in the equation. As in the probit regression, we expect
the ireasing tightness of the Cairo housing market since
controls on rents were introduced to show up in a significant
negative coefficient for LINGER, the number of years since the
tenant moved in (and the rental contract was agreed).
LINGERSQ was also included to allow for a non-linear
relationship.
The household's expected completed length of stay in the
dwelling is a potentially important determinant of its
willingness to pay key money in return for a lower
(controlled) rent. To the extent that it is possible to do
so, it will also be imputed by the landlord in considering the
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acceptability of renters and the amount of key money to ask.
This factor is measured by our variable ESTLOS - the
estimated completed length of stay of the renter, and and by
ESTLOSSQ, the square of ESTLOS, which is included to allow for
non-linearity in the relationship. We used a model to
estimate completed lengths of stay for renters (for details
see Appendix 3). The longer the household expects to stay,
the more key money it will pay. Correspondingly, landlords
will ask for more key money from tenants who are less likely
to move, because the rent control law gives tenants secure
tenure, and thus landlords cannot evict tenants and obtain-
vacant occupancy.
The higher the rent agreed when the tenants move in to
the unit the lower we expect key money to be. We therefore
included the initial rent for the unit (in the great majority
of cases, the same as the current rent, but renters were asked
about both current and initial rent) as ORNTP81, using the CPI
to convert all observations to 1981 prices as a common
numeraire.
The only measure of the value of the unit available to us
was our imputed value in 1981, clearly a proxy to be used with
caution: the value when the contract was made will be
correlated, but not necessarily highly correlated, with the
value in 1981: values of housing have changed at different
rates in different parts of the city. Nevertheless, ESTVAL,
the imputed 1981 value of each dwelling was included as the
best available proxy for housing value at the time of the
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contract.
We assumed that landlords entering into a true key money
contract with a tenant would not raise the rent paid by their
tenants, whereas if the transaction was a rent advance,
landlords and tenants would be entering into an 'informal
rent' contract, and the landlord might ask for a higher rent
later. We therefore included the variable RNTINC, an
indicator variable taking the value 1 when the current rent
was higher than the initial rent, and zero otherwise.
6.8 Empirical Results: Ordinary Least Squares Model
The first model estimated includes rent, dwelling value,
estimated completed stay, the time trend and RNTINC. Because
the only information on dwelling value is our estimated value
for 1981, we chose to use only observations for 1976-81 to
estimate the model. Over five years relative values are
likely to have changed comparatively little, whereas using
1981 values to model transactions which took place 10 and even
20 years ago seemed impossible to justify.
Model 1 was estimated both with and without the Mills
ratio as a correction for censoring. The dependent variable
(key money in 1981 Egyptian Pounds) was specified both in
linear (Figures 6.8 and 6.9)and log form(Figures 6.10 and
6.11). The log transformation was adopted to correct for
heteroskedasticity in the errors.
The sign of auv implies negative correlation which seems
appropriate: the more likely renters are to pay key money, the
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more likely they are to pay a higher amount. That is
consistent with the results of our rent regressions, reported
below. The T-statistic for the Mills ratio was significant at
a = .05 or better (two-tailed test) in both versions (log an
linear dependent variable). The test is equivalent to a
Lagrange multiplier test and thus is a lot more powerful than
is commonly thought. It mitigates the need to carry out Full
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation or to compute
correct errors [Melino (1982)]. We concluded that it was
appropriate to include a correction for sample selection bias.
In both versions, the equations appear to explain a
substantial fraction of the variation in the dependent
variable: corrected R 2 was .49 for the linear model and .45
for the log version.
Many of the coefficients in both equations (looking at
the equations which include the Mills ratio correction -
Figures 6.9 and 6.11) are puzzling at best. They lead us to
view the results with great caution. The coefficients of
LINGER and LINGERSQ are not significant in the linear model
and barely so in the log model. In both models the
coefficients of LINGER and LINGERSQ have the expected sign:
key money is lower in less recent moves, and the rate of
decline slows for less recent movers. The sign of the
coefficient of RNTINC is also negative as expected but not
statistically significant in either model.
The coefficients of the other variables do not have the
expected signs. In both models rent has a positive
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coefficient, one which is significant (a = .05) in the log
dependent variable model and insignificant in the linear
model. Estimated value has a negative coefficient and is not
significant in either model. Estimated length of stay has the
opposite effect to the one we expect: longer expected
completed stays are associated with lower key money, whereas
we expected the opposite.
The positive coefficient on rent and negative coefficient
for value were so striking that we are forced to consider the
possibility that the equation is misspecified. An alternative
hypothesis is that initial rents reflect initial value quite
accurately and that by convention or for convenience, key
money is set as a multiple of rent. If so, then introducing
ESTVAL means introducing a variable which does not belong in
the equation and is highly correlated with rents. We
therefore estimated a second model, including the same
variables as before with the exception of ESTVAL, which we
excluded.
Model two was estimated for movers 1976-81 as before.
The Mills ratio is again significant in the linear equation (a
= .05) and in the log equation (a = .06). The coefficient on
rent is again positive, albeit smaller than in Model 1, and
with smaller standard errors. It is significant only for a =
.12, however. The coefficients of ESTLOS (complete stay) and
LINGER (time trend) are similar in sign and magnitude to those
estimated previously.
It was also possible to estimate the second model for the
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full sample, since data for the value of dwellings when the
original contract was made was no longer required. When the
equations were re-estimated using all observations, we found
the Mills ratio significant for both regressions, and highly
significant in the log regression.
The coefficient of rent was significant in the linear
regression -- each increase of LE 1 per month in rent raises
key money by LE 22.
The coefficients of LINGER (time trend) are significant,
and not surprisingly they are changed substantially when we
estimate the regression for all observations.
The coefficients of ESTLOS (complete stay) remain
opposite in sign to those expected but are no longer
significantly different from zero in the regression for all
observations.
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Figure 6.7
Variables included in the OLS Regressions(Continuous Choice
Model)
Independent Variable
KEYP81: Reported key money payment in 1981 Egyptian Pounds
Dependent Variables
ORNTP81:
ESTVAL:
ESTLOS:
ESTLOSSQ:
LINGER:
LINGERSQ:
Inital rent in 1981 Egyptian Pounds
The value of the dwelling in 1981
Estimated complete stay in the dwelling
Square of ESTLOS
Years since the renter moved in
Square of LINGER
An indicator variable taking the value 1 for
renters reporting that their rent has
increased since they moved in.
RNTINC:
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Figure 6.8
Ordinary Least Squares Linear Model of Key Money 1 :without
Mills ratio
Dependent variable: Amount of key money in constant 1981 LE
(KEYP81)
Moves 1976-81:
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
T for HO:
Parameter=0
Prob> T 1
CONSTANT
OLERTP81
13108.21
20.73
ESTVAL
ESTLOS
0. 58x10-2
-1083.19
ESTLOSSQ 24.18
LINGER
LINGERSQ
RNTINC
-660.11
101.53
-217.7
0.28X10-1 -0.21
338.74
7.47
542.59
88.85
443.85
-3.20
3.24
-1.22
1.14
-0.49
Number of Observations: 19
R2  0.61
Adjusted R2_ 0.38
F: 2.68
Prob > F: 0.06
Root M.S.E.: 493.51
Mean of Dependent Variable: 901.17
C.V. 54.76
[Ref 1636:102684]
4015.40
31.23
3.26
0.66
0.007
0.52
0.84
0.008
0.007
0.25
0.28
0.63
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Figure 6.9
Ordinary Least Squares Linear Model of Key Money 1:with Mills
ratio
Dependent variable: Amount of key money in constant 1981 LE
(KEYP81)
Moves 1976-81
Parameter Standard T for HO:
Estimate Error Parameter=0
CONSTANT 10559.54 3899.19 2.71
OLERTP81 33.51 29.22 1.15
ESTVAL 
-0.18X10-1 0.26X10-1 -0.70
ESTLOS -861.72 330.16 -2.61
ESTLOSSQ 19.82 7.18 2.76
LINGER -387.26 514.76 -0.75
LINGERSQ 66.05 83.03 0.80
RNTINC 
-414.30 417.28 -0.99
MILLS -876.12 468.50 -1.87
Number of Observations: 19
R 2  0.70
Adjusted R2 _ 0.49
F: 3.27
Prob > F: 0.04
Mean of Dependent Variable: 901.17
Root MSE: 449.00
C.V.: 49.82
[Ref 1636:102684]
Prob> T|
0.02
0.28
0.51
0.02
0.019
0.47
0.44
0.34
0.09
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Figure 6.10
Ordinary Least Squares Semi-Log Model of ey_ Money 1 :without
Mills ratio
Dependent variable: Log of Amount of key money in constant
1981 LE (KEYP81)
Moves 1976-81
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
T for HO:
Parameter=0
Prob> :T:
CONSTANT
OLERTP81
-0. 32x10-4
-1.07
0. 23x10-ESTLOSSQ
LINGER -1.41
0.22LINGERSQ
RNTINC 0. 79x10- I
0.37x10- 2 -0.89
0.45
0. 99x10-
0.72
0.12
0.59
-2.39
2.32
-1.98
1.90
0.13
Number of Observations: 19
R2  0.56
Adjusted R 2 _ 0.30
F: 2.19
Prob > F: 0.11
Mean of Dependent Variable: 6.55
Root MSE: 0.65
C.V.: 9.94
[Ref 1636:102684]
19.42
0.06
ESTVAL
ESTLOS
5.30
0.04
3.66
1.41
0.003
0.19
0.39
0.03
0.04
0.07
0.08
0.90
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Figure 6.11
Ordinary Least Squares Semi-Log Model of Key Money 1:with
Mills ratio
Dependent variable: Amount of key money in constant
(KEYP81)
Moves 1976-81
1981 LE
Parameter
Estimate
Standard
Error
T for HO:
Parameter=0
CONSTANT
OLERTP81
15.78 5.01
0.76x10- 1 0.37x10-1
0.49x10- 4 0.33x10-4ESTVAL
ESTLOS -0.75 0.42
ESTLOSSQ 0.17x10-1 0.92x10-2
LINGER
LINGERSQ
RNTINC
MILLS
Number of Observations: 19
R 2 _ 0.68
Adjusted R 2 _ 0.45
F: 2.99
Prob > F: 0.05
Mean of Dependent Variable:
Root MSE: 0.58
C.V.: 8.80
Prob> T
3.15
2.04
-1.48
0.01
0.07
0.17
-1.78
1.81
0.10
-1.03
0.17
-0.20
-1.25
0.10
0.66
0.11
0.53
0.60
-1.55
1.61
-0.38
-2.08
0.15
0.14
0.71
0.06
6.55
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Figure 6.12
Ordinary Least Squares Linear Model of Key Money 2 :without
Mills ratio
Dependent variable: Amount of key money
(KEYP81)
Moves 1976-81:
CONSTANT
OLERTP81
ESTLOS
ESTLOSSQ
LINGER
Parameter
Estimate
13320.00
14.96
-1103.77
24.69
-614.32
LINGERSQ 94.40
-193.12
Standard
Error
3737.96
13.66
311.76
6.78
477.12
78.87
411.69
in constant 1981 LE
T for HO:
Parameter=0
Prob> IT:
3.560.0035
1.10
-3.54
3.64
-1.29
1.20
-0.47
0.29
0.004
0.003
0.22
0.25
0.65
R2 _ .61
Adjusted
F: 3.37
R 2 .43
Prob > F: 0.03
Mean of Dependent Variable:901.17
Root MSE: 475.00
C.V.: 52.71
[Ref 1535:102684]
RNTINC
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Figure 6.13
Ordinary Least Squares Linear Model of Key Money 2 :with Mills
ratio
Dependent variable: Amount of key money
(KEYP81)
Moves 1976-81:
in constant
Parameter
Estimate
Standard
Error
T for HO:
Parameter=0
Prob> IT 1
CONSTANT
OLERTP81
ESTLOS
ESTLOSSQ
LINGER
LINGERSQ
RNTINC
MILLS
Number of
R 2 0.69
11396.87
15.72
-940.76
21.70
-279.39
48.64
-325.86
-798.30
3614.88
12.63
301.92
6.48
478.49
77.17
387.41
443.94
Observations: 19
Adjusted R2 0.51
F: 3.85
Prob. > F: 0.02
Mean of Dependent Variable:
Root MSE: 438.79
C.V.:
[Ref :
48.69
1535:102684]
901.17
[Ref 1636:102684]
1981 LE
3.15
1.25
-3.12
3.35
-0.58
0.63
-0.84
-1.80
0.008
0.24
0.009
0.006
0.57
0.54
0.42
0.10
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Figure 6.14
Ordinary Least Squares Linear Model of Key Money 2 : without
Mills ratio
All Move Dates
Dependent variable: Amount of key money
(KEYP81)
in constant 1981 LE
Parameter
Estimate
CONSTANT
OLERTP81
1450.62
26.13
-51.96ESTLOS
ESTLOSSQ 0.87
LINGER -100.21
LINGERSQ 2.93
RNTINC -459.05
Standard
Error
1740.48
6.50
131.28
2.42
56.42
1.98
424.47
T for HO:
Parameter=O
Prob> Ti
0.83
4.020.0002
-0.40
0.36
-1.78
1.48
-1.08
R 2 _0.31
Adjusted
F:3.143
R 2 ' 0.21
Prob > F:0.012
Number of Observations: 49
Mean of Dependent Variable: 861.85
Root M.S.E.: 935.98
C.V. 108.60
[Ref:1647 102684]
0.41
0.69
0.72
0.08
0.15
0.29
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Figure 6.15
Ordinary Least Squares Linear Model of Key Money 2 : with
Mills ratio
Dependent variable: Amount of key money in constant 1981 LE
(KEYP81)
All Move Dates
Parameter
Estimate
Standa
Error
CONSTANT 1937.98 1723
OLERTP81 21.69 6
ESTLOS -11.24 130
ESTLOSSQ 0.31 2
LINGER -110.46 55
LINGERSQ 4.42 2
RNTINC -335.69 420
MILLS -976.12 560
R2 _ 0.35
Adjusted R 2 _ 0.24
F: 3.25
Prob > F: 0.0075
Number of Observations: 49
Mean of Dependent Variable: 861.85
Root MSE: 914.612
C.V.: 106.122
[Ref:1647 102684]
rd
.61
.85
.39
.39
.44
.12
.78
.49
T for HO:
Parameter=O
1.12
3.17
-0.09
0.13
-1.99
2.09
-0.80
-1.74
Prob> T|
0.27
0.003
0.93
0.90
0.05
0.04
0.43
0.09
Mills ratio from probit model 2, above
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Figure 6.16
Ordinary Least Squares Log Model of Key Money 2 : without
Mills ratio
Dependent variable: Log of Amount of key money in constant
1981 LE (KEYP81)
Moves 1976-81
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
T for HO:
Parameter=0
CONSTANT
OLERTP81
ESTLOS
ESTLOSSQ
20.61
0. 25x10-
1.18
0. 26x10-
LINGER
LINGERSQ
RNTINC
-1.16
0.18
0.22
5.08
.18x10-
0.42
0. 92x10-2
0.65
0.11
0.56
Number of Observations: 19
R2 _ 0.53
Adjusted R 2 _ 0.32
F: 2.46
Prob > F: 0.08
Mean of Dependent Variable: 6.55
Root MSE: 0.65
C.V.: 9.86
[Ref: 1535:102684]
Prob> Ti
4.05
1.38
-2.79
2.80
0.001
0.19
0.01
0.01
-1.78
1.70
0.39
0.10
0.11
0.70
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Figure 6.17
Ordinary Least Squares Semi-Log Model of Key Money 2 : with
Mills ratio
Dependent variable: Log of Amount of key money in constant
1981 LE (KEYP81)
Moves 1976-81
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
T for HO:
Parameter=0
CONSTANT
OLERTP81
18.12
0. 26x10- I
ESTLOS -0.97
ESTLOSSQ 0. 22x10- I
LINGER -0.72
0.12LINGERSQ
RNTINC
MILLS
0. 46x10-
-1.03
4.98
0. 17x10-
0.42
0. 89x10- 2
0.66
0.10
0.53
0.61
Number of Observations: 19
R 2 '0.62
Adjusted R2 ' 0.40
F: 2.82
Prob > F: 0.05
Mean of Dependent Variable: 6.55
Root MSE: 0.60
C.V.: 9.23
[Ref 1535:102684]
Prob>| T
3.64
1.53
0.003
0.15
-2.34 0.04
2.45
-1.10
0.03
0.29
1.16
0.09
-1.69
0.27
0.93
0.12
238
Figure 6.18
Ordinary Least Squares Semi-Log Model of Key Money 2 : without
Mills ratio
Dependent variable: Log of Amount of key money
1981 LE (KEYP81)
All Observations:
Parameter Standard
ErrorEstimate
in constant
T for HO:
Parameter=O
Prob> Ti
CONSTANT
OLERTP81
10.42 2.54
0.31x10-1 0.95x10-2
ESTLOS -0.29 0.19
4.110.0002
3.250.0022
-1.54
0.51x10- 2 0.35x10-2
LINGER -0.26
LINGERSQ
0 . 82x10-
0.82x10- 2 0.29X10-2
RNTINC -0.43 0.62
Number of Observations:
R2 '0.32
Adjusted R 2 '0.22
F:3.32
Prob > F: 0.009
Mean of Dependent
Root MSE: 1.36
C.V.: 22.97
[Ref 1647:102684]
49
Variable:
ESTLOSSQ
0.13
1.44
-3.23
2.85
-0.70
0.16
0.002
0.007
0.49
5.94
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Fjg ure 6.19
Ordinary Least Squares Semi-Log Model of Key Money 2 with
Mills ratio
Dependent variable: Log of Amount of key money in constant
1981 LE (KEYP81)
All Observations:
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
T for HO:
Parameter=0
Prob> T!
CONSTANT
OLERTP81
11.80
0. 18X10- I
ESTLOS -0.18
ESTLOSSQ
LINGER
LINGERSQ
RNTINC
MILLS
0.35X10-2
-0. 29
0. 12X10-
-0. 82X10-
-2.76
2.25
0.89X10- 2
0.17
0.31X10- 2
0.07
0.28X10-1
0.55
0.73
5.250.0001
2.05 0.05
-1.06
1.12 0.27
-4.070.0002
4.510.0001
-0.15
-3.770.0005
Number of Observations: 49
R2 ' 0.49
Adjusted R 2 ' 0.40
F: 5.76
Prob > F: 0.0001
Mean of Dependent Variable: 5.94
Root MSE: 1.19
C.V.: 20.08
[Ref 1647:102684]
0.30
0.88
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6.9 Conclusions
Our qualitative choice model of key money was successful
in explaining the decision to pay or not pay key money. Many
of its coefficients were significant, with the expected signs.
Recent movers are more likely to pay key money, as are
household heads with more education. Resident owners and
landlords in informal areas are less likely to receive key
money. The greater the ratio of original rent to value, the
lower the probability that key money was paid, as expected.
Our continuous choice model was only moderately effective
in explaining the amount of key money paid. It explained
about one half of the variation in key money for recent
movers. The positive coefficient on OLERTP81 (the initial
rent) which was significant (T=1.15) suggests that our model
of price discrimination by landlords (see chapter 4) is an
appropriate one. Similarly, the negative coefficient of the
Mill's ratio suggests that renters who pay key money are also
likely to pay higher key money.
The substantial discrepancy between the amounts of key
money reported paid by recent movers in the survey and the
amounts sought by sellers interviewed both by the Informal
Housing Study and in my own field work is less puzzling when
we recall that it reflects the sample of owners of vacant
apartments interviewed (or of any randomly selected sample of
owners of vacant units. Landlords who are searching for
tenants willing to pay key money are those more likely to have
vacant apartments than landlords willing to accept rent
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payments alone. The higher the key money sought, the longer
the expected search time, ceteris paribus. When we interview
owners of vacant apartments we are observing a truncated
sample, dominated by units not yet rented because the landlord
is seeking a relatively high rent or key money. On the other
hand, when we look at our sample of renters, we observe trades
where the owner found a renter who could pay his asking price
in rent and key money. Landlords whose reservation price was
higher or who asked for a higher key money to rent ratio
appear with lower probability in the survey of renters: it is
more likely that their units remained vacant.
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Footnotes
I See Maddala 1983 for a definition of censored data and the
econometric problems associated with them.
2 Cross-tabulation of neighborhood and household
characteristics of the households interviewed against the
supervisor codes did not reveal any significant differences
between the characteristics of households or zones for which
the 'outlier' supervisor was responsible and other households
or zones. Moreover, those interviewers who worked both under
the 'outlier' supervisor and under others consistently
reported a higher frequency of key money payments (consistent
with those found by their colleagues) in interviews when they
worked under other supervisors. The variable INT2 was
therefore coded one for interviews supervised by the outlier
supervisor and zero for all other interviews and included in
the probit regressions.
3 See Belsley, Kuh and Welch (1981) for a description of
these techniques.
4 For further discussion of this method, see Maddala (1983),
pp. 223-5.
Chapter 7
Negotiated Rents Under Rent Controls
7.1 Introduction
In chapter 4, we proposed two models which set out to
portray rational price-setting behavior in a black market for
rental housing. This chapter tests those models. We estimate
the relationship between the rents which Cairo tenants report
paying, dwelling and tenant characteristics, and the rent
controlled rents for their units, and use our estimates to tst
hypotheses drawn from the models of chapter 4.
7.2 Market and Controlled Rents: Descriptive Statistics
The mean ratio of initial monthly rent (measured in 1981
Egyptian Pounds) to value (in 1981) indicates the terms of the
rental contract when the tenancy started'. Among renters who
did not pay key money, that ratio is .0066 for recent (1975-
81) movers compared with .0052 for renters who moved to their
current dwellings before 1975. Renters after 1975 who paid no
key money were paying a higher proportion of the value of
their dwelling in rent than renters who moved in before 1975.
For renters who paid key money, the ratio of initial monthly
rent to value was virtually unchanged2 .
The higher rent to value ratio for recent renters who did
not pay key money suggests that some renters are paying higher
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rents as an alternative to key money. We also saw that long-
term Cairo residents were more likely to pay key money (they
were 73 percent of the group which paid key money and 55
percent of the group which did not). Long-term Cairo
residents also paid slightly more key money than more recent
in-migrants to the city (a mean of LE (1981) 259 for long-term
residents vs. LE (1981) 125 for recent in-migrants).
When we compare the current and controlled rent of recent
in-migrants and long-term Cairo residents we find that long
term Cairo residents pay less rent on average. Both current
rent and the ratio of current rent to imputed controlled rent
are somewhat lower for long term Cairo residents than for
recent in-migrants to the city. A part of that difference is
attributable to the higher proportion of long-term Cairo
residents living in public housing and paying very low rents.
If we consider only households renting from private
landlords, long term Cairo residents and recent in-migrants
occupy dwellings of similar imputed value (LE 7645 for
household heads born or raised in Cairo and LE 7384 for in-
migrants), although the in-migrant group occupies smaller
dwellings (a mean of 3.0 rooms compared with 3.2 for long-term
residents). Their length of stay in their current dwellings
is comparable (a mean of 14.3 years for long-term residents
versus 14.9 years for recent in-migrants). Among households
renting from private landlords, the mean rent for long-term
residents was LE 8.14 for the whole sample and 10.5 for
households which moved after 1971. Among in-migrants to the
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city mean rent was LE 8.21 for the whole sample and LE 11.31
for households which moved after 1971.
When we examine renters who do and do not pay key money,
we find only small differences between the rent premiums they
pay, relative to the controlled rent (see Table 7.3). Those
renters who report paying key money also pay a marginally
higher premium over the estimated controlled rent for their
dwellings. For example, for recent movers (1976-81) the
median premium was 60% for those who do not report paying key
money and 80% for those who did pay. Controlled rents for
both sets of households were slightly higher for those who do
not pay key money. We found a median rent payment of LE 5.7
per month for 1976-81 movers who did not pay key money,
compared with a median of LE 5.4 per month for the
corresponding group who paid key money. For movers in 1976-81
we found a median legal rent of LE 4.0 for those who paid key
money and LE 5.0 for those who did pay key money.
We have noted that households which pay key money have a
mean household income about 50 percent higher than the mean
for households which do not pay key money. The higher rent
payments for households which paid key money reflect their
higher incomes and correspondingly higher demand for housing.
Table 7.3 shows current and original rents and the
current/controlled rent ratio for households by income
quartile. Households in the highest and lowest income
quartiles pay a higher premium over controlled rents than the
two middle quartiles. However, we have noted that a weakness
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of our measure of controlled rents is that it does not take
differences in building quality into account, even to the
extent that the rent control law allows. Our controlled rents
for high income households (those likely to occupy units
classified as high quality construction) will therefore tend
to be underestimated, while controlled rents for the lowest
income households (occupying construction classified as low
quality) will tend to be overestimated. That implies that the
lowest income households are paying a higher premium over the
controlled rent for their units than any other quartile.
For all renters from private landlords, the discrepancy
between actual and controlled rents increased rapidly in the
1970's. It is thus important to consider whether the
determinants of rents have changed and whether new forms of
evasion of rent controls (such as higher rent payments) became
more widespread after the early 1970's. Moreover, the
tabulated statistics cited above cannot control for all the
variables involved in the determination of rents. The next
sections present a multivariate analysis of the determinants
of rents in Cairo.
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Table 7.1
Ratio of Current Rent to Controlled Rent_by Move Date of
Renter and Key Money Status
PDKEY = 1 PDKEY = 0
Q1 Median Q3 Q1 Median Q3
Length of Stay
(move date)
0-5 years 1.4 1.8 2.7 1.3 1.6 2.4
(1976-81)
6-10 years 1.0 1.4 1.9 1.0 1.0 1.6
(1971-75)
11-15 years 1.0 1.0 1.6 0.9 1.0 1.5
(1966-71)
16-20 years 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.3
(1961-65)
21-30 years 1.5 1.8 3.4 1.0 1.4 1.8
(1951-61)
> 30 years 1.5 1.8 3.1 1.5 1.9 3.0
Note: The table shows the range of values observed for the
ratio: Q1 is the 25th percentile, Q3 the 75th percentile.
The median is the 50 the percentile of the distribution.
Source: Informal Housing Study Household Interview Survey data
Table 7.2
Distribution of Rents, Housing Values and Key Money for
Dwellings for which Key Money Was Paid
Q1 Median Q3
Estimated Dwelling
Value in 1981 3212 5042 10974
Key Money (1981 LE) 202 585 1104
Rent (Original Rent
in 1981 LE per month) 13.3 17.4 26.6
Source: Informal Housing Study Household Interview Survey data
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Table 7.3
Rent and Ratio of Current to Controlled Rent
Quartile
by Income
1
(lowest)
LE 0-50Income Range
(LE per month)
Expenditure Range
Original Rent (LE)
Mean
Median
Current Rent (LE)
Mean
Median
Controlled (legal) Rent
Mean
Median
Current/Controlled Rent
Mean
Median
Income Quartile
2 3 4
(highest)
50-80 80-121 121-1420
LE 1-59 59-87 87-125 125-797
6.3
4.0
7.1
4.2
3.9
2.8
2.4
2.8
5.6
4.0
5.6
4.2
4.4
3.9
1.3
3.9
7.8
5.1
7.9
5.0
4.5
3.9
1.7
3.9
14.4
7.0
12.8
7.0
5.1
5.0
2.5
5.0
Source: Informal Housing Study Household Interview Survey data
Table 7.4
Original, Currentand Controlled Rent and
Ratio of Current to Controlled Rent
BY Place ofOria;in
Place of Origin
Original Rent
Mean
Median
Current Rent
Mean
Median
Controlled Rent
Mean
Median
Current/Controlled Rent
Mean
Median
Greater
Cairo
8.0
5.0
7.8
5.0
4.5
4.0
1.7
1.3
Note: Place of origin defined
the question: "Where were you
most of your life"?
Source:Informal Housing Study
Elsewhere
in Egypt
10.3
6.0
9.7
5.6
4.6
3.9
2.3
1.4
by answer of household head to
born or where have you spent
Household Interview Survey data
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7.3 Simple Models of Rent Payments Under Rent Controls
In our analysis of the relations between landlords and
tenants in chapter 3, we identified a number of factors which
are expected to influence the market rent the tenant pays to
the landlord of his unit. If rent controls are in effect and
fully enforced, of course, then the rent for each unit (Rh)
will be exactly equal to the controlled rent (Rc ), where the
controlled rent is set by the rent control legislation.
Rh= Rc.
Where rents are controlled but the controls are not perfectly
enforced, the controlled rent may be one of several factors
which determine the rent paid:
R1= Rc , X ,
where X is the vector of other idiosyncratic factors which
influence the outcome of the bilateral bargaining which will
determine the rent payment.
In this chapter, we assume that there is a market (or
shadow) rent for each dwelling unit which can be modelled as a
hedonic relationship:
Market rent = f(dwelling characteristics).
In chapter 5 we estimated hedonic equations for housing value
for both owners and tenants and found that the two regressions
are not statistically distinguishable. That supports our
contention that this is a plausible assumption in the Cairo
context.
A tenant and a landlord agree on the form of the tenant's
payment for the unit, which may be in the form of rent only,
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or a combination of rent and key money. The minimum value of
the tenant's rent is the legal (controlled) rent; it may be
larger. The tenant's payment for the unit is the subject of
bargaining between the landlord and tenant. The market rent
will be one of several factors which determine the actual
magnitude of the payment. We can plausibly suppose that the
size of the controlled rent will also enter into the
negotiation: the higher the controlled rent relative to the
market rent, the stronger the position of the landlord.
The landlord may discriminate between renters according
to their actual or imputed characteristics. Tenants' and
landlords' characteristics will also affect the outcome of the
bargaining. We therefore have the contract rent (the tenant's
actual cost of housing), which in Cairo may be composed of
rent alone, or both rent and key money. To express these
possibilities, we consider that from a landlord's viewpoint,
housing should earn an amount equal to:
s ( Rm , Rc , T, L )
On the other hand, the way this total may be paid depends on
the circumstances of the tenant (access to liquid wealth to
pay key money), and the respective requirements of the
landlord. It may be made up in part by the controlled rent,
Rc and the remainder by key money, or a rent premium
equivalent:
Rh + 0 ( K )
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Thus we have:
Rh 0 ( Rm , Rc, T, L ) - 0 ( K )
( D, Rc, T, L, K
Where: Rm: market rent
Rc : legal (controlled) rent
Rh : contract rent for the housing unit
K : key money
T : tenant characteristics
L : landlord characteristics
D : dwelling and neighborhood characteristics
That is the specification which we estimate here.
This equation is used to test hypotheses which derive
from the two models set out in chapter 4. The first model
(competitive market model) implied that socioeconomic
characteristics of the renter will enter into rent
determination only insofar as they reflect the viability of an
informal contract between landlord and tenant, or a tradeoff
between rent and key money. We expect high key money payments
to be reflected in lower rents, ceteris paribus. We also
expect that high income will be associated with greater
wealth, and hence larger key money payments (and lower rent).
The second model (imperfectly competitive market with price
discrimination) suggested that landlords will engage in search
for tenants with greater willingness and ability to pay.
Higher rent payments will be associated with higher key money
as landlords exploit their degree of monopoly power by
exercising price discrimination.
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7.4 Model Specification
We model rents first as a simple hedonic regression in
which they are determined by characteristics of the dwelling
and the contract. We then modify it to incorporate
characteristics of the tenant household, in order to test the
hypothesis that price discrimination by landlords is a feature
of the Cairo housing market.
There is no strong a priori notion of the correct
functional form for hedonic regressions. We chose to use the
log-linear (semi-log) specification. The semi-log model
allows the value added by a characteristic to vary
proportionately with the size and quality of the dwelling.
Moreover, in our case, specifying the dependent variable as
the logarithm of current rent also alleviates the statistical
problem of heteroskedasticity or changing variance of the
error term. The coefficients of the semi-log model can be
interpreted as the percentage change in the dependent variable
given a unit change in the independent variable.
Definitions of the variables included in the rent
regressions are given in Figure 7.1. The measures of housing
characteristics included are ROOMS (the number of rooms in the
dwelling), BATHS (the number of complete baths in the
dwelling), TOILETS (the number of toilets not included in
complete baths in the dwelling or used by its residents).
Each of these variables was expected to increase the value of
the dwelling. SEPRM, an indicator variable for rented rooms
without bath or kitchen was included because such rentals are
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likely to have a different character from rentals of complete
units. We showed in the previous chapter that renters of
rooms are less likely to pay key money; the hypothesis we are
testing here is that rents will be correspondingly higher:
residents of rooms typically have (in fact, if not in law)
less secure tenure and are more vulnerable to demands for rent
increases.
OLDCAT, the age of the building, is a continuous variable
constructed from the mid-points of the categories classified
in the informal housing survey. t is included to take into
account the effects of building age independent of the length
of tenancy.
A second set of variables is included to take account of
contract terms and landlord tenant relations. RCRENT would
have a coefficient of 1 and no other coefficient would be
significant if all renters were paying the legal rent for
their dwelling (and if we measure RCRENT with accuracy). Our
hypothesis is instead that it is one factor in the bilateral
bargaining between landlords and tenants, but not a decisive
factor, because the rent control law is so widely ignored or
flouted in setting rents.
LIOWN is an indicator variable taking the value 1 for
resident landlords and zero for non-resident landlords. We
hypothesized that resident landlords would be more likely to
accept illegal rent in lieu of key money payments, since they
could impose stronger sanctions on their tenants to prevent
them from reneging (paying no more than the legal rent).
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Resident owners have become more common over time in
Cairo: 42.6 percent of households which moved after 1971
reported resident landlords, compared with 40.3 percent of
those who moved before 1971. Among recent movers, resident
owners are slightly less likely to take key money (36.1
percent of those who paid key money rented from resident
owners, compare with 45.6 percent of those who paid no key
money). Similarly, higher income (above median income)
households are less likely to have resident landlords (35.7
percent) compared with households with incomes below the
median (45.8 percent had resident landlords).
RFOWN is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the
landlord is a relative or friend of the tenant. We assume
that contracts between relative or friends incorporate lower
rents as well as a lower frequency of key money. We found
that owners who were relatives or friends were found in 16.4
percent of households which did not pay key money but only 5.8
percent of those who did make key money payments. The
corresponding figures for recent movers were 24 percent (no
key and related or friend of own) and 2.8 percent (key money
paid to a landlord who was friend or relative).
Among recent movers, living in a dwelling owned by a
relative or friend has become more common (17.4 percent of
those who moved after 1971 compared with 11.8 percent of
households who moved in earlier periods).
INFORMAL was included to test the hypothesis that
landlords in informal areas would be freer to charge higher
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rents (because they lack building permits and the ensuing rent
control enforcement procedures). The proportion of informal
buildings is 61 percent for the whole sample of renters, but
that conceals an increase from 46.5 percent for households
which moved before 1971 to 79.1 percent among more recent
movers. Among recent movers who paid key money 75 percent
lived in dwellings classified as informal compared with 81
percent of those who did not pay key money.
LINGER is included to take account of the increase in
rents over time. KEYP81 is included to trace the impact, if
any, of key money payments on rents. Key money is valued at
1981 prices to permit comparison between contracts made at
widely differing dates.
In model 2, further variables are included to take
account of household characteristics: TOTEXP measures total
household expenditure per month in Egyptian Pounds (the sample
for model 2 is smaller than for model 1 because not all
households were willing to divulge income or expenditure
information). If landlords operate as price discriminating
profit maximizers, we expect this variable to have a
significant positive coefficient. On the other hand, if
wealthy renters pay in the form of key money and renters
without wealth pay the same price in the form of (illegal)
extra rents, then this variable should have a significant
negative coefficient, corresponding to higher rents paid by
lower income renters.
HHSIZE measures the size of the renter's household. If
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landlords use household attributes to indicate whether they
are likely to be desirable tenants, then they are likely to
charge higher rents, the larger the tenant's household is.
Not only do larger households probably cause more wear and
tear on their dwellings; they also will have a longer expected
length of stay, since the Egyptian rent control law grants
lifetime security of tenure to all members of the household.
EDCAT is a continuous variable measuring years of
education, and estimated from the categorical variable
included in the survey. It is included, as was the education
variable in our key money regressions, as a proxy for wealth:
we assume that the greater investment in education reflects
greater wealth in the household head's family of origin.
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Figure 7.1
Summary of Variables included in the Rent Regressions
Dependent Variable:
LGCRENT Natural logarithm of current rent per month
for the dwelling in Egyptian Pounds
Independent Variables:
Models 1 and 2
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
OLDCAT
RCRENT
LIOWN
RFOWN
INFORMAL
LINGER
KEYP81
Number of rooms in the dwelling
Number of complete baths in the dwelling
Number of toilets (not in complete baths)
in the dwelling (=1 if toilet is present in
the building, not dwelling)
Age of the building in years. Estimated by
taking the mid-point of the intervals coded
in the original survey, with a maximum of 30
Imputed controlled (legal) rent for the
dwelling. For the method by which the
variable was constructed, see appendix 3.
Takes the value 1 if the landlord is resident
in the building and zero otherwise.
Takes the value 1 if the landlord is a friend
or relative of the tenant and zero otherwise.
Takes the value 1 for dwellings which are
informal (lack building permits or are
built on land not zoned for housing) and zero
otherwise.
Number of years since the household moved
into the unit.
Key money paid in current (1981) Egyptian
Pounds.
Model 2 Only:
TOTEXP
HHSIZE
EDCAT
Total monthly household expenditure in
Egyptian Pounds
Size of household (number of individuals)
Number of years of education. Estimated by
taking the mid-point of the intervals coded
in the original survey.
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7.5 Results of Model Estimation
7.5.1 Models 1 and 2:
Model 1 estimates the contribution to current rents of
dwelling characteristics, controlled rent, and variables which
we expect will influence contract conditions. Model 2 adds
tenant characteristics. Both models succeed in explaining a
substantial fraction of the variation in rents observed in
Cairo. Model 1, in which the independent variables are
dwelling and landlord characteristics, explains 62 percent of
rent for the full sample of renters. When households which
paid key money and those which did not were considered
separately, Model 1 was more successful in explaining rents
for households which did not pay key money (R2 = .61 for the
full sample and R2 = .63 for recent movers) than for
households which did pay key money (R2 = .57 for the full
sample and R2 = .52 for recent movers).
When renter characteristics were added (Model 2), the
explanatory power for the full sample was increased only
slightly (R2 rose from .62 to .63). However including tenant
characteristics had a greater impact on the explanatory power
of the regressions estimated for recent movers (R2 increased
from .63 to .69 for recent movers who paid no key money and
from .52 to .60 for recent movers who paid key money). That
suggests that for tenancies which started recently the second
model (of price discrimination) may be more appropriate.
Model 1 was estimated for the complete sample of renters
(results are reported in Figure 7.2). It was then estimated
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for several subsets of observations separately, and F-tests3
were performed to determine whether the apparently different
coefficients obtained for subsets were statistically distinct.
Coefficients were compared for households which moved before
1971 and those who moved between 1971 and 1981. We were
unable to reject the hypothesis of equality of coefficients.
Similarly, when we compared rent regressions estimated
separately for renters who did and did not pay key money, the
two regressions were statistically alike -- we could not
reject the hypothesis of equality of coefficients. The same
result obtained when we compared households with incomes above
and below the median for the sample, and when we compared
those who did and did not pay key money, limiting our samples
to households which moved after 1971.
In almost all the regressions estimated, housing
characteristics (ROOMS, BATHS, TOILETS) had positive
coefficients significant at the 1 percent level or higher.
The coefficient of SEPRM was positive, as expected, in all the
regressions estimated, but statistically significant in only
one regression. Baths and toilets add more to rental value
than an equivalent number of rooms, a finding which parallels
the results of hedonic estimates of rents in the USA4 .
OLDCAT (age of the building) had coefficients
corresponding to a decrease of 1.1 to 2.4 percent in rents for
each additional year as a result of aging of the building. In
addition, LINGER had coefficients corresponding to an annual
reduction in rents of 1.1 percent when the regression was
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estimated for the full sample. wever the decline in rents
with increasing length of tenure of the dwelling was much
larger for recent movers (or, the increase in rents for more
recent tenancies, as it should perhaps better be described)
was 8.2 percent per year for movers after 1971 who paid no key
money and 3.6 percent per year for movers after 1971 who paid
key money. In contrast, for the sample of households which
moved more than 10 years earlier, the coefficient of linger
was -. 008, corresponding to a year to year change of only 0.8
percent in rent. To calculate the full effect of changes in
length of stay on the rents paid, we need to sum the effect of
OLDCAT and LINGER, since each year added to a tenancy also
adds a year to the age of the building they occupy.
The variable RCRENT was included to determine whether it
would have an effect on the market or negotiated rents
actually paid by tenants. If controls were effectively
enforced, its coefficient should be 1.0 and no other variable
should be significant. We found, however, that RCRENT was
consistently significant and positive. An increase of LE 1 in
the legal rent results in a 7 to 15 percent increase in rent
for all renters. When those who pay key money are considered
separately, however, we find that an increase of LE 1 in the
legal rent corresponds to a 10 to 15 percent decrease in rent.
When RCRENT was omitted from the regression, it caused
changes in the coefficients of dwelling characteristics --
ROOMS, BATHS, TOILETS, INFORMAL and SEPRM. Omitting it had
only a very small effect on the R2 of the regressions.
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However, including RCRENT makes the coefficients of household
characteristics (in Model 2) more precise, with smaller
standard errors, while changing the coefficients by much less
than one standard error. This finding supports our contention
that the controlled rent is appropriately included as a
variable in the regression. It is included as a factor which,
together with landlord and tenant characteristics, influences
the bilateral bargaining between landlord and tenant which
determines the rent actually paid for each unit.
The coefficient of LIOWN, which indicates rental
contracts with a resident landlord, was positive for the whole
sample and for households which paid no key money; for
households which paid key money it was consistently negative.
We recall that the analysis in chapter 6 showed that renters
from resident landlords are less likely to pay key money. It
is tempting to interpret the two results as meaning that
renters from resident landlords who pay key money receive a
discount in rent as a result, whereas we find that for the
sample of all renters paying key money does not seem to bring
a significant reduction in rents.
When the regression was estimated for the whole sample
(Figure 7.2) its coefficient was positive but not
statistically different from zero. When recent movers were
considered separately (Figure 7.5), the coefficient of LIOWN
corresponded to a premium of 9.1 percent for tenants of
resident owners and was just statistically significant (t>l).
For the sample of recent movers who paid no key money, the
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coefficient of LIOWN indicated that tenants of resident owners
pay a premium of 20 percent; it was highly significant (t>2).
This finding supports our contention that rents are determined
by negotiation and that resident owners are more likely to
take a rent premium in lieu of key money.
Tenants whose landlords were relatives or friends
consistently reported paying lower rents: the coefficient of
RFOWN was -. 09 (corresponding to a 9 percent discount) for the
whole sample (Figure 7.2) and just significant (t>l). Recent
movers who paid no key money received a discount estimated at
15.8 percent (Figure 7.6) compared with a discount of 6.8
percent for those who paid key money and moved recently
(Figure 7.5). Both coefficients for recent movers were barely
significant (t> 1). It is plausible to suppose that tenants
who paid key money were less closely related to or acquainted
with their landlords than those who paid no key money, and
hence also received a smaller rent discount.
INFORMAL had a positive coefficient for all the samples
for which the regression was estimated. That contrasts with
findings for third-world housing markets with no rent control,
in which rental housing in informal areas bears lower rents
than similar housing in formal areas5 . The definition of
informal housing used here is such that a very high proportion
of newly constructed housing in Cairo is "informal". Rent
discounts for informal housing are associated with the
probability of eviction, which is on average low for informal
housing in Cairo, given its prevalence. The positive
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coefficient of INFORMAL, meaning that residents in informal
areas seem to pay higher rents, in conjunction with the
finding of chapter 6 that residents in informal areas pay key
money less frequently, provides support for the argument at
the beginning of this chapter that in much of the newly
constructed housing in Cairo, most of which was classified as
informal, landlords have proved willing to accept higher
rents, and that most of their tenants do not pay key money.
The rent premium for informal housing supports our
contention that informal rents higher than the legal
controlled rents are a more common form of evasion in informal
housing. The rent premium for informal housing is higher for
households with below median income (12 percent; t>l); for
households with above median income the coefficient of
INFORMAL was .07 and not significantly different from zero.
When households were considered by their date of moving, the
coefficient of INFORMAL was found to be significant
(corresponding to an 11 percent premium) only for households
which moved before 1971; for more recent movers it was not
significantly different from zero.
The regression results suggest rejection of the
hypothesis that key money and rent are closely related, and
that higher key money corresponds directly to lower rent. The
coefficient of key money was statistically indistinguishable
from zero in the regressions (both models) for the complete
sample. Only in the estimates of model 2 for movers since
1971 (Figure 7.9) did key money have a statistically
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significant coefficient. That coefficient was negative and of
the expected sign but very small: .000053. It suggests that a
key money payment will bring about only a very small decrease
in rent. The mean monthly rent for the sample of LE 9.82
corresponds to an annual rent of LE 118. A payment of LE 1000
in key money would reduce that rent by only LE 6.256.
7.5.2 Model 2 only
The effects of the three household characteristics
(income, household size and education) were positive and
significant in most of the regressions (Figures 7.8 to 7.11).
The estimates for the sample of households which moved after
1971 should more closely correspond to current conditions, so
we choose to focus on those results. Looking at those who
paid no key money (Figure 7.10) and who, we hypothesized are
paying rent premiums in lieu of key money, we see that monthly
rents increase by 1 percent for each LE 10 of monthly
household expenditure (note that for this sample the mean
monthly expenditure is LE 105 and the range is from LE 9.25 to
LE 797).
An additional household member adds 9.9 percent to the
rent and household heads with more education pay significantly
more rent (about 1 percent more for each year of education).
All three household characteristics have high t-statistics (t
> 1 for EDCAT; t > 2 for TOTEXP and t > 3 for HHSIZE).
Household heads with more years of education and those with
higher incomes were shown in chapter 7 to have a higher
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probability of paying key money; we demonstrate here that they
are also likely to pay higher rents.
In contrast, none of the household characteristics proved
to be significant in the regression for households which had
paid key money after 1971 (Figure 7.11). TOTEXP has a
positive coefficient and HHSIZE and EDCAT negative
coefficients; all have t-statistics of less than one.
Looking more closely at the regressions for recent movers
grouped by whether theyid not (Figure 7.10) or did (Figure
7.11) pay key money, we find substantial differences in the
magnitude and significance of some coefficients. The
intercept is very large in the regression for households which
paid key money, and it alone explains a very large proportion
of the variation in rents. In the regression for households
who paid no key money, on the other hand, the constant is much
smaller and the largest coefficients are those for dwelling
characteristics, the discount for related landlords and the
premium for resident landlords.
Rents appear to have been rising at about 9.7 percent a
year (the sum of the coefficients of LINGER and OLDCAT) for
households who paid no key money and more slowly (7 percent a
year) for those who paid key money. Household characteristics
of the tenants are positive and significant for renters who
paid no key money; they are also positive but not
statistically significant for renters who paid key money. The
magnitude of the coefficients of household characteritics are
similar in both regressions.
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Figure 7.2
Ordinary Least Squares Log-Linear Model of Rents 1
Sample: All Observations
CONSTANT
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
SEPRM
OLDCAT
RCRENT
LIOWN
RFOWN
INFORMAL
LINGER
KEYP81
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
.92 .16
.17 .03
.30 .10
.33 .80*10-1
.66*10-1 .11
.16*10-1 .42*10-1
.77*10-1 .88*10-2
.19*10-1 .62*10-1
.89*10-1 .88*10-1
.10 .69*10-1
-.11*10-1 .39*10-1
.12*10-1 .35*10-4
T for HO:
Parameter=0
5.89
5.64
3.10
4.18
0.60
-3.76
8.78
0.31
-1.01
1.44
-2.95
0.36
Number of observations:
Adjusted R 2 :
Mean of Dependent Variable:
Standard Error of Regression:
Independent variable means:
BATHS
TOILETS
ROOMS
OLDCAT
SEPRM
RCRENT
RFOWN
LIOWN
LINGER
INFORMAL
KEYP81
Paid key money:
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.62
1.76
0.49
(LE 8.17)
83.8%
30.9%
3.12
21.34
14.3%
LE5.09
14.3%
41.3%
14.5 years
61.0%
LE213 .4
20.1%
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Figure 7.3
Ordinary Least Squares Log-Linear Model of Rents 1
Sample: Households which paid no key money
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
T for HO:
Parameter=0
CONSTANT
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
SEPRM
OLDCAT
RCRENT
LIOWN
RFOWN
INFORMAL
LINGER
.87
.16
.34
.32
.87*10-1
-. 15*10-1
.79*10-1
.53*10-1
-. 71*10-1
.96*10-1
-. 11*10-1
.18 4.73
.03 4.74
.11 3.18
.90*10-1 3.59
.11 0.76
.50*10-2 -3.08
.91*10-2 8.62
.69*10-1 .77
.94*10~1 -. 76
.80*10-1 1.20
.41*10-2 -2.71
Number of observations:
Adjusted R 2 :
Mean of Dependent Variable:
Standard Error of Regression:
Independent variable means:
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
SEPRM
OLDCAT
RCRENT
LIOWN
RFOWN
INFORMAL
LINGER
KEYP81
207
0.61
1.64
0.49
(LE 7.42)
2.98
82.1%
31.9%
17.4%
23.2 years
LE 4.75
43 . 596
16.4%
60 . 9%
15.9 years
LE 0.0
Paid key money: 0.0%
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Figure 7.4
Ordinary Least Squares Log-Linear Model of Rents 1
Sample: Households which paid key money (PDKEY = 1)
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
T for HO:
Parameter=0
CONSTANT
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
SEPRM
OLDCAT
RCRENT
LIOWN
RFOWN
INFORMAL
LINGER
KEYP81
1.41
.27
-. 10
.37
-. 54
-. 18*10-1
.15*10-1
-.11
-. 23
.15
-. 11*10-1
.00
.42
.11
.34
.20
3.35
2.70
-.30
1.87
.61 -. 88
.11*10-1 -1.59
.49*10-1 .31
.15
.32
.16
.19*10-1
.45*10-4
-. 70
-. 73
.93
-. 59
.14*10-5
Number of observations:
Adjusted R 2 :
Mean of Dependent Variable:
Standard Error of Regression:
Independent variable means:
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
SEPRM
OLDCAT
RCRENT
LIOWN
RFOWN
INFORMAL
LINGER
KEYP81
52
.57
2.20
.49
(LE 11.17)
3.65
90.4%
26.9%
1.9%
14.10 years
LE 6.44
32.7%
5.8%
61.5%
8.7 years
LE 1062.90
Paid key money: 100.0%
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Figure 7.5
Ordinary Least Squares Log-Linear Model of Rents 1
Sample: All recent mover households
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
(moved 1971-81)
T for HO:
Parameter=O
CONSTANT
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
SEPRM
OLDCAT
RCRENT
LIOWN
RFOWN
INFORMAL
LINGER
KEYP81
1.03
.73*10-1
.46
.57
.11
-. 13*10-1
.11
.91*10-1
-.11
.28*10-1
-. 51*10-1
-. 37*10-4
Number of observations:
Adjusted R 2 :
Mean of Dependent Variable:
Standard Error of Regression:
Independent variable means:
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
SEPRM
OLDCAT
RCRENT
LIOWN
RFOWN
INFORMAL
LINGER
KEYP81
.24
.57*10-1
.16
.14
4.22
1.27
2.82
4.01.
.18 .57
.61*10-2 -2.17
.26*10-1 4.34
.90*10-1 1.02
.12 -.95
.12 .24
.19*10-1 -2.74
.40*10-4 -. 92
115
.58
2.01
.46
(LE 9.82)
3.07
80.9%
31.3%
10 . 4%
15.1 years
LE 5.88
42.6%
17.4%
79.1%
5.7 years
LE 352.26
Paid key money: 31.3%
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Figure 7.6
Ordinary Least Squares Log-Linear Model of Rents 1
Sample: Recent mover households who paid no key money
(Moved 1971-81, PDKEY = 0)
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
T for HO:
Parameter=0
CONSTANT
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
SEPRM
OLDCAT
RCRENT
LIOWN
RFOWN
INFORMAL
LINGER
1.18
.28*10-
.42
.45
.87*10-
-. 17*10-1
.13
.20
-. 16
-. 47*10-1
-. 51*10-
.29
.62*10-1
.18
.16
4.09
.45
2.37
2.77
.18 .49
.67*10-2 -2.61
.25*10-1 5.33
.98*10-1 2.01
.12 -1.33
.14 -. 33
.20*10-1 -2.56
Number of observations:
Adjusted R 2 :
Mean of Dependent Variable:
Standard Error of Regression:
Independent variable means:
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
SEPRM
OLDCAT
RCRENT
LIOWN
RFOWN
INFORMAL
LINGER
KEYP81
79
.63
1.86
.42
(LE 8.58)
2.83
77.2%
32.9%
15.2%
17.6 years
LE 5.38
45.6%
24.0%
81.0%
4.62 years
LE 0.00
Paid key money: 0.0%6
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Figure 7.7
Ordinary Least Squares Log-Linear Model of Rents 1
Sample: Recent mover households who paid key money
(Moved 1971-81, PDKEY = 1)
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
T for HO:
Parameter=O
CONSTANT
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
OLDCAT
RCRENT
LIOWN
RFOWN
INFORMAL
LINGER
KEYP81
1.71
.37
.32
.74
-. 24*10-1
-. 96*10-1
-. 42*10-i
.68
.47*10-1
-. 63*10-
-. 45*10-4
.57
.20
2.99
1.85
.44 .73
.31 2.40
.21*10-1 -1.16
.11 -.90
.19 -.21
.59 1.14
.23 .20
.58*10-1 -1.09
.71*10-4 -. 64
Number of observations:
Adjusted R2 :
Mean of Dependent Variable:
Standard Error of Regression:
Independent variable means:
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
SEPRM
OLDCAT
RCRENT
LIOWN
RFOWN
INFORMAL
LINGER
KEYP81
36
. 52
2.34
.51
(LE 12.55)
3.58
88.9%
27.8%
0.0%
9.7 years
LE 6.97
36.1%
2.8%
75.0%
4.3 years
LE 1125.26
Paid key money:
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Figure 7.8
Ordinary Least Squares Log-Linear Model of Rents 2
Sample: All observations
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
T for HO:
Parameter=O
CONSTANT
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
SEPRM
OLDCAT
RCRENT
LIOWN
RFOWN
INFORMAL
LINGER
KEYP81
TOTEXP
HHSIZE
EDCAT
.62
.10
.32
.29
.48*10-1
-. 13*10-l1
.11
.64*10-1
-43*10-1
.71*10-1
-. 99*10-2
.51*10-4
.69*10- 3
.24*10-1
.65*10-2
.22
.41*10-
.13
.94*10-1
.14
2.82
2.49
2.57
3.11
.35
.48*10-2 -2.81
.18*10-1 6.16
.74*10-1 .87
.10 -.42
.84*10-1 .85
.49*10-2 -2.02
.26*10-4 1.94
.40*10-3 1.72
.19*10-1 1.25
.70*10-2 .93
Number of observations:
Adjusted R 2 :
Mean of Dependent Variable:
Standard Error of Regression:
Independent variable mean:
ROOMS 3.0
BATHS .81
TOILETS .32
SEPRM 14.3%
OLDCAT 20.9 y
RCRENT LE 4.94
RFOWN 14.8%
LIOWN 40.2%
LINGER 13.7 ye
INFORMAL 65.1%
KEYP81 LE 294.20
TOTEXP 121.64
HHSIZE 5.0
EDCAT 6.99
209
.62
1.76
.51
(LE 8.47)
ears
ars
years
Paid key money: 20.1%
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Figure _7 . 9
Ordinary Least Squares Log-Linear Model of Rents 2
Sample: All recent mover households
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
(moved 1971-81)
T for HO:
Parameter=0
CONSTANT
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
SEPRM
OLDCAT
RCRENT
LIOWN
RFOWN
INFORMAL
LINGER
KEYP81
TOTEXP
HHSIZE
EDCAT
.60
.67*110-1
.39
.48
.22
-. 11*10-1
.11
.94*10-1
-. 91*10-1
.11
-. 65*10-1
.17*10-4
.13*10-2
.60*10-I1
.79*10-2
.33 1.82
.64*110-1 1.05
.19 2.02
.15 3.08
.20 1.11
.67*10-2 -1.76
.27*10-1 4.23
.11
.13
.89
-. 68
.14 .79
.21*10-1 -3.05
.29*10-4 .58
.54*10-3 2.45
.29*10-1 2.02
.93*10-2 .85
Number of observations:
Adjusted R2:
Mean of Dependent Variable:
Standard Error of Regression:
Independent variable means:
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
SEPRM
OLDCAT
RCRENT
LIOWN
RFOWN
INFORMAL
LINGER
KEYP81
TOTEXP
101
.61
2.02
.48
(LE 10.69)
3.0
.78
.12
11.9%
15.5 years
LE 5.8
39.6%
16.8%
80.2%
5.6 years
LE 489.17
LE 115.66 per month
Paid key money: 31.3%
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Figure 7.10
inary Least Squares Log-Linear Model of Rents 2
Sample: Recent mover households who paid no key money
(Moved 1971-81, PDKEY = 0)
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
T for HO:
Parameter=O
CONSTANT
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
SEPRM
OLDCAT
RCRENT
LIOWN
RFOWN
INFORMAL
LINGER
TOTEXP
HHSIZE
EDCAT
.83
.13*10-1
.31
.41
.13
-. 15*10-I
.15
.12
-. 21
.48*10-1
-. 82*10-1
.10*10-2
.99*10-2
.94*10-2
.33
.63*1 .21
.20
.17
.18
.66*10-2.34
.24*10-1
.11
.12
2.48
1.56
2.43
.71
6.13
1.10
-1.65
.14 -. 34
.22*10-1 -3.77
.49*10-3 2.06
.96*10-2 1.03
.89*10-2 1.05
Number of observations:
Adjusted R 2 :
Mean of Dependent Variable:
Standard Error of Regression:
Independent variable means:
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
SEPRM
OLDCAT
RCRENT
LIOWN
RFOWN
INFORMAL
LINGER
KEYP81
TOTEXP
HHSIZE
EDCAT
70
.69
1.86
.40
(LE 8.61)
2.71
.73
.36
17.1%
17.8 years
LE 5.24
44.3%
22. 9%
80.0%
6.09 years
LE 0.00
LE 104.62
4.6
6.6 years
Paid key money: 0.0%
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Figure 7.11
OrdinaryLeast Squares Log-Linear Model of Rents 2
Sample: Recent mover households who paid key money
(Moved 1971-81, PDKEY = 1)
Parameter Standard
Estimate Error
T for HO:
Parameter=0
CONSTANT
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
OLDCAT
RCRENT
LIOWN
RFOWN
INFORMAL
LINGER
KEYP81
TOTEXP
HHSIZE
EDCAT
2.29
.52
-. 24
.44
-. 33*10-1
-. 15
-. 15
.13
.15
-. 36*10-1
-. 38*10-4
.16*10-2
-. 89*10-1
-. 14*10-I
1.15 2.00
.26 2.05
.68 -. 36
.38 1.13
.27*10-1 -1.19
.13
.32
.85
.36
.82*10-1
.69- 4
.25*10-2
.10
.25*10-1
-1. 11
-. 46
.15
.41
-.45
-.55
.64
-. 86
-. 59
Number of observations:
Adjusted R2 :
Mean of Dependent Variable:
Standard Error of Regression:
Independent variable means:
ROOMS
BATHS
TOILETS
SEPRM
OLDCAT
RCRENT
LIOWN
RFOWN
INFORMAL
LINGER
KEYP81
TOTEXP
HHSIZE
EDCAT
.60
2.39
.63
(LE 15.41)
3.64
.90
.29
0 . 0%
10.2 years
LE 7.10
29.0%
3.2%
80.6%
4.5 years
LE 1593.74
140.58
4.4
9.4
Paid Key Money
31
100.0%
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7.6 Conclusions
Our empirical estimates show that rents in Cairo can
plausibly be viewed as market determined. Even though a
number of idiosyncratic factors enter into the determination
of individual rent levels, more than half of the variation in
rents is explained by an abbreviated vector of dwelling
characteristics. However, rents, once agreed, are fixed for
the duration of the lease for most tenants. As a result, in
recent years Cairo renters who remained in their dwellings
have enjoyed very high tenure discounts as rents for vacant
dwellings rose rapidly.
Our results do not support the contention that the key
money tenants pay represents the present value of a rent
discount agreed upon for the duration of the lease: key money
is large relative to the rent discount received by those who
pay it. That finding is consistent with the evidence from our
study of key money that higher rents are associated with
higher, not lower key money payments.
The evidence reviewed here supports our second
hypothesis, that landlords in Cairo have a degree of market
power which they use to exercise price discrimination,
charging different rents and key money prices to different
households. Among recent movers the great majority of renters
are paying substantially more than the controlled rent for
their dwellings, and high income households pay more than low
income households for apparently similar dwellings.
Property owners have continued to build rental housing in
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Cairo in recent years in spite of the stringent limits on
rents set by the rent control legislation in force. Some have
been able to collect key money. As controlled rents failed to
keep up with inflation in the 1970's, they also collected
rents higher than the levels set by law. Our estimates
suggest that in over three fourths of tenancies which started
between 1976 and 1981 rents were higher than the regulations
permit (Table 7.1). That proportion increased sharply in the
1970's. In the 1960's fewer than 25 percent of new tenancies
appear to have borne significant rent premiums over the legal
level.
The increase in rent levels relative to controlled rents
reflects the failure of controlled rent levels to keep up with
the rapid increase in the price level in the 1970's. Table
2.4 showed that the median rent for a new tenancy rose from LE
5 in 1971-73 to LE 10.25 in 1979-81. However, that increase
corresponded to roughly constant real rent levels: in constant
1981 Egyptian Pounds median rents for new tenancies were LE
11.32 in 1971-73 and LE 11.31 in 1979-81. At the same time,
the proportion of new renters paying key money also rose, from
21.4 percent in 1971-73 to 38.9 percent in 1979-81.
The willingness of tenants to pay rent premiums (or the
inability of the administrators responsible for implementing
the law to enforce it) meant that landlords were able to
collect returns on newly rented apartments on the order of 6
to 8 percent per year of the value of those apartments7  When
the contracts for tenancies started in earlier periods were
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made, the rents they incorporated allowed the landlords a
similar return: 6.2 percent for tenancies with no key money
and 5.9 percent for tenancies with key money (Figure 6.4).
However, the real value of these rents shrank rapidly with
inflation, resulting in returns to landlords with sitting
tenants which were much lower.
This chapter has provided further support for the
hypothesis of the second of our models of evasion of rent
controls, that landlords willing to build rental housing have
under rent controls a degree of market power which permits
them to charge higher prices for housing to some renters than
to others, thus presumably increasing their earnings. Those
higher prices take the form of both rents and key money.
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Footnotes
Prices for 1981 are used in both numerator and denominator
to make possible comparisons between contracts made at
different periods: estimates of dwelling value are only
available for 1981, and are used as a proxy for dwelling value
at the time each contract was made.
2 See chapter 6, figures 6.3 and 6.4: mean value of ORNTVAL
for PDKEY = 1 and PDKEY = 0.
3 Chow, Gregory C. 1960.
4 See Follain, James R. and Stephen Malpezzi (1980) and
Malpezzi, Stephen, Larry Ozanne and Thomas Thibodeau (1980).
5 Jimenez (1984) found that in Davao (Philippines) formal
sector rents were about 18 percent more than equivalents in
the informal sector.
6 We considered the possibility that the lack of significance
in the coefficient for key money was attributable to
measurement error. However, alternative formulations of the
independent variable for key money (as an indicator variable
equal to 1 for households which paid key money and 0 for those
who did not, and as the log of key money) did not produce
convincingly different outcomes. The coefficient for key
money was not significantly different from zero (t < 1) and
had no consistent sign. Similarly, we considered whether key
money should be specified in current rather than constant
Egyptian pounds, but using the alternative formulation
produced similarly small coefficients (e.g. -. 000094 was the
coefficient of key money measured in current pounds for model
2, estimated for the sample of recent movers only) and no
higher level of significance.
7 The mean value of annual rents as a fraction of dwelling
value was 7.9 percent for tenants who paid no key money and
6.0 percent for tenants who paid key money (Figure 6.3).
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Policy Implications
4.1 Summary
In this study we set out to develop and test a model of
the rental housing market in Cairo which would allow us to
identify some of the consequences of the long-standing system
of rent controls. The widespread evasion of controls through
side payments from renter to landlord was identified as an
important characteristic of the market which had been
neglected by previous economic models of rent controls.
Economists have been unusually consistent in their
condemnation of both the efficiency and the equity effects of
rent controls when they are imposed for more than a very short
period. We argued that it is not possible to analyse the
impacts of the system of rent controls in Cairo without a
clearer understanding of the widespread evasion of rent
controls, and of the contractual relationship between
landlord and tenant in such a context.
We were able to use data from the 1981 household survey
to demonstrate that rental housing transactions in Cairo take
place in a "market", albeit a "black market" in which a
significant component of the price paid by renters takes the
form of illegal side payments. We found evidence that black
market activity is widespread. The price paid by the most
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recent movers incorporated a substantial premium over the
legal price of rental housing. However, the premiums paid by
renters had a very high coefficient of variation'. That
variance cannot be attributed to the cost or difficulty of
obtaining information about prices alone. In the Cairo
housing market, renters and owner-occupiers share similar
perceptions of the value of alternative housing units.
hedonic regressions using renters' and owners' estimates of
The value of their dwellings was statistically
indistinguishable: the hypothesis of different coefficients
was decisively rejected. The interviews quoted in Chapter 3
provide further evidence that information about asking prices
for vacant rental units is readily available to would-be
renters.
What is the nature of the landlord-tenant transaction in
such a context? We suggested that when landlords and tenants
are relatively homogeneous, then individual (as opposed to
corporate) landlords' dealings with their tenants can better
be characterized as a relationship, rather than a purely
market transaction. Renters and the individual owners who
dominate the Cairo housing market are similar in surprisingly
many respects. The characteristic which clearly distinguishes
them is wealth: owner-occupants own their dwellings and
resident landlords own their own and one or more additional
rented units. In such a housing market, dominated by
individual landlords, informal rent contracts incorporating
illegal side payments are effectively enforceable,
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particularly for resident landlords and in areas which are
more "informal"'2 .
We developed two models of a rent controlled housing
market with evasion. In the first, we outlined a competitive
market in which all renters at a given point in time pay the
same price, but tenants may select different modes of payment
- rent premiums or key money - and landlords are risk-averse,
and so charge more for rent premium contracts than for
contracts with key money. In the first model, higher rent
should coincide with lower key money payments, ceteris
paribus. The second was a model in which landlords with
vacant rental units have some monopoly power which they use to
exercise price discrimination. Wealthier tenants, or tenants
with higher willingness to pay, are charged both higher rent
and higher key money. Testing the models, we found that key
money is more likely to change hands when landlords are not
resident and in formal areas.
To the extent that rent controls cause excess demand for
housinc, they cause disequilibrium, preventing the completion
of trades which would have been mutually advantageous for
landlords and tenants. Both landlords and would-be tenants
have strong incentives to evade controls. However, such
behavior is inherently risky. Landlords, who may be penalized
for evasion, face the problem of determining how likely a
prospective tenant is to renege on a contract which includes
side payments in the form of key money or rent premiums.
Landlords who cannot rely on social controls for enforcement
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of illegal rent contracts are more likely to prefer key money
contracts (which make it harder for the tenant to renege).
Landlords must decide how long to search for a tenant
willing to pay key money or a relatively high rent premium.
We noted that in any survey of vacant units those with high
prices will be over-represented. Landlords with a high rate
of time preference, such as those seeking funds to complete a
building or addition, are likely to accept lower rent or key
money, but they would be expected to have a preference, other
things being equal, for key money over rent premiums.
Tenants with liquid assets to pay key money can choose
whether to pay side payments to landlords in the form of rent
premiums or key money. However, capital markets in Egypt, as
in most less developed countries, are far from perfect.
Tenants find it difficult (or impossible) to borrow against
their collateral if they have any to pay key money.
Theoretical models which assume that renters can borrow
against their expected lifetime earnings in order to pay key
money neglect the reality that most renters' choices are
subject to a severe wealth constraint.
This study was initially motivated by a puzzling
phenomenon: the continuing construction of rental housing in
Cairo, a city with long-standing and ostensibly stringent rent
controls. Economists are unusually unanimous in the belief
that rent controls inhibit new construction and the
maintenance of existing housing. We found that many renters
in Cairo are paying more than the controlled rent for their
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dwellings. The magnitude and frequency of rent premiums
(amounts paid in addition to the controlled rent) grew as the
gap between construction costs and controlled rents widened in
the 1970's. Those rent premiums, as well as the more widely
discussed key money, help to explain individual landlords'
continuing willingness to construct new rental housing and the
rapid growth of rental housing in the informal housing stock.
This study underlines the importance of the non-
tradeability of an occupied rent controlled unit. It allows
landlords to exercise price discrimination in order to earn
higher returns on their investment in housing. We considered
the hypothesis that landlords are in monopolistic competition
and use their individual monopoly powers to charge higher
prices to wealthier tenants.
When we tested the two models of controlled housing
markets with evasion, we found that our model of the decision
whether or not to pay key money in general confirms our prior
beliefs: the probability of paying key money is higher for
more recent movers, and for those with more education
(introduced as a proxy for wealth) and higher incomes; renters
in informal areas had a lower probability of paying key money.
Tests based on our models of the magnitude of key money
were less successful. Several variables had signs which were
the opposite of those expected, while others were not
significant. We found that key money appeared to increase
with rent. This finding suggested that we should reject the
hypothesis of model I that key money and rent are simply
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alternative ways of paying the same contract rent. It is,
however, consistent with our model II which predicts price
discrimination on the part of landlords.
Tests based on our model of the amount of rent paid,
showed higher rents associated with key money, more education
and higher household income, as well as larger and more recent
buildings. Tenants of resident owners pay higher rents.
Those findings are consistent with the hypothesis that
resident landlords and their tenants have an ongoing
relationship which permits effective enforcement of informal
rent contracts.
The empirical results demonstrate that rent premiums are
an important form of side payment. It is significant that
when rent premiums are paid, the illegality of the transaction
need never be explicit. A recent report on the British
controlled rental housing sector notes that its data are based
on rents registered with the authorities, and that they
represent only about half of the eligible units, although the
law requires that all units be registered.
8.2 Policy Implications
In its Five Year Plan for 1982/3 - 1986/7, the Egyptian
government identified as one of the economic problems revealed
by the experience of the 1970's the government's popularly
perceived obligation to protect those on limited or nominally
fixed incomes from rising prices, regardless of the cost of
doing so. The "Plan Foundations and Priorities" incorporate
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as a goal "appropriate pricing policies to ensure that both
consumers and producers receive per signals, with a
simultaneous reduction in the subsidy burden".
The Plan document also stresses the need for adequate
investment in housing. There is considerable emphasis in the
plan on fulfilling the basic needs of the population. Housing
comes into this category. It is scheduled to receive 13 per
cent of total investment in the current five-year plan as
compared with 10 per cent in the previous five years. The
plan target is an additional 800,000 urban housing units, and
the plan envisages almost all housing investment being
undertaken by the private sector3 . It thus seems appropriate
to consider both the impacts of the current rent control
legislation on housing production, and on the signalling role
of prices in the economy.
We have already noted that the security of tenure granted
to sitting tenants is as important as rent reductions in its
impact on the housing market. The effect of security of
tenure and rent controls together is to take certain property
rights away from landlords. However, those rights are not
just transferred to tenants. The right to occupy the unit is
granted exclusively to the sitting tenant, if any, for
example. The landlord loses the right to replace the existing
tenants with new occupants who are willing to pay more for the
unit, but that right is assigned ambiguously. In Cairo, only
under certain circumstances does a sitting tenant have the
right to sublet (at a higher rent than he pays) to another
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occupant, without the landlord's consent. In considering the
broader implications of the policy, this incomplete allocation
of rights is even more important in a controlled market with
widespread evasion than are the nominal controls on rental
housing prices.
The landlord under rent controls loses the right to empty
and demolish the building, replacing it with, for example, a
taller building on the same site. Yet the tenants do not
acquire this right, either. The landlord has the right to
make improvements, but no incentive to do so, if he cannot
raise the rent to pay for the improvements and, possibly, earn
a return, too. The tenant has the incentive but not the right
to make improvements; he also cannot recover the cost of any
improvements if he moves. Landlords in Cairo retain the right
to make additions to an existing building, and this has been a
source of significant revenues for Cairo landlords. Much of
the increase in the housing stock in the 1970's, the Informal
Housing Study (Abt (1982a)] found, was in the form of
additions to the existing stock, rather than new buildings.
Governments instituting rent controls rarely seem to be
paying adequate attention to the long term implications of
their decision. Instead, the controls are introduced in
response to what is perceived (or presented) as a short term
crisis -- an inability of supply to respond to increased
demand in the short run. But controls, once introduced, are
very difficult to eliminate. The Cairo case indicates both
the extent of entrenched interests which result when controls
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stay in force for an extended period, and the distance which
can evolve between the actual system for allocation of housing
and that which the government originally had in mind.
When rent controls limit the landlord's legal rights and
when the landlord takes a side payment from the tenant (giving
in return the right to occupy the unit), the definition of
property rights which ensues may be clear to both landlord and
tenant as long as there are no substantial shifts in the
physical and economic environmen The fuzzy definition of
those rights becomes evident when exogenous changes must be
dealt with by owner and tenant. In Cairo, the problem has
been manifest when piped water and sewers are provided in
previously unserved urban areas. Both landlords and tenants
are reluctant to pay for house connections. The investment
will increase the value of the building, but the landlord is
unlikely to be able to realize that gain unless the tenants
move out. When tenants do pay for such connections they
become more tied to their dwellings. Such increased friction
in the operation of housing markets is a problem with far-
reaching consequences for a changing economy. The tenants
will benefit from improved services, but will be unable to
recover any of the capital cost of the improvement if they
move out. Thus, the policy relevance of this research goes
beyond the issue of whether and in what ways rent controls can
or should be modified or extended or eliminated in Cairo. The
character of the informal as well as the formal agreements
between owners and sitting tenants, and the implicit
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allocation of ownership rights a obligations between them
have had and will continue to have an important impact on
public policy. It affects the public sector's ability to
finance improvements to urban infrastructure, roads, water and
sewers (all of which are urgently needed in Cairo as in many
other third-world cities) using user charges and property
taxes.
An improvement which increases the capital value of a
dwelling can and should, it is often argued, be financed in
whole or in part by a tax on the beneficiary. Benefit taxes
have in the past traditionally assumed that the beneficiary
was the property owner, who would gain from the capitalization
of the improvement into the value of his property. Where
tenants have secure tenure and long expected stays in their
dwellings, as in Cairo, the increase in value effectively
accrues to the tenant rather than to the landlord. Moreover,
financing public infrastructure improvements by taxing the
landlord is then inequitable. When cash flows to landlords
are minimal, as a result of long-standing rent controls, such
a tax is also likely to be impossible to collect. At the same
time, the terms of renters' formal and informal agreements
with their landlords rarely give them enough security of
tenure to make them willing to pay, because their rights are
not transferrable and thus they cannot recuperate their
outlays if they move after the improvement is carried out.
In the absence of a clear allocation of property rights
between owner and tenant, it becomes difficult to pay
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compensation when public improvements are made - when housing
needs to be demolished to widen a road, for example. In
Cairo, public works projects have been delayed by the acute
problem of compensating both owners and occupants of housing
affected by the project. The solution adopted has usually
been to rehouse the occupants in public housing - often
located far from their original dwellings - and to compensate
the owners for the value of the dwellings. But this procedure
is slowed by the lack of available public housing and the
reluctance of residents of affected housing to move to it.
Similarly, the absence of a clear allocation of property
rights impedes private improvements to the housing stock, even
if both landlord and tenant would be better off if the
physical condition of the dwelling were improved.
We have argued that when landlords have small scale
holdings, and are resident they have a very different
relationship with their tenants than do large scale individual
or corporate property owners. That suggests that governments
seeking to eliminate rent controls need to consider the
unplanned side effects of controls and their elimination,
including the scale of holdings of owners of rental property.
Rent controls in Cairo have added to the existing incentives
to build new housing in 'informal' areas, usually on
agricultural land (which is scarce and which the government is
trying to conserve), in preference to areas formally
designated for urbanization, where land is more costly, albeit
provided with services, but where it may be more difficult to
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get away with evasions of the rent control law, such as key
money or rent premiums. The increasing share of rental
housing provided by resident private owners is also probably
attributable to the rent control laws' indirect effects.
The existence of rent controls certainly increases the
vacancy rate in Cairo's rental housing stock. The owner of an
apartment will rent it if the key money and rent he receives
match or exceed his estimate of the worth of alternative uses
of the unit. By keeping the unit vacant, he retains access to
the unit for his personal use -- to serve as a dowry for a
daughter or son who marries, for example. In Cairo, he also
holds an appreciating asset in a market where key money
payments and rents are rising faster than inflation. Owners
with offspring nearing an age when they need a dowry and
owners with a higher rate of time preference are thus less
likely to make a deal.
8.3 Further Research
We have already noted the relative neglect of the rental
sector in recent research on housing markets. In particular,
this study raises as many questions as it answers about rental
contracts and landlord-tenant relationships in cities of
developing countries. The data used here provided only
limited information about landlords, but our findings
strongly suggest that further attention needs to be given to
the characteristics of owners of urban rental property. Who
are they? In particular, who are the small scale landlords,
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and what are their motives for owning property? We found
small landlords apparently accepting very small real rates of
return because real property is perceived as a relatively
attractive investment and hedge against inflation.
In this study we have intentionally avoided an issue
which has usually been the focus of studies of rent controls:
evaluating the effects of controls. Economists have
unanimously condemned their effects as inefficient and
inequitable. Yet controls continue to be advocated by
politicians and renters4 . This study makes clear that the
effects of controls extend beyond the immediate impacts on
rents and housing consumption. More needs to be learned about
landlord-tenant contracts and about the organization of the
rental property market in other controlled housing markets, in
India for example: are small landlords more prevalent in
cities where controls on rents make evasion easier for them
than for large landlords?
8.4 Conclusions:
This study has made it clear that you cannot model
housing markets in less developed countries without taking
into account both capital shortages and the shortage of
outlets for individuals to invest small savings. An owner who
has no available outlet for his savings offering a higher
return may decide to build rental housing in spite of the low
return it offers in real terms. High nominal interest rates
on bank deposits are mistrusted in environments where
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inflation has been high for some time. An owner who cannot
borrow to finish his building may choose a tenant who will pay
a low rent, but can pay some key money in advance, which can
be used to complete the unit.
Capital market constraints help to explain the continuing
construction of rental housing in Cairo. When a unit is added
to an existing building, the marginal cost of building an
extra unit is not equal to the average cost of all units in
the building. It is common in Cairo to add units to existing
buildings, increasing the density of development of the site.
For example, an owner may build several units for himself and
his family, then add one or more rental units. In that case
either the actual cost or the cost as he perceives it of the
additional units may be less than the average cost. Land is a
sunk cost for example. Thus, landlords estimating the return
they want to get on the basis of the marginal construction
cost may be willing to accept a lower rent or key money. Our
estimated dwelling value is then not a good measure of the
landlord's investment, on which he is seeking to earn a return
in rent or key money.
A landlord without access to the formal capital market
may need the key money he collects to complete the unit.
Without the key money the unit could not be built or completed
(because of market imperfections which make it impossible for
the landlord to borrow against the stream of future rental
income). If so, the tenant's willingness to pay is reduced
because he assumes some risk (that the unit will not be
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completed), which reduces the amount the landlord can charge.
We conclude that part at least of the explanation of our
initial dilemma -- why is rental housing still being built in
Cairo - lies in the fact that some investors are 'captive' --
they have or see no other more lucrative alternative
investment than rental units built on land they already own,
perhaps by increasing the density on a site they already
occupy.
Such captive investment involves efficiency costs for the
economy if higher rates of return exist elsewhere in the
economy, and urban housing is being built because capital
markets are imperfect.
This study has not looked closely at the equity impact of
Cairo's rent controls, which is clearly significant. Sitting
tenants when controls were introduced or extended to their
housing have benefited. So have tenants with fixed rents and
secure tenure in urban areas which have become more attractive
(their market price has risen over time) relative to the rest
of the city.
Policymakers need to know how consumers value alternative
bundles of public services provided to them. If different
population groups, of different ages, incomes or household
types, value public services differently, then policymakers
need to know that. They also need to know how the behavior of
consumers will be affected by changes in policy variables.
An important focus of econometric work on housing has
been the estimation of parameters to measure consumer demand
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for housing attributes and to estimate the magnitude of the
benefits implied by alternative public expenditures. In
principle, rent controls seem to make such estimates
inaccessible for public decisionmakers in Cairo. Rent
controls mean that we cannot, it seems, interpret coefficients
in hedonic regressions on rental values as prices and from
them determine consumer willingness to pay for housing
attributes.
It appears that to a significant extent the disincentives
to owners of rental property in urban Egypt were balanced in
the 1970's by the attractiveness of housing as an asset.
Housing is the main investment item for households in most
capitalist countries, and even in the Soviet Union (where
illegal side payments have been associated with exchanges of
cooperative apartments). In the 1970's Egypt benefited from a
substantial inflow of remittances from migrant workers in
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries. Those remittances were
used to pay for housing, land and consumer durables. The
attractiveness of housing as an asset is associated, however,
with the existence of imperfect capital markets and the
presence of persistent inflation.
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Footnotes
1 The coefficient of variation is the mean divided by the
standard deviation.
2 Developed without planning permission, in contravention of
zoning or subdivision regulations. Although we used a
dichotomous variable in this study to identify "informal"
rental units, there is in reality a spectrum of "informality"
from dwellings built or additions made without building
permits in areas zoned for residential use, to dwellings built
on agricultural land by squatters (individuals who do not own
the land).
3 See Ministry of Planning, Arab Republic of Egypt 1982.
4 Danielson and Keles (1984) cite continuing pressures in
Turkey to reintroduce controls on rents in urban areas, for
example.
Appendix 1
The Informal HousingSt udy
The data used in the empirical analysis was collected in
1981 as part of a study of the role of the informal sector in
housing in Egypt, a group of Egyptian and US organizations
carried out a detailed survey of 500 households in Cairo and
750 in Beni Suef. A major component of the project was data
collection: the survey was designed to collect information
about the housing sector as a whole, although the study for
which it was to be used was focussed on the informal sector of
the housing market. The survey questionnaire asked about the
occupants, their housing and neighborhood characteristics.
Most information was collected from direct questions to the
household head, but some additional information about
structures and neighborhoods was added by the enumerators, who
were university students who had been given intensive training
for their work and were supervised by professional enumerators
from CAPMAS.
The sample was selected after a "scanning survey"
updating the 1976 census in selected census tracts, and
designed to permit generalization to the city as a whole. The
survey was designed and carried out by Abt Associates, Inc.
and Dames and Moore,Inc. both of Cambridge, Massachusetts, and
the General Organization for Housing, Building and Planning
Research, an Egyptian Government agency, of Dokki, Cairo. It
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was headed by Stephen K. Mayo and financed by the US Agency
for International Development. The survey design and
interviews were carried out in cooperation with the Egyptian
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics.
The econometric analyses reported here use the data
collected in the household survey of Cairo residents. A brief
description of the survey methodology is given here; a more
detailed description of the survey and sampling procedure is
given in the reports on the project: Abt Associates 1981a,
1981b, 1981c, 1981d.
A two-stage probability sample of dwelling units was
identified as follows: in the first stage a random sample of
50 census enumeration districts in Greater Cairo was selected.
The districts were chosen from 7368 enumeration districts with
approximately 1.6 million dwelling units in Greater Cairo,
defined as the contiguous urbanized parts of Cairo, Giza and
Kalyubeya governorates, and major cities (markaz) in rural
hinterlands of Giza and Kalyubeya. The probability of
selection of each district was proportional to the 1976
enumeration district population of dwelling units (each
district is defined to include approximately 200 dwelling
units. The sample frame was updated to 1981 by the Scanning
Survey: a team of trained enumerators from CAPMAS who visited
every building in the district. In Cairo, the enumeration
produced a sample of 12,986 dwelling units in 3,386 buildings.
The second stage was a simple random sample of 10
occupied dwellings from the 1981 survey frame in each of the
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50 enumeration districts chosen in the first stage. In cases
of refusal or when a household was found not to be at home, an
adjacent dwelling was to be selected by the enumerator and its
occupants interviewed. The survey documentation reports that
"rates of refusal were extremely low for the survey, as were
instances of no-one being at home when the interviewer
arrived" but the exact values of these statistics are not
given. However, the survey documentation notes that
distributions of dwelling characteristics "appear to match
quite closely those of comparables from the Scanning Survey",
indicating that the random sampling procedure within
enumeration districts worked well.
The design of the sample meant that there was probably
some undersampling of rapidly growing peripheral areas which
were not enumeration districts in 1976 or which then had small
populations. It has also been suggested that the 1976 Census
sampling frame (and hence the 1981 survey sampling frame)
undersampled the City of the Dead, a cemetery area which has
become an inhabited part of Cairo. The sample of districts is
broadly distributed in the city, and comparison of sample data
from the survey with data from the 1976 census suggest that it
produces good estimates of population parameters for sample
variables.
While rates of refusal to respond to the survey as a
whole are reported to have been low, some questions had high
proportions of missing responses. Most variables had some
missing values and the empirical results reported here are
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thus based on fewer than the total of 346 renter and 154
owner-occupant households surveyed. Moreover, the surveyors
or coders did not use the nonresponse codes consistently and
it is not always possible to distinguish refusals to respond
from responses not applicable to individual households. The
accuracy of one variable of crucial concern to us (payments of
key money) is discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven.
A more serious problem is the denomination of some
financial data: the Egyptian pound (LE) is divided into 100
Piastres, equal to 1000 Millemes. The survey asked
interviewers to code some responses in LE and others in
Piastres. A small number (five percent or less) of responses
to a number of financial questions (rents, housing and land
values) appeared to be outliers because of confusion over
units of measurement. A rent coded as LE .06 (6 piastres) is
an outlier but would be within one standard deviation of the
mean at LE 6. A dwelling coded as valued by its occupants at
LE 6 would more plausibly be valued at LE 6000. Unfortunately
we did not have access to the original questionnaires and were
not able to check such outlier observations to identify
whether they were coding errors.
Finally, the Informal Housing Study carried out in-depth
interviews with persons involved in the supply of housing and
infrastructure in Cairo. Chapter 3 makes exentsive use of
some of those transcripts, primarily interviews with
contractors and owners.
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Appendix 2
Egyptian Consumer Price Index 1913-1931
CPI39
100
154
189
202
237
196
176
162
161
165
160
153
152
151
148
138
132
125
130
130
130
131
131
131
142
176
235
310
1913-14
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
100*
118*
138*
185*
242*
278
293
287
281
278
294
319
317
296
284
283
290
302
302
303
1914-81
Price
Index
19.5
30.1
36.9
39.4
46.3
38.3
34.4
31.6
31.4
32.2
31.2
29.9
29.7
29.5
28.9
26.9
25.8
24.4
25.4
25.4
25.4
25.6
25.6
25.6
30.2
35.3
47.3
61.9
71.1
74.9
73.4
71.9
71.1
75.2
81.6
81.0
75.7
72.6
72.4
74.2
77.2
77.2
77.5
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Appendix 2 (Continued)
Egyptian Consumer Price Index 1913-1981
CP139 CPI60 CP166 CP167 CPI67U 1914-81
Price
Index
304*
306*
297*
299*
310*
356*
388*
391*
384
396
412
100
100.3
109.3
123.1
128.9
127.7
127.5
133.3
137.5
100 *
107.8
110.2*
112.0*
114.6*
119.1
120.5
128.8*
147.2*
158.3
170.7
191.8
100*
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Notes
100
155.2
171.2
191.1
212.6
77.7
78.3
76.0
76.5
79.3
91.0
99.2
100
102.2
103.9
106.3
113.6
116.3
119.4
130.8
148.9
164.2
185.1
205.6
226.0
272.7
301.2
345.8
* : Year used as base for (constructed)
Sources
Index for 1914-81
Republique Arabe Unie, Annuaire Statistique 
_de l'Egypte
1917-1948
Republique d'Egypte Annuaire Statistique
1949/50 to 1955/56
Arab Republic of Egypt Statistical Indicators 1952-72
Arab Republic of Egypt Egypt Statistical Handbook 1977
Arab Republic of Egypt Egypt: Statistical Yearbook 1982
Arab Republic of Egypt "Monthly Bulletin of Consumer Price
Index, October 1982",
Ikram 1980, Table 26: Urban Consumer Price Index
113.6*
116.3*
141.0
148.9*
164.2*
185.1*
205.6*
226.0*
272.7*
301.2 
345.8 *
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Appendix 3
Estimation of Controlled Rents
Egypt's rent control legislation sets rents for all new
construction after 1965 as a fraction of official construction
cost and land cost. The land values used to estimate official
rents are "official values". For housing built before 1965,
official rents are a fraction of the initial rent.
Residents reported the number of years they had lived in
their dwelling. Surveyors estimated the age of buildings and
additions to buildings in which they carried out interviews in
intervals of 5 to 10 years. The sample was divided into
dwellings whose occupant moved in when the building was first
completed, and dwellings whose occupant was a more recent
mover. We defined households which moved in when the building
was first completed ("original occupants") as those with a
length of stay which started within 5 years of the building's
completion. That is a reasonable assumption given the long
stays typical in Cairo. "Recent movers" were renters who
moved more than five years after the building was completed.
For households which were original occupants, we were
able to use their length of stay to estimate the legal rent.
If they moved before 1965, we took the original rent (which
they were asked to report, in addition to the current rent)
and reduced it by the appropriate fraction (See Table 2.1).
For example, the legal rent for dwellings built between 1944
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and 1952 was subject to a series of legal reductions between
1952 and 1965, so the legal rent in 1981 was 68% of the
initial rent when the dwelling was occupied.
For original occupants who moved after 1965, we used
official construction prices (Table 2.4) (taking the midpoint
where a range is given). We added an estimate of land cost
for which we arbitrarily assumed that land cost 10% of
building cost (a figure consistent with costs reported by
owner-occupiers on the survey). The official annual rent was,
for example, 8% of official construction cost and 5% of land
cost between 1965 and 1977. Official construction costs are
given in prices per m2 so we assumed areas (based on Ministry
of Housing and Reconstruction figures) of [(Om 2 Number of
Rooms) + 10m2.
For recent movers we had to use the surveyors' estimates
of building age as the basis for imputing legal rents. For
buildings built before 1960 (virtually all occupied before
1965) we took Min (original rent, current rent). For
buildings built between 1960 and 1970, we used official
building costs and the legally permitted (post 1965) ratio of
rent to building and land costs (8% of building cost and 5%
of land cost) to estimate legal rent. We arbitrarily assumed
that land cost 10% of building cost (a figure consistent with
costs reported by owner-occupiers on the survey). For
buildings occupied by recent movers and built 1971-76 and
1976-81, we again estimated rents as the appropriate multiple
of estimated area, based on official construction costs.
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Appendix 4
Imputing Completed Lengths of Stay
for Owners and Renters in Cairo
Housing decisions can be analyzed in the framework of
household lifetime utility maximization with respect to the
mode of tenure, consumption levels, and lengths of stay
jointly. In this study we are concerned with the choice not
of mode of tenure but of a rental contract with or without
key money or a "rent premium". Moves typically take place to
adjust housing consumption in response to changing life-cycle
conditions. In Cairo, however, the transactions costs of
moving are very high. Insofar as tenancies are not
transferrable, households which have paid key money face even
higher transactions costs if they move. It is therefore
interesting to study the determinants of the complete lengths
of stay in the context of our data.
It is the planned complete length of stay which is
relevant to the decision to pay key money. Of course, planned
lengths of stay may not be realized for a variety of reasons,
such as unanticipated changes in family or financial
circumstances. However, the data available from the household
survey carried out as part of the Informal Housing Study in
Cairo include lengths of residence spells by the households
surveyed, as of the time of the interview. We do not know how
much longer these spells will last, nor how long those house-
holds expected to stay in their current residence when they
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moved there. Furthermore, the incomplete spells of residence
which we observe are subject to length-biased sampling.
This problem was first given attention in the labor
market literature on the duration of spells of unemployment
(Salant 1977). More recently, it has been given attention in
the literature on the economics of housing: Pickles and Davies
1983; Henderson and Ioannides 1984; Rosenthal 1986; Ioannides
1986. Here we adopt the methodology employed by Henderson and
Ioannides 1984 in order to estimate the parameters of the
distribution of complete spells, using data including
incomplete spells by households whose characteristics are
known as of the time when the current (interrupted) spell
began.
The problem is the following: let t be the date of a
family's most recent move, T the length of a completed spell
of residence, f (T) the density function of completed spells
T. S is the length of an incomplete spell, which is by
definition 1981-t, and g (S) the density function for
incomplete spells. The distribution function f (T) describes
the universe of all completed spells of residence. To
understand the length bias involved in our sampling from this
universe, consider that the times of moves of a household have
been marked on a straight line. Consider choosing a random
point on the line, with each point as likely to be chosen as
any other point. Yet clearly the interval (that is, the
completed spell) which a randomly chosen point belongs to is
more likely to belong to a longer rather than a shorter spell.
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Similarly, consider that after an interval is chosen, the
distance from the beginning of the interval is measured. This
experiment produces the length of an interrupted spell.
From the theory of stochastic processes of the renewal
type (see Henderson and Ioannides 1984, 6) we have that:
g(S) = [1 - F(S)] / E[T],
where F (.) is the distribution function for complete spells
and E [T] its mean. We follow Henderson and Ioannides, (op.
cit.) and assume that the distribution of complete spells is
lognormal with a mean which is a function of households'
characteristics as of the time the interrupted spell began and
variance which is independent of characteristics. We used the
maximum likelihood method to estimate different parameters for
renters and owners. Equality was strongly rejected by the
data.
The coefficients of E[ln T] = Co+ C1i+...+Ckk are
generally significant for both renters and owners. The above
specification is highly significant. The expected complete
lengths of stay were computed from the above results for each
household from the formula:
E[T I XI..Xk ] = exp [Y Var (T)] exp [Co+ CIi+...+Ckk]
The result of this computation was used as the variable ESTLOS
in the probit models of discrete choice and the ordinary least
squares models of key money described in Chapter 6.
The estimated complete stays are uniformly long: the
interquartile range is 24 to 36 years for owners and 20 to 29
years for renters.
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Estimation of the Distribution of Complete Spells of Residence
Coefficients
E [ ln T ]
of Renters
CONSTANT
NPRVDU
AGEMOV
ILLITERATE
READWRITE
UNIVERSITY
MOVREASJOB
MOVREASMAR
MOVREASDIS
Mean
3.47
.269
T-Statistic
33.2
3.50
-. 012 -4.24
.194
.123
.024
2.21
1.40
.27
-. 191 -2.02
-.282 -3.43
-. 265 -2.81
Mean T-Statistic
3.60 20.9
.148 1.05
-. 013 -3.25
.255 1.77
.295 2.53
-. 008 -. 05
-. 082 -. 35
.129 .57
-. 323 1.90
Variance of ln T .046
Number of Observations:
Owners
3.05 .029 1.90
481 Total (336 Renters & 145 Owners)
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Independent Variable Definitions
NPRVDU
AGEMOV
ILLITERATE
READWRITE
UNIVERSITY
MOVREASJOB
MOVREASMAR
MOVREASDIS
Household head reports no previous residenc
(i.e. was born at present residence) [0,1]
Age when household head moved to present
residence
Household head is illiterate [0,1]
Household head can read and write [0,1]
Household head has attended university [0,1]
Job was reason for move to current residence
Marriage was reason for move to current
residence
Displacement (involuntary) was reason for move
to current residence
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